The following is a real-time transcript taken as closed captioning during the oral argument proceedings, and as such, may contain errors. This service is provided solely for the purpose of assisting those with disabilities and should be used for no other purpose. These are not legal documents, and may not be used as legal authority. This transcript is not an official document of the Florida Supreme Court.

William Todd Larimore v. State of Florida

SC06-139

THE NEXT CASE ON OUR
CALENDAR THIS MORNING
LARIMORE VERSUS STATE OF
FLORIDA.
>> GOOD MORNING.
CHIEF JUSTICE LEWIS.
MEMBERS OF THE COURT.
I'M WARD METZGER.
I'M HERE REPRESENT INTODD
LARIMORE.
AS YOU ARE AWARE
MR. LARIMORE IS BEING
PROSECUTED FOR LACK OF A
BETTER WORD IN THE STATE OF
FLORIDA IS SEEKING TO COMMIT
HIM FOR TREATMENT AS A
SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR.
I BELIEVE THE FACTS OF THIS
CASE ARE RELATIVELY
UNDISPUTED.
BUT I WOULD LIKE TO FOCUS ON
ONE FACT THAT I BELIEVE IS
THE MOST CRUCIAL FACT IN, IN
CASE.
THIS -- MR. LARIMORE WAS
SENTENCED YEARS AGO,
COMPLETED HIS SENTENCE.
HE WAS -- HE WAS -- HIS
SENTENCE EXPIRED.
IN YEAR 2000, 26 MONTHS
LATER AFTER HIS SENTENCE
EXPIRED AFTER HIS REMAINED
IN THE PHYSICAL CUSTODY OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS UNLAWFULLY I
MIGHT ADD THE STATE OF
FLORIDA SOUGHT COMMITMENT AS
AN SVP.
I BELIEVE THAT'S THE MOST
CRUCIAL FACT IN THIS CASE
BECAUSE I BELIEVE THERE'S
BUT A SINGLE ISSUE THAT WE
NEED TO RESOLVE.
>> WAS HE IN CUSTODY ON ANY
OFFENSE AT THE TIME THEY
SOUGHT THAT DESIGNATION?
>> LAWFUL CUSTODY, NO HE WAS
NOT.
THERE -- HE HAD --
>> I ASSUME THAT'S A
DISPUTED ISSUE
WHERE -- WHETHER THE CUSTODY
WAS LAWFUL CAN.
>> I THINK THAT'S A FAIR
CHARACTERIZATION.
>> THEN WHY -- WHAT IS YOUR
ARGUMENT THAT THE
DUST -- CUSTODY WAS NOT
LAWFUL.
MY POSITION IS THAT WHEN HE
WAS SENTENCED ON HIS
VIOLATION OF PROBATION
OFFENSE HE WAS NOT GIVEN
TRIP CREDIT AT THAT POINT IN
TIME.
HE WAS RETURNED TO THE
FLORIDA STATE PRISON SYSTEM
WITHOUT BEING GIVEN CREDIT
FOR THIS -- TO THE TIME HE
HAS SERVED.
WHEN HIS SENTENCE WAS
IMPOSED, I BELIEVE IN
FEBRUARY 29th, OF 2000 IT
EXPIRED THAT DAY.
HAD HE PROPERLY BEEN
CREDITED WITH TRIP CREDIT HE
COULD NEVER HAVE BEEN
RETURNED TO THE STATE
PRISON.
SO WHEN THEY DIDN'T CREDIT
HIM PROPERLY, HE THEN GOES
BACK TO PRISON FOR TWO
YEARS.
UNLAWFULLY BECAUSE THE
CREDIT WAS NOT APPLIED.
[INAUDIBLE]
>> HE WAS IN PHYSICAL
CUSTODY.
[INAUDIBLE]
YES, THAT'S TRUE.
THERE ARE THREE CASE, THREE
OR FOUR CASES MOORE,
DUCHARE -- DUCHARME, WHERE
THE STATE IS SEEKING
COMMITMENT BUT THEY ARE
STARTING THE PROCESS.
AND THERE'S SOME CONTACT
BETWEEN SAY DOC AND DCF
WHERE THE STATE ATTORNEY'S
OFFICE WHERE THEY'VE
INITIATED THE PROCESS FOR
COMMITMENT.
[INAUDIBLE]
[INAUDIBLE]
I BELIEVE THE CUSTODY
PURPOSE IS LEGISLATIVE
A -- INTENT.
IF YOU LOOK AT COUPLE OF THE
STATUTE, IF YOU LOOK AT
394.925 THAT'S THE UR REPBT
STATUTE THAT RELATES TO
APPLICABLE OF THE ACT.
IN THAT STATUTE THE ACT
APPLIES TO PEOPLE RA -- THAT
ARE IN SOME FORM OF TOTAL
CONFINEMENT.
I DON'T BELIEVE THERE'S ANY
WAY YOU CAN ARGUE OR ANY WAY
THAT YOU CAN ANALYZE TOTAL
CONFINEMENT OTHER THAN BEING
IN SOME FORM OF PHYSICAL
CUSTODY.
BUT WE HAVE HELD THAT, THAT
CONFINEMENT DOESN'T NEED TO
BE FOR THESE SEXUALLY
VIOLENT OFFENSES.
>> I UNDERSTAND THAT AND I
DON'T HAVE A PROBLEM FOR
THIS CASE.
WITH THAT ANALYSIS.
AS LONG AS YOU WITH LAWFULLY
IN SOME FORM OF
INCARCERATION SERVING SOME
TYPE OF A SENTENCE, THEN I
BELIEVE AT THIS POINT IN
TIME, YES THE STATE CAN SEEK
COMMITMENT.
>> I ASSUME YOUR ARGUMENT
I'M NOT SURE IF IT MATTERS
TODAY.
YOUR ARGUMENT THAT CUSTODY
HAS TO MEAN IN PRISON, NOT
ON PROBATION.
IN PRISON, SERVING A LAWFUL
SENTENCE AND NOT ON
PROBATION.
>> I GUESS THAT'S WHERE THIS
ISSUE ABOUT THE LAW -- IN
THIS SITUATION FOR A COUPLE
OF YEARS --
[INAUDIBLE]
I SHARE THAT FEELING.
[INAUDIBLE]
[INAUDIBLE]
>> I THINK THAT, THAT CAN BE
ANSWERED BY LOOKING AT
SECTION 394.912 SUBSECTION
11.
IN THAT PARTICULAR STATUTE
THERE ARE TWO WAYS THAT THEY
DEFINE TOTAL CONFINEMENT.
