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Anthony Mungin v. State of Florida

THE NEXT CASE ON THIS MORNING'S DOCKET IS MU NGIN VERSUS STATE OF FLORIDA , AND WHILE THE COUNSEL ARE APPROACHING , I WOULD LIKE TO WELCOME, IN THE BACK OF THE AUDIENCE WE HAVE 40 PALM BAY HIGH SCHOOL SOPHOMORES, WHO ARE STUDENTS IN THE LAW AND CRIMINAL PROGRAM OF BREVARD COUNTY, AND THEY ARE HERE TODAY , ACCCOMPANIED BY THEIR TEACHERS, JIM MORRISON AND ROBERT DONALDSON. WELCOME TO THE -- DONALDSON. WELCOME TO THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT. WHICH SIDE ARE YOU ALL ON? ALL THE RE. OKAY. WELCOME. WE USUALLY SEE PEOPLE HIGH UP IN THE AUDIENCE, SO GOOD TO SEE YOU . PARTIES READY FOR MUNGIN ?

GOOD MORNING. MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT. TODD SCHER ON BEHALF OF MR . MUNGIN. THIS CASE IS BEFORE THE COURT ON A CONSOLIDATED 3.851 APPEAL, FOLLOWING A LIMITED EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON A FEW ISSUES AND PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS. GIVEN THE SHORT AMOUNT OF TIME I HAVE THIS MORNING, I AM GOING TO FOCUS ON SOME OF THE ISSUES THAT ARE INVOLVED IN A 3.851 APPEAL, AND I WOULD LIKE TO FOCUS SPECIFICALLY AND BRIEFLY ON ARGUMENTS ONE AND TWO AND THEN FOCUS IN ON ONE ASPECT OF ARGUMENT FOUR, WHICH RELATES TO THE IMPROPER SUMMARY DEFENSE OF NEIL SLAPPY ISSUE AND IF TIME PERMITS, AS A PEEK OF ARGUMENT FIVE, RELATING TO TRIAL COUNSEL'S GUILT P HASE INVESTIGATION, REGARDING FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE WITH RESPECT TO AN ALIBI. JUST BRIEFLY AS TO ARGUMENT ONE , AS I ACKNOWLEDGED IN THE BRIEF , THIS ISSUE IS NOT ONE THAT WAS RAISED BELOW REGARDING WHAT WE SUBMIT IS FUNDAMENTAL ERROR BY THE LOWER COURT'S FAILURE TO RECUSE ITSELF AND , IN FACT , THE ENTIRE CIRCUIT, FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT , FROM PRESIDING OVER THESE POSTCONVICTION PROCEEDINGS. TRIAL COUNSEL IN THIS CASE , CHARLES COOPER WAS AT THE TIME OF THE EVIDENCE DRAFTER HEARING, A SITTING COUNTY COURT JUDGE IN DUVAL COUNTY.

CHIEF JUSTICE: JUSTICE LEWIS.

WHAT ARE THE PARAMETERS , BECAUSE WE SEE THIS DIFFERENT VARIETY OF THIS TYPE OF ISSUE COME UP, MANY , MANY TIMES, BECAUSE OF THE NATURAL FLOW THAT OCCURS. SHARE WITH US THE PARAMETERS OF THIS. YOU SEE ME TO BE SEEING A PER SE KIND OF RULE FLOWING FROM THIS SCENARIO.

WELL , I DON'T KNOW THAT I AM SEEKING ANYTHING OTHER THAN THIS , THE FACTS OF THIS PARTICULAR CASE. I SUBMIT CERTAINLY THIS DOES HAPPEN ON OCCASION, AND A LOT OF TIMES THESE DON'T EVEN RISE TO THIS LEVEL, BECAUSE IT IS DEALT WITH BELOW. THERE HAVE BEEN A FEW TIMES WHERE THIS COURT HAS ADDRESSED IT, SOMETIMES IN WRITINGS, SO WE DON'T KNOW WHAT -- IN WRITINGS, SO WE DON'T KNOW WHAT THE UNDERLYING REASONS WERE , BUT IN THE HODGES CASEY CITED , THE COURT NOTED THAT CIRCUIT JUDGE AND TRIAL COUNSEL WERE RECUSED BY HIM AS A SITTING JUDGE AT THE TIME. I THINK IN SITUATIONS WHERE PARTICULARLY AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS GRANTED, THERE SHOULD BE REASONABLE, IF TRIAL COUNSEL IS A SITTING JUDGE IN THAT SAME CIRCUIT.