ONE OF THEM IS AN INDIVIDUAL
WHO IS CURRENTLY BEING HELD.
I THINK THAT APPLIES TO
SOMEONE WHO IS ALREADY IN
DOC AND IS SERVING A
SENTENCE.
THE SECOND PART OF THAT
SUBSECTION RELATES TO AN
INDIVIDUAL SERVING AN
INCARCERATION SENTENCE.
SO I BELIEVE WHAT THE
LEGISLATURE HAS DONE IS
SPECIFICALLY SAY WE ARE
TARGETED PEOPLE WHO ARE IN
THE FLORIDA STATE PRISON
SYSTEM AND THEY ARE SERVING
SENTENCES.
IF YOU DON'T READ IT THAT
WAY THEN I THINK WE CAN END
UP IN A POSITION WHERE THE
STATE AND LET ME PREFACE IT
WITH THIS.
IN ATKISON THIS COURT SAID
YOU HAVE TO BE IN LAWFUL
CUSTODY AT THE TIME THAT THE
ACT WAS ENACTED.
IN OTHER WORDS IF YOU ARE
OUT ON THE STREET, YOU CAN'T
GO BACK AND PICK SOMEBODY UP
AND BRING THEM IN BUT AS
LONG AS YOU ARE BEING HELD
LAWFULLY IN CUSTODY AT THAT
POINT IN TIME, THE STATE CAN
SEEK THIS TYPE OF
COMMITMENT.
I THINK THAT -- THAT
PRINCIPLE SHOULD BE APPLIED
UNDER THIS SITUATION.
THE REALITY IF YOU DON'T
THEN SOMEBODY WHO COMMITS A
QUALIFYING OFFENSE
SUBSEQUENT TO THE DATE THE
STATUTE WAS ENACTED COULD BE
FOUND GUILT, COULD ENTER A
PLEA, COULD RECEIVE A
SENTENCE, COULD COMPLETE
THAT SENTENCE AND FIVE YEARS
TOWN THE ROAD NEXT YEAR THE
YEAR AFTER THE STATE COULD
THEN GO PICK THEM UP,
SEEKING COMMITMENT.
[INAUDIBLE]
>> IN THE GLOBAL VIEW OF THE
PHILOSOPHY BEHIND THE
STATUTE WHICH IS PROTECTING
SOCIETY FROM THESE
INDIVIDUALS, YES, HE DOES.
BUT I THINK THE LEGISLATURE
HAS LIMITED AND THEY HAVE
LIMITED SPECIFICALLY TO
PEOPLE WHO ARE SERVING
SENTENCES BECAUSE OTHERWISE
AS YOU'VE INDICATED YOU CAN
END UP WITH A TREMENDOUS
POPULATION.
[INAUDIBLE]
>> YES, THAT'S WHAT I
BELIEVE THE ISSUE IS.
AS I INDICATED BASED ON THE
STATUTORY ANALYSIS THAT I
HAVE GONE THROUGH, I THINK
LAWFUL CUSTODY NOW MEANS
AFTER THE AMENDMENTS IN MAY
OF '9 LAWFUL CUSTODY NOW
MEANS YOU HAVE BE SERVING A
SENTENCE.
AND THE REALITY HERE FOR
MR. LARMORE HE WASN'T
SERVING A SENTENCE.
HIS SENTENCE LONG EXPIRED
BEFORE THE STATE EVEN
THOUGHT ABOUT IT.
[INAUDIBLE]
THEY THOUGHT HE WAS.
THAT WAS A MISTAKE THAT THE
STATE MADE.
NOT MR. LARIMORE.
I THINK IF WE DON'T PUT
LIMITATIONS ON IT THEN WE
GET TO THE POINT THAT THE
MAJORITY DISCUSSED IN
ATKISON WHICH YOU CAN LEAD
TO ABSURD RESULTS OR THINGS
THAT ARE FUNDAMENTALLY
UNFAIR.
IF WE HAVE A MAN WHO HAS
BEEN INCARCERATED FOR OVER
SEVEN YEARS NOW BEYOND THE
EXPIRATION OF THIS SENTENCE,
AND HE HAS IN MY OPINION NOT
BEEN LAWFULLY INCARCERATED
SINCE I GUESS FEBRUARY 29th
OF 2000.
>> DID YOUR DEFINITION OF
CUSTODY IN YOUR MIND
AND -- IS IT EQUIVALENT TO
TOTAL CONFINEMENT, TOTAL
CONFINEMENT SPECIFICALLY
DEFINED IT THE STATUTE?
>> TOTAL CONFINEMENT IS
DEFINED IT THE STATUTE.
>> IT'S JUST NOT IN PRISON
OR THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
OR ANY OTHER SECURE FACILITY
FOR ANY OTHER REASON.
>> YES, I AGREE WITH THAT
FOR OUR PURPOSES WITH
MR. LARIMORE, SINCE HE WAS
IN DOC THAT'S WHY I'M
REFERRING TO PRISON.
BECAUSE THAT'S WHERE HE
PHYSICALLY IS.
TOTAL CONFINEMENT INVOLVE
BEING IN A SECURE FACILITY
SERVING SOME TYPE OF A
SENTENCE.
THAT HAVE EXPANDED IT SO IF
YOU ARE NOT WITHIN A DOC
FACILITY, AS LONG AS YOU
HAVE BEEN SENTENCED, YOU'RE
SERVING THE SENTENCE YOU CAN
BE IN ANOTHER FAT.
YOU CAN BE IN A HOSPITAL
SOMEWHERE.
AND THEY CAN GET YOU THERE.
IN MY VIEW THERE WAS A POINT
IN TIME WHERE MR. LARIMORE
WAS IN TOTAL CONFINEMENT
SERVING A SENTENCE, AND THAT
WAS FEBRUARY 29th OF 2000
WHEN HE WAS SENTENCED.
AT THAT POINT IN TIME HE IS
SERVING A SENTENCE.
AND HAD THE STATE COME IN AT
THAT POINT IN TIME WITH WITH
A PETITION OR WITH A WARRENT
OR SOMETHING TO INITIATE THE
PROCESS, I THINK THAT WE
WOULDN'T BE ARGUING THIS
TODAY, BECAUSE THEY WOULD
HAVE TIMELY STARTED THIS.
THE FACT IS THAT, THAT
SENTENCE EXPIRED THAT DAY
AND HE WAS NO LONGER SERVING
A SENTENCE TWO YEARS LATER.
>> DID HE HAVE CUSTODY.
>> HE'S IN THE FLORIDA CIVIL
COMMITMENT FACILITY WHICH IS
THE DCF FACILITY, SOMEWHERE
IN SOUTH FLORIDA.
>> HE'S ALREADY GONE THROUGH
THE PROCEDURE OR IN ABEYANCE
OF THIS --
>> IT IS STAYED AT THIS
POINT IN TIME.
THERE ARE A COUPLE OF OTHER
ISSUES THAT WE ARE TRYING TO
DEAL WITH.
BUT A THIS POINT THE TRIAL
JUDGE DECIDED TO WAIT --
[INAUDIBLE]
>> TPHFL THIS IS FAIRLY
TYPICAL FOR THOSE CASES.
THEY GO ON FOR YEARS.
[INAUDIBLE]
>> IF I UNDERSTAND YOUR
QUESTION DID I NOTIFY YOU
THAT HE DID NOT --
>> NO I DIDN'T.
I TAKE IT THERE HAVE BEEN
SOME PRELIMINARY MENTAL
HEALTH EVALUATIONS THAT HAVE
CLASSIFIED IN THIS CATEGORY.
>> I WOULD ASSUME SO.
BECAUSE THE PREDICATE TO
START THIS IS THAT THERE'S A
MULTIDISPHREUBNARY TEAM AND
THEY DO, IN FACT, CONDUCT
SOME REVIEW OF THE RECORDS.
AND PERHAPS IF THERE ARE ANY
EXISTING PSYCHOLOGICAL OR
PSYCHIATRIC REPORTS.
>> DID HE HAVE WHAT HAS BEEN
PHYSICALLY EXAMINED BY
SOMEONE AND WHAT YOU TERMED
TO BE ILLEGAL CUSTODY.
WAS HE PHYSICALLY EXAMINED
WHILE IN CUSTODY.
>> I CAN'T ANSWER THAT
QUESTION.
I'M NOT HIS TRIAL ATTORNEY.
I'M NOT SURE OF WHAT THE
STATUS OF WHAT HAS OR HAS
NOT BEEN DONE.
>> I SEE I'M GETTING CLOSE
THE REBUTTAL TIME.
THIS -- AT THIS POINT I
WOULD RELINGUISH TO
MR. MCCOY.
>> OKAY.
>> GOOD MORNING, YOUR HONOR.
CHARLIE MCCOY ON THE BEHALF
OF THE STATE.
OUR MAIN ARGUMENT HAS TWO
STRAIGHT FORWARD STEPS.
THE FIRST IS THE APPROPRIATE
PWAEUGS AT LEAST UNDER
MR. LARIMORE FACTS HAS
SATISFIED CUSTODY AS USED IN
THE STATUTE.
THIS ISSUE 394.925 THE SCOPE
OF THE ACT PROVISION.
AND THE FACT THAT HE WAS ON
PROBATION -- THAT'S ALL BEEN
THAT HE WAS LAWFULLY ON
PROBATION AS OF JANUARY 1st,
199 WHEN THE RYCE ACT TOOK
EFFECT.
AND AFTER THAT THE FAILURE
OF THE STATE TO FILE A
PETITION WHILE HE WAS IN
LAWFUL CUSTODY IS NOT A
JURISDICTIONAL BAR.
WE HAVE A PARALLEL ARGUMENT
THAT HE WAS DEFINED AT THE
TIME THAT HE WAS RESENTENCED
AND, AGAIN THE FAILURE TO
HAVE THAT PETITION FILED
WHILE HE WAS TOTALLY
CONFINED IS NOT A
JURISDICTIONAL MATTER.
[INAUDIBLE]
>> AS FAR AS A MATTER OF
FACIAL APPLICABLE OF THE ACT,
YES, YOUR HONOR.
WE DO ARGUE OVER WHAT
CUSTODY MEANS.
AND THE FIRST THING I WANT
TO POINT OUT TO YOU, YOUR
HONOR --
[INAUDIBLE]
>> NOT IN THE WAY YOU
STATED.
FIRST OFF THE --
>> YOU ARE NOT REALLY SAYING
IT'S SOMEBODY'S BELIEF --
[INAUDIBLE]
>> IF THEY WERE IN CUSTODY
WHATEVER THAT TERM MEANS
THEN THE LAW CAN BE APPLIED
TO IT.
NOW, THIS CASE ILLUSTRATES
THAT.
HE WAS IN UNLAWFUL CUSTODY
FROM THE STATE'S PERSPECTIVE
BY VIRTUAL OF HIS
ACTUAL -- FACT ACTUAL OF
PROBATION IN THE REASON
WE'RE ASKING THE COURT TO
ACKNOWLEDGE AND HOLD THE
CUSTODY MEANS MORE THAN
TOTAL CONFINEMENT.
THE LEGISLATURE DELIBERATELY
LEFT THAT TERM IN.
LESS THAN A YEAR LATER WHEN
THEY INSERTED THE
CONFINEMENT LANGUAGE.
AND THIS COURT RECENTLY HELD
IN MADDUX CASE THE USE OF
DIFFERENT TERMINOLOGY IN THE
SAME STATUTE IS STRONG
EVIDENCE THAT A DIFFERENT
MEANING WAS INTENDED.
SECONDLY AND LET'S GO TO THE
GLOBAL PURPOSE OF THE "JIMMY
RYCE" ACT TO PROTECT PEOPLE
FROM VIOLENT SEXUAL
PREDATORS.
HERE YOU HAD A MAN THAT WAS
PUT ON PROBATION.
HE WAS ON PROBATION ONLY
ABOUT 2 1/2 MONTHS BEFORE
THE RYCE ACT TOOK EFFECT.
HE HAD AGREED AS PART OF
PLEA BARGAIN TWO SPECIAL
CONDITIONS OF PROBATION THAT
COINCIDE OR AMERICAN WITH
THE PURPOSE OF THE RYCE ACT
AND THAT WAS IN THE
SUPPLEMENTAL OF THIS COURT
ACCEPTED LAST DECEMBER HE
AGREED NOT TO HAVE ANY
CONTACT WITH SIX OR SEVEN
NAMED INDIVIDUALS I ASSUME
WERE WOMEN OR PINEORS.
AND NOT TO HAVE ANY CONTACT
WITH ANY MINOR UNTIL HIS OUT
OF THE PROGRAM.
UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES
IT'S ABSURD TO SAY THE RYCE
ACT WASN'T AVAILABLE.
NOW AS I.