CHIEF JUSTICE: WE ARE NOT DEALING WITH A "SHOULD" HERE. FIRST OF ALL, AND I THINK THAT YOU WOULD AGREE , THAT THERE WAS NO MOTION TO RECUSE.

CORRECT .

CHIEF JUSTICE: -- FILED. WHICH TO ME WOULD BE PRETTY SIGNIFICANT, BECAUSE IF THIS HAD BEEN SOMETHING THAT COUNSEL BELOW WAS CONCERNED WITH, A TIMELY MOTION TO RECUSE COULD HAVE BEEN FILED, AND EVEN THOUGH THE CANONS DO NOT REQUIRE IT A PROCEDURE COULD HAVE BEEN PUT INTO PLACE AT THAT TIME, SO WHAT IS IT ABOUT, IF THERE IS NO RULE AGAINST OR PRECLUDING JUDGES FROM SITTING WHEN OTHER JUDGES WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN COUNSEL WOULD BE A WITNESS, THEN WHAT WOULD, A GAIN, GOING BACK TO WHAT JUSTICE LEWIS IS SAYING, AREN'T YOU, HOW ARE YOU NOT URGING A PER SE RULE?

WELL, A GAIN, PROBABLY IT WOULD DEPEND ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF EACH CASE. I MEAN, IF THERE WAS AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING GRANTED ON A VERY MINOR ISSUE THAT PERHAPS DIDN'T INVOLVE THE TESTIMONY OF TRIAL COUNSEL OR THE COURT HAS TO, I AM NOT SAYING INITIALLY ON THE FILING OF A MOTION, THE CIRCUIT HAS TO RECUSE ITSELF.

CHIEF JUSTICE: WOULDN'T THAT BE THE VERY LAST INITIAL OBLIGATION ON COUNSEL, IT TO FILE A TIMELY MOTION TO RECUSE?

I AGREE AND UNFORTUNATELY WE DON'T HAVE A PROCEDURE AT THIS POINT WHERE WE CAN ALLEGGE THAT POSTCONVICTION COUNSEL SHOULD HAVE FILED THE MOTION TO RECUSE. PART OF THE PROBLEM HERE, OF COURSE WE DON'T KNOW, IS THAT THIS CASE WENT THROUGH A NUMBER OF ATTORNEYS, VARIOUS REGISTRY LAWYERS APPOINTED AND THEN GOT OFF AND ANOTHER ONE WAS APPOINTED AND THEN GOT OFF. OF COURSE IT STARTED OFF WITH THE CCR-NORTH OFFICE FILING THE MOTION, THEN M.R. OLIVE WAS APPOINTED AND THAT BECAME WRAPPED UP IN THE LITIGATION.

YOU HAVE TO AGREE THAT THIS COURT HAS BEEN VERY STRICT, IN TERMS OF REQUIRING THE FILING OF SOMETHING.

I DO.

IN A TIMELY MANNER. I RECALL, PERHAPS, THE MOST SERIOUS CASE IN WHICH I DISSENTED, WAS ONE WHERE THE JUDGE PRESIDED OVER THE POSTCONVICTION PROCEEDINGS, HAD ACTUALLY REPRESENTED THE FAMILY OF THE VICTIM AT SOME POINT, BUT NO ACTION WAS, THERE WAS A PROCEDURAL DEFAULT INVOKED, AND THIS COURT APPROVED THAT, AND SO WE HAVE A RATHER STRICT RULE FOR GOOD REASONS, AS TO REQUIRING SOME ACTION BE TAKEN BELOW.