>> DO YOU AGREE THAT THE
OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE ACT
PROVIDE FOR WHAT THE
DEPARTMENT OR THE STATE CAN
DO IF THE DEFENDANT IS ABOUT
TO BE IMMEDIATELY RELEASED
FROM PRISON FROM THE TOTAL
COB FINEMENT AND HOW THEY
CAN EXPEDITE
THE -- CONFINEMENT AND HOW
THEY CAN EXPEDITE TO
DETERMINE WHETHER HE'S A
SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR
ELIGIBLE FOR CIVIL
COMMITMENT.
>> YES, YOUR HONOR.
THAT'S ONE OF THE STRONGEST
POINTS FOR THE STATE'S
ARGUMENT THAT THE FILING IS
NOT JURISDICTIONAL IN BOTH
OF YOUR SLOW TRACK FOR
COMMITMENT THE PREFERRED ONE
THAT THE PROCEDURE IS DONE,LY
BY THE TIME THEY WOULD BE
RELEASED FROM PRISON AND THE
FAST TRACK YOUR HONOR
REFERRED WHICH IS 394.195
THE FAST TRACK, THE
LEGISLATURE WENT OUT OF ITS
WAY TO SAY THE PROVISIONS
ARE NOT JURISDICTIONAL.
MY POINT IS THAT THESE OTHER
PROVISIONS SEEM TO ASSUME OR
EMAPPLY THAT THESE
DEFENDANTS WILL BE IN TOTAL
CONFINEMENT AS SOME POINT
AND IT'S THE DANGER OF THEM
BEING RELEASED FROM PRISON
AND OUT INTO THE GENERAL
POPULATION THAT ALLOWS THE
STATE TO INVOKE THIS FAST
TRACK PROCESS.
IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IF THE
STATUTE CONTEMPLATED THAT
THE DEFENDANT WOULD ALREADY
BE OUT IN THE PUBLIC
POPULATION THEY WOULDN'T
HAVE THESE FAST TRACK
PROCEDURES.
>> WELL THE FAST TRACK
PROCEDURE, YOUR HONOR IS ONE
FOR WHEN RELIEF -- RELEASE
BECOMES IMMEDIATE IT'S NO
FAULT OF THE STATE.
LET'S GIVE YOU TWO REAL
WORLD EXAMPLE.
SOMEONE GETS POST CONVICTION
RELIEF AND ALL OF A SUDDEN
DAY ARE DUE TO BE OUT.
ANOTHER EXAMPLE SOMEBODY
SENTENCED AT THE TIME
SERVED.
EITHER AS PART OF A PLEA
BARGAIN AND I BRING THAT UP.
>> THAT'S WHAT I'M SAYING.
THE WHOLE STATUTORY SCHEME
SEEMS TO ASSUME THAT THE
DEFENDANTS TO WHOM THE ACT
APPLIES ARE ALL CURRENTLY IN
CONFINEMENT, NOT OUT ON
PROBATION SOMEWHERE.
BUT IN CONFINEMENT.
>> THAT'S TRUE OF THE FUTURE
IF YOU WILL, YOUR HONOR FROM
EFFECT THETIVE DAY FOR WHEN
SOMEBODY.
>> HOW WOULD THE STATUTE
DISTINGUISHLOGICALLY FROM
PEOPLE CURRENTLY IN CUSTODY
AS YOU SAY THIS PART A AN
MRIES TO PERSON CURRENTLY
THIS CUSTODY SO AS TO THOSE
PERSONS CURRENTLY IN CUSTODY
THEY COULD BE OUT ON
PROBATION, BUT AFTER THOSE
SENTENCED TO TOTAL
CONFINEMENT IN THE FUTURE
THEY HAVE TO BE TOTALLY
CONFINED.
WHAT'S THE LOGIC BEHIND
MAKING A DISTINCTION LIKE
THAT?
>> THE LEGISLATURE I'M
SURE -- WELL THEY WANT TO DO
AT LEAST TWO THINGS OF THAT
TOTAL CONFINEMENT LANGUAGE.
SUPPOSE SOMEONE COMMITTED A
SEXUALLY VIOLENT OFFENSE OR
ANOTHER OFFENSE IN THE
FUTURE AFTER THE LAW TOOK
EFFECT.
BUT THEIR SENTENCE WAS NOT
ONE OF IMPRISONMENT.
IT WAS FROM PWAEUGS ONLY.
THEY WOULDN'T BE SUBJECT TO
THE ACT.
THAT'S IN THE FUTURE.
THE OTHER THING THEY DID IF
THEY INCLUDED NOT JUST
PRISON OR JAIL OPERATED BY
JUVENILE, SO THAT I SUSPECT
THAT THE IDEA THERE WAS IF
SOMEONE WERE CONFINED THAT
INDICATE NOT GUILT BY VIRTUE
OF INSANITY OR MENTAL RYCE
ACT.
THEY COULD BE SUBJECT OF THE
ACT TO PREVENT THEM FROM
BEING RELEASED AFTER IS
CERTAIN AMOUNT OF TIME.
THEY DIDN'T -- THE
LEGISLATURE DIDN'T REQUIRE
PRISON, IF YOU WILL.
BUT THEY NEVERTHELESS LEFT
THIS WORD CUSTODY SITTING
BACK THERE.
AND WITH FULL KNOWLEDGE THAT
CUSTODY EVEN IN THE CRIMINAL
CONTEXT AND JIMMY RYCE DOES
HAVE A BACK TKPWROP OF
CRIMINAL CONTEXT BECAUSE YOU
HAVE ALL YOUR QUALIFYING
OFFENSE BUT THE NATURE OF
YOUR SENTENCE DETERMINES THE
APPLY KABL OF THE ACT TO
YOU.
AND THIS COURT HAS
RECOGNIZED IN A CRIMINAL
CONTEXT THE CUSTODY,
PROBATION AND THE CUSTODY
AND THAT'S IN THE BOLLYEA
CASE WHERE YOU SAID BECAUSE
OF THE PURPOSE OF POST
CONVICTION WOULD BE 8 -- 380.5.
>> I'M SURE THE LEGISLATURE
WAS AWARE OF CUSTODY AND
THEY CHOSE TO LEAVE THAT IN
THE STATUTE.
I WANT TO EMPHASIZE
SOMETHING ABOUT THE TIME
LINE HERE.
OF COURSE MR. LARIMORE'S
ORIGINAL IMPRISONMENT RAN
OUT IN '982 1/2 MONTHS
BEFORE THE RYCE ACT TOOK
EFFECT.
HE WAS ON PROBATION.
HE WAS ON PROBATION ABOUT
THE YEAR OR SO WHEN HE
VIOLATED.
AT THAT TIME HE WAS HELD IN
COUNTY JAIL A WHILE AND THEY
HAD THE HEARING AND HE GOT
FIVE YEARS.
THE WHOLE TRIP ISSUE -- A
COUPLE OF YEARS AFTER THAT,
HE WAS SERVING THAT FIVE
YEAR THE STATE FILED THE
FIRST PETITION WHICH
COINCIDENTLY WAS -- HE WAS
ON HIS FIVE YEARS PROBATION
AND THAT CONTINUES
UNINTERRUPTED.
IN ANTICIPATION OF BEING
RELEASED FROM THE FIVE YEAR
RESENTENCING THEN THE FIRST
DCA IN LARIMORE ONE SAID NO
UNDER TRIP HE WAS ENTITLED
TO FULL CREDIT SO HE
COULDN'T BE.
I WANT TO GO TO A COMMENT
YOU MADE JUSTICE PARENT.
YOU SAID YOU SHUTTERED WHEN
YOU HEARD A TRIP CREDIT.
IN THE GUIDELINES ANYTHING
ELSE YOU CAN SAY ABOUT THEM
THEY WERE INFROM INDICATE IN
THEIR APPLICATION OF THE
FACTS IN THE STATE MADE AN
HONEST MISTAKE OF LAW BOTH
THE ORIGINAL AND THE
PROBATION THEN WHEN DOC
FORFEITED HIS GAIN TIME THEY
RESTORED ABOUT SEVEN YEARS
OF JAIL TIME, THE SECOND
TIME AND THEN TWO YEARS WENT
BY ROUGHLY INVALIDATE THE
FIRST SENTENCE THEN ANOTHER
TWO YEARS AND THEY SAY YOU
CAN'T FORFEIT THE GAME TIME.
TWO MISTAKES OF LAW AT BEST
HE WAS STILL IN TOTAL
CONFINEMENT ALL THE TIME
EVEN AGREES HE'S IN PHYSICAL
CUSTODY.
I SUBMIT HE WAS LAWFULLY IN
CUSTODY -- CUSTODY AT LEAST
AT THE TIME DOC HAS TO
FIGURE OUT WHAT HIS NEW
SENTENCE WOULD BE AFTER THE
FIRST.
>> COULDN'T HE BE THE ONE TO
BENEFIT FROM THE STATE
MISTAKE.
IT WASN'T HIS MISTAKE.
IT WAS THE STATE'S MISTAKE
WHETHER A MISTAKE OF LAW OR
FACT.
IT'S A MIST STAEUBG.
WHY SHOULD HE NOT BENEFIT
SINCE HE IS -- IF HE CAN
FACT DEMONSTRATE HE WAS NOT
LAWFULLY IN CUSTODY.
AT THE TIME OF.
>> HE DID BENEFIT BY GETTING
THE SENTENCES VACATED.
E PHRAEBGS -- EXPLAIN WHITE
SO MUCH --
>> HE BENEFITTED BY GETTING
THE UNLAWFUL SENTENCE
VACATED.
THAT WAS HIS IMMEDIATE
BENEFIT.
THE WHOLE POINT SHOULD HE
BENEFIT BECAUSE HE WAS NOT
LAWFULLY IN KUFPTDY AND
POSSIBLY THE STATE HAS NO
RIGHT TO THEN FILE A JIMMY
RYCE.
>> YOUR HONOR, THAT THE FACT
HE WAS BEING HELD THROUGH
WHAT YEARS LATER DETERMINED
TO BE THE STATE LAW EXPLAINS
WHY THERE'S SO MANY DELAY.
THERE'S NO NEED TO FILE ONE
IF SOMEONE HAS YEARS OF JAIL
TIME LEFT TO GO.
I WANTED TO EXPLAIN WHY SO
MUCH TIME WENT BY.
AS FAR AS SHOULD HE BE ABLE
TO BENEFIT.
TAKE THE DEFENDING POSITION
AND.
THEY HAVE LAWFUL CUSTODY
43 -- FOR THE OPINION AND
THE THREE DISSENTERS,
RELYING ON THE NUMBER OF
CALIFORNIA CASES SAID ACTUAL
CUSTODY WHERE HONEST MISTAKE
OF LAW SHOULD EVEN THOUGH
LATER DETERMINED UNLAWFUL
SHOULDN'T DEFEAT.
I'M NOT ASKING THIS COURT
TO.
WHERE THE VERY IMPORTANT
COMPELLING PUBLIC PURPOSE OF
THE RYCE ACT IS FRUSTRATED
THROUGH INTRICATE
APPLICATION OF THE
SENTENCING GUIDELINES YEARS
AFTER OF COURSE THEY'VE BEEN
REPLACED BY THE CURRENT
CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT.
AGAIN, IT WOULD NOT HURT THE
ANSWER FROM THE OTHER SIDE.
ONLY A YEAR LATER THEY CAME
BACK AND AMENDED THAT
LANGUAGE.
>> I'M READING SECTION
394.915 SECTION 2, AND IT
SAY UPON THE EXPIRATION AND
INCARCERATION OF THE
SENTENCE AND RELEASE ON THE
CIVIL WHO WOULD
MULTIDISCIPLINARY TEAM
RECOMMEND FOR THE COURT MAY
CONDUCT A HEARING.
AND THEN LATER ON IN SECTION
4 IT SAYS IF THE COURT
CONCLUDES THAT THERE IS
PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE
THE PERSON IS SEXUALLY
VIOLENT PREDATOR, THE COURT
SHALL ORDER AT THE PERSON BE
HELD IN THE APPROPRIATE
SECURE FACILITY UPON THE
EXPIRATION OF HIS OR HER
INCARCERATIVE SENTENCE.
IF YOU LOOK AT SECTION 2 AND
4 TOGETHER, WHEN THE STATUTE
IS TALKING ABOUT RELEASE
FROM CUSTODY, IT'S TALKING
ABOUT RELEASE FROM TOTAL
CONFINEMENT.
NOT FROM PROBATION.
>> YOUR HONOR, WE WOULD
AGREE THAT CERTAINLY THAT'S
THE MOST COMMON EXAMPLE AND
EVEN THE PREFERRED METHOD IF
YOU WILL FOR COMMITTING
SOMEONE ON THE RYCE ACT THAT
SLOW-TRACK COMMITMENT
PROCESS.
>> THE WHOLE POINT OF THIS
TEAM IS WE DON'T WANT TO LET
PEOPLE OUT ON THE STREET IF
THEY ARE IN EMINENT DANGER
OF COMMITTING A SEXUALLY
VIOLENT OFFENSE WHICH THEY
HAVE ALREADY DONE ONCE.