NO, AND I UNDERSTAND THAT. I WOULD POINT OUT, HOWEVER, FOR EXAMPLE IN THE MAHARAJ CASE, WHERE THIS COURT ULTIMATELY REVERSED FOR A HEARING ON SOME OTHER ISSUES, THE COURT DID ADDRESS IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, AN ISSUE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN APPEAL, THAT THE COURT SHOULD HAVE DISQUALIFIED ITSELF BECAUSE OF AN ALLEGED RELATIONSHIP, PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SITTING JUDGE AND THE PROSECUTOR IN THAT CASE, AND SO THERE IS --

CHIEF JUSTICE: IN THAT CASE THE CANON, THERE WAS A SPECIFIC CANON 3-E, THAT THIS WAS, WASN'T HE THE SUPERVISING ATTORNEY OF THE ASSISTANT STATE ATTORNEY WHO HAD PROSECUTED THE DEFENDANT?

BUT IN EVERY CASE WHERE THAT ISSUE, I MEAN, I HAD ANOTHER CASE. ARBELIAZ, WHERE IT WAS --

CHIEF JUSTICE: THAT IS TOTALLY DIFFERENT. THERE YOU HAD A JUDGE THAT WAS INVOLVED IN THE CASE BELOW. HERE THIS JUNK -- NO?

I DON'T BELIEVE IN MAHARAJ THE JUDGE WHO PRESIDED OVER THE 3.850 WAS INVOLVED IN THE ACTUAL --

HE SUPERVISED THEM , RIGHT?

CHIEF JUSTICE: HE WAS THE SUPERVISING ATTORNEY OF THE ASSISTANT STATE ATTORNEY.

RIGHT . CORRECT.

CHIEF JUSTICE: BUT THE CANON SPECIFICALLY TALKS ABOUT THAT, CONTEMPLATES THAT. TO ME THAT IS A PRETTY BIG DIFFERENCE.

BUT IT STILL WASN'T RAISED IN THE TRIAL COURT, AND SO YOU ARE STILL DEALING WITH, REALLY , AN ISSUE OF WHETHER IT IS FUNDAMENTAL ERROR OR NOT, AND SO I AM HERE.

WE COULD SPEND 20 MINUTES --

I UNDERSTAND.

CHIEF JUSTICE: JUSTICE QUINCE, YOU HAD A QUESTION.

THIS ISSUE CONCERNS ME , BECAUSE HE REALLY NEED TO SEE WHAT KIND OF LIMITS WE CAN PLACE ON THIS , BECAUSE EARLIER THIS WEEK , WE HAD A SITUATION WHERE THE PROSECUTOR WAS NOW A JUDGE , AND THESE KINDS OF THINGS GO ON ALL OF THE TIME , AND SO WHAT KIND OF LIMITATIONS WOULD YOU PUT ON THIS KIND OF ISSUE? YOU ARE GOING TO GET RID OF THE WHOLE CIRCUIT EVERY TIME THERE IS SOMEONE WHO WAS A PROSECUTOR OR IS NOW A JUDGE IN THAT CIRCUIT , AND IS CALLED TO TESTIFY -- TESTIFY?

I AM NOT SURE WHAT CAME UP EARLIER THIS WEEK. I KNOW FOR EXAMPLE SOMETIMES IT DOES HAPPEN, AND I AM AWARE OF A CASE FROM DADE COUNTY WHERE THERE HAD BEEN A BRADY ALLEGATION MADE AGAINST THE PROSECUTOR. THAT PROSECUTOR HAD SINCE BECOME A SITTING JUDGE IN DADE COUNTY . AND THE VENUE WAS MOVED.

THERE AGAIN , YOU HAVE SOMEBODY WHO WAS REALLY INVOLVED IN THE CASE, CORRECT?

RIGHT , BUT THE , CORRECT