I SEATS LIKE IT WOULD BE
CONTRARY TO THE INTENT OF
THE LEGISLATURE IF WE SAID,
WELL, WE'VE LET THEM OUT ON
THE STREET FOR ONE OR TWO OR
THREE YEARS ON PROBATION BUT
NOW WE WILL BRING THEM BACK
IN.
>> WE ARE.
BUT WHY WOULD THE
LEGISLATURE THEN GO BACK AND
THOSE PROCEDURES BY WHICH
SOMEONE IS COMMITTED?
EITHER THE SLOW TRACK OR THE
FAST TRACK AND EXPRESSLY SAY
THESE PROVISIONS THE TIME
LIMITS ARE NOT
JURISDICTIONAL IN ONE OF THE
TWO PROVISIONS THE
LEGISLATURE EVEN GOES TO THE
TO SAY NO WAY PREVENT THE
STATE ATTORNEY FROM
PROCEEDING AGAINST SOMEONE
WHO IS OTHERWISE SUBJECT TO
COMMITMENT UNDER THE ACT.
>> I AGREE WITH YOU.
AND THAT -- BUT THAT SEEMS
TO ME TO SAY THAT IF THE
STATE BEGINS PROCEEDING BUT
CANNOT FINISH PROCEEDING
BEFORE THE PERSON IS
RELEASED, THAT WON'T BE A
JURISDICTIONAL BAR TO
CONTINUE THE PROCEEDING
AGAINST THAT INDIVIDUAL.
BUT IF THERE'S NOT
NECESSARILY A MEANS THAT
SOMEBODY WHO IS ALREADY BEEN
RELEASED BEFORE PROCEEDING
ARE INSTITUTED, CAN STILL BE
OF COMMITTED.
>> LET'S TAKE THE FACTUAL
EXAMPLE.
YOUR HONOR.
I LIKE TO USE THE FACTS IN
THESE.
YOU HAVE ALL ANOTHER CASE
PENDING BEFORE YOU MOORE
ACE.
ANOTHER RYCE ACT CASE
PENDING OUTCOME IN THIS ONE.
PERHAPS THE MOORE CASE
SHOULD BE THE LEAD ON THIS
ISSUE.
WHAT HAPPENED THERE HE
COMMITTED HIS SEXUALLY
VIOLENT OFFENSES IN OHIO IN
THE EARLY 90s.
SERVED THAT TIME, CAME TO
FLORIDA.
IN 2002 HE WAS PROSECUTED
FOR FAILURE TO REGISTER AS A
SEX OFFENDER AND TOOK ABOUT
TWO YEARS IN THAT JUDGMENT
SATISFIED VACATED.
I DON'T KNOW WHAT THE
GROUNDS GROUNDS FOR RELIEF
WERE.
HE ENTERED A PLEA TO THAT
SAME OFFENSE AND IN RETURN
HE GETS TIME SERVED.
HE'S IMMEDIATELY TURNED
LOOSE.
STATE STARTS THE COMMITMENT
PROCEEDING.
IT'S THE SAME ISSUE.
YOU'RE TALKING SOMEONE WHO
IS RECOMMENDED FOR
COMMITMENT WHO ACTUALLY BY
FAILING TO REGISTER COMMITS
AN OFFENSE AT LEAST RELATED
TO THE VIOLENT OFFENSE WOULD
BE TURNING THEM LOOSE TO
PREVENT THAT FROM HAPPENING
AND THEN THERE'S A
JURISDICTIONAL BAR THEY ARE
RELEASED BEFORE THE
ASSESSMENT.
AND KEEP IN MIND THE STATE
ATTORNEY HAS A CONDITION
PRECEDENT TO BRING "JIMMY
RYCE" ACT HAS TO HAVE THE
WRITTEN REPORT OF THE
MULTIDISCIPLINARY TEAM AND
TO OTHER CASES THAT'S A
STATUTORY REQUIREMENT
BECAUSE IT SAYS FOLLOWING
RESEAT OF THE RAIN REPORT
THE STATE ATTORNEY CAN
PETITION IN THE CIRCUIT
COURT COMMITMENT.
OTHER CASE LAW SAID WHAT HAS
TO BE A FAVORABLY
RECOMMENDATION.
YOU HAVE TO WAIT UNTIL THE
ON SHORT NOTICE PERHAPS THE
MULTIDISCIPLINARY TEAM HAS
DONE THEIR WORK AND OF
COURSE RECOMMENDED
COMMITMENT BEFORE THE
INITIAL PETITION CAN EVEN BE
FILED.
>> I WANT TO GO BACK TO
PROBATION PART.
BECAUSE THERE'S THIS CASE
AND IT'S GIVING MORE OF
COURSE THE FACTS OF THE
CASES ARE GOING TO EVOKE A
SEEMSAL OR PSYCHOLOGICAL
RESPONSES.
MY CONCERN IS THAT YOU'RE
ALTERNATIVE ARGUMENT ABOUT
SOMEONE BEING ON PROBATION,
IF THE IDEA, THEN WOULD BE
THAT YOU'RE SAYING THAT THIS
STATE WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT
TO TAKE ANYBODY ON PROBATION
FOR ANYTHING IT WOULDN'T
HAVE TO BE A SEXUAL OFFENSE,
AND DETERMINE HAVE THEM
SUBJECTED TO EXAMINATION BY
A MULTIDISCIPLINARY TEAM AND
POTENTIALLY TO SEE
COMMITMENT.
IS THAT YOUR ON THE
PROBATION ISSUE?
BECAUSE YOU'VE GOT SEVERAL
DIFFERENT WAYS TO PERHAPS GO
WITH THIS, BUT THAT SEEMS TO
BE WHAT YOUR URGE IS THIS
IDEA THAT PROBATION DOESN'T
MATTER, AGAIN
WHETHER -- WHETHER THE
LEGISLATURE HAS A
DIFFERENTIATED IF THEY WERE
CONTEND -- INTHE -- INTENDING
TO INCLUDE --
>> IF YOU ALL AGREE
PROBATION EQUALS CUSTODY.
IF PROBATION AS OF JANUARY
1st, 1999, IF A PERSON IS
PUT ON PROBATION ONLY AFTER
THAT TIME, OR THEY HAD TO BE
TOTALLY CONFINED.
WE'RE TALKING ABOUT THE
CUSTODY, THE PROVISION OF
THE RYCE ACT.
--
>> WAIT, WAIT.
SO YOU SAY THE LEGISLATURE
SET UP ONLY PEOPLE ON
PROBATION IN 1999 WOULD BE
SUBJECT --
>> NO, YOUR HONOR.
I'M SAYING THEY HAVE TO BE
IN CUSTODY.
IT SAYS THAT I HAVE TO BE IN
CUSTODY.
WE'RE SAYING CUSTODY
ENCOMPASSES MORE THAN TOTAL
CONFINE.
JUSTICE PAEUFRPBT IS ASKING
A RATHER STRAIGHT
FORWARD -- JUSTICE PARIENTE
IS ASKING THE RATHER
STRAIGHT FORWARD QUESTION.
LET ME TRY TO ASK IT.
LET'S SAY WE HAVE THE
CRIMINAL FROM OHIO TRB
DEFENDANT HERE THAT THE
RELEASED BUT THEN LATER IT
GETS ARRESTED FOR DUI OR DWI
OR WHATEVER.
AND IS SENTENCED TO
PROBATION.
>> PROBATION ONLY.
>> PROBATION ONLY.
>> SO IS THE STATE'S
ARGUMENT HERE.
NOW THAT THE -- HE HAS BEEN
PUT ON PROBATION, TOTALLY
SEPARATE OFFENSE, THAT THE
STATE CAN NOW REACH OUT AND
IMPOSE THE "JIMMY RYCE" ACT
ON THAT PERSON THAT
OTHERWISE WOULD NOT HAVE
BEEN ELIGIBLE.
AND SO IS IT THE STATE'S
POSITION THAT BECAUSE THAT
PERSON IS PUT ON PROBATION
FOR DUI AND DWI THAT THE
STATE NOW HAS A HOOK TO
IMPOSE THE "JIMMY RYCE" ACT
THAT IT DIDN'T HAVE BEFORE.
IS THAT THE STATE'S POSITION
OR NOT?
>> I ASSUME FROM YOUR
QUESTION IF THE PERSON IS
NOT IN CUSTODY --
>> THE ONLY POSSIBLE CUSTODY
NOW IN TERMS OF USING THE
ACT IS THIS PROBATION -- NO,
YOUR HPBOR.
IF THEY WERE NOT IN CUSTODY
AT ALL.
THEY HAVE TO BE SENTENCED TO
TOTAL CONFINEMENT IN THE
FUTURE.
DOESN'T HAVE TO BE FOR
SEXUAL OFFENSE.
IF THEY ARE NOT
SENTENCE -- SENTENCED TO
TOTAL CONFINEMENT IN THE
FUTURE, YOU'RE EXAMPLE IS
PROBATION AND DUI THEN THEY
WOULDN'T BE SUBJECT TO THE
ACT.
>> WE'RE TALKING ABOUT THE
OPERATION OF THE ACT FOR
PURPOSES NOW OF BEING IN
CUSTODY WHEN YOU INITIATE
THE PROCEEDING IN THE SAME
ISSUE THAT'S INVOLVED IN
THIS CASE.
>> CUSTODY UNDER THE DUI
ENOUGH PROBATION?
>> NO, YOUR HONOR,
THE -- LET'S TAKE THIS
DEFENDANT.
EVERYTHING HAS --
>> THE STATE DIDN'T MAKE THE
MISTAKES.
SO HE GOT OUT WHEN HE WAS
SUPPOSED TO GET OUT AND
THAT'S GONE.
NOW HE COMMITS A DUI AND HE
IS PUT ON PROBATION.
PROBATION ONLY.
RIGHT.
>> HE -- HE WOULD STILL BE
SUBJECT TO THE ACT BY
VIRTUE.
>> WELL, YOUR HONOR I HAVE
TO MAKE SURE I UNDERSTAND
YOUR QUESTION CORRECTLY IN
IF YOU AGREE WITH THE
STATE'S ARGUE PROBATION
EQUALS CUSTODY, THEN YES HE
WOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE ACT.
IF YOU SAY -- WELL, NO
THAT'S THE WE'LL POINT.
>> I'M ASKING WHETHER WE
AGREE WITH IT.
WE'RE ASKING WHETHER THAT'S
THE POSITION OF THE STATE.
AND THE POSITION OF THE --
>> THE POSITION OF THE
PROBATION AND AND DUI WOULD
GIVE THE STATE A HOOK NOW TO
ACT WHEREAS IT DIDN'T HAVE
THE AUTHORITY TO INITIATE
PROCEEDING.
>> THE HOOK WOULD HAVE BEEN
HE WAS IN CUSTODY AS ON
JANUARY 1st, 1999 YOUR
HONOR.
NOT BECAUSE HE GOT A
PROBATIONARY ONLY SENTENCE
FOR THE DUI.
LET ME -- IF I COULD CLARIFY
WHAT IS GOING TO BECOME THE
MORE NORM IN THE OPERATION
OF THE ACT AS TIME PASSES.
PEOPLE WILL BE COMMITTING
THEIR QUALIFYING OFFENSES
AND SENTENCE TO PRISON.
THEY GET OUT, THEY ARE
IN -- THEY ARE OUT.
THEY COMMIT A NEW CRIME.
THIS NEW CRIME THEY WOULDN'T
BE SUBJECT TO THE ACT.
THE FORWARD PROVISION AND --
[INAUDIBLE]
>> YOU'VE USED UP YOUR TIME.
>> OUR LAST STATEMENT IS BY
THE FACT THAT HE WAS IN
CUSTODY BY BEING ON
PROBATION OR TOTALLY
CONFINED WHILE WAITING TO BE
RESENTENCED HE WAS SUBJECT
TO THE ACT THE FACT THAT
STATE FILED THE PETITION
AFTERWARD WAS NOT A
JURISDICTIONAL ARTICLE.
>> THANK YOU.
THANK YOU.
>> REBUTTAL.
I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A NOTE
FOUR BRIEF POINTS.
I THINK WE CAN ANSWER THE
PROBATION -- PUT YOUR
MICROPHONE DOWN.
>> SORRY.
>> THERE YOU GO.
I THINK WE CAN ANSWER THE
QUESTION OF WHETHER
PROBATION EQUALS CUSTODY
VERY SIMPLY BY LOOKING AT
THE STATUTE.
NOT ONE PLACE IN THAT
STATUTE IS THE WORD
PROBATION MENTIONED.
THEY TALK ABOUT CUSTODY,
THEY TALK ABOUT TOTAL
CONFINEMENT THEY TALK ABOUT
SERVING AN INCARETATIVE
SENTENCE.
THE LEGISLATURE INTENDED
THAT PROBATIONER BE SUBJECT
O THIS ACT THEY COULD HAVE
SAID THEY NEVER DID.
THERE WAS A DISTRICT COURT
OF APPEAL CASE SIDDAL, AND
THIS THAT CASE THE DISTRICT
COURT SAID PROBATIONERS ARE
NOT SUBJECT TO THE ACT.
THAT WAS SIX OR SEVEN YEARS
AGO.
THE LEGISLATURE HAS HAD SIX
OR SEVEN YEARS TO INCLUDE
PROBATION AND THEY HAVE NOT.
MY POSITION FOR PROBATION IS
NOT APPLY.
>> THAT CASE DEALS WITH SOME
OTHER AREA CANNOT BE APPLIED
IN THIS AREA THAT'S SAYS
THAT PROBATION EQUATES TO
CUFF DITT.
>> YES.
>> MR. MCCOY POISED THE
QUESTION OF WHY WAS CUSTODY
LEFT IN THE STATUTE?
AND I THINK THAT'S VERY
SIMPLE.
THE LEGISLATURE, A WANTS TO
LIMIT THE POPULATION THAT WE
ARE TARGETING FOR THESE
COMMITMENT PROCESSES AND AS
JUSTICE CANTERO DISCUSSED
THEY ARE FOCUSING ON PEOPLE
WHO ARE IN PRISON AND WE
DON'T WANT TO LET THEM OUT.
SO THAT WE'RE TRYING TO
CAPTURE THAT POPULATION.
THE LEGISLATURE HAS LIMITED
AND I THINK IF YOU APPLY
THAT THE PEOPLE TO PEOPLE ON
THE STREETS WE MAY END UP
HAVING SOME SERIOUS DUE
PROCESS ISSUE THAT AREN'T
PRESS SEPBT WHEN YOU'RE
TALKING ABOUT PEOPLE IN
CUSTODY.
IT'S ALSO BEEN PRESENT THAT
THE STRONGEST ARGUMENT IS
THAT SPECIFIC STATUTE
LANGUAGE THAT FAILURE TO
COMPLY WITH THE TIME PERIODS,
THE EXPEDITED ONES FOR
SOMEONE WHO IS EMINENTLY
GOING TO BE RELEASED OR THE
YEAR 1/2 START THE
NOTIFICATION PROCESS THOSE
ARE NOT JURISDICTIONAL.
AND I RECOGNIZE THAT SOME OF
THE LOWER COURTS INCLUDING
THE FIRST DISTRICT IN
MR. LARIMORE'S CASE HAVE
RELIED ON THAT.
I DON'T THINK THAT'S
APPROPRIATE STATUTORY
ANALYSIS.
THE STATUTE ITSELF SAYS THAT
THE FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH
THESE TIME PERIODS, THESE
SCREENING PERIODS, THESE
PERIODS WHERE YOU NOTIFY
VARIOUS AGENCY IS NOT
JURISDICTIONAL IF YOU ARE
OTHERWISE SUBJECT TO THE
PROVISIONS OF THIS PART.
PART, I THINK REFERS TO THE
ENTIRE JIMMY RYCE STATUTE.
THAT'S --
>> PART 5 OF CHAPTER 394.
>> YES, YES, SIR.
THAT'S THE INTERPRETATION
THAT THE GORDON COURT
REACHED.
AND I BELIEVE THAT'S THE
APPROPRIATE INTERPRETATION.
LET ME ADDRESS MOORE FOR A
MINUTE.
I THINK THERE'S A HUGE MAJOR
DISTINCTION BETWEEN MOORE
THE FACTS OF MOORE AND THE
FACTS OF THIS CASE.
PRIOR TO THE SENTENCE THE
STATE SOUGHT COMMITMENT
PROCEEDING.
THEY INITIATED IT.
WHEN HE WAS ACTUALLY
RESENTENCED I BELIEVE IT WAS
THE DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY MADE A MISTAKE
BUT THEY ARE NO LONGER FOR
MR. MOORE AND SUBSEQUENT TO
THAT RECTIFIED AND PICKED UP.
WHILE HE WAS IN FACT IN
LAWFUL CUSTODY THE STATE DID
BEGIN THE PROCEEDING.
THAT HAS NOT HAPPENED IN
THIS.
>> LET ME ASK YOU A QUESTION
ON THE DUE PROCESS CONCERNS.
I WOULD LIKE TO ARTICULATE
THAT.
IF THE JIMMY RYCE HAS BEEN
DEFINED AS A CIVIL
COMMITMENT PROCEEDING AND IF
ITS BEGUN WHEN SOMEBODY
COMMITMENT FOR THEIR RELEASE
OR IF IT'S DONE AFTER
THEY'VE BEEN RELEASED AND
THEY ARE SIMPLY SERVED BUT
NOT INCARCERATED WHILE THEY
AWAIT THE JIMMY RYCE PROCESS
TO GO THROUGH, WHAT'S THE
DUE PROCESS CONCERN?
>> I THINK THERE MAY BE A
DUE PROCESS ISSUE IN THE
SCENARIO WHERE THE PERSON
HAS COMPLETED THE SENTENCE
OR HER SENTENCE, HAS BEEN
RELEASED, IS LIVING IN THE
COMMUNITY, HAS COMMITTED NO
NEW OFFENSE HAS DONE
ABSOLUTELY NOTHING OTHER
THAN HAVE A QUAL FIRING
OFFENSE AND THE STATE OF
FLORIDA PICKS THIS PERSON UP
AND PUTS THE PERSON.
IF THEY SERVE THEM WITH BUT
DON'T PUT THEM IN A
COMMITMENT FACILITY UNTIL
AFTER THE JIMMY RYCE PROCESS
IS COMPLETED AND THEY ARE
DETERMINED TO QUALIFY FOR
COMMITMENT HOW IS THAT
DIFFERENT THAN THE BAKER ACT
PROCEEDING FOR DUE PROCESS
REASONS?
>> A BAKER ACT PROCEEDING
YOU HAVE TO INITIATE IT
BASED ON CURRENT BEHAVIOR OF
THE CLIENT.
AND SOMEONE OBSERVES
SOMETHING YOU GO TO A JUDGE
YOU GET A WARRENT.
BUT UNDER THE SCENARIO THAT
YOU ARE DEPOSITING THE
PERSON HASN'T DONE ANYTHING.
>> IT'S A FUTURE DANGERS.
>> YES.
>> WITH OUR ASINCE OASISANCE
YOU'VE EXHAUSTED ALL YOUR
TIME.
WE'LL TAKE IT UNDER
ADVISEMENT.
THE COURT WILL TAKE ITS
MORNING RECESS.
PLEASE RISE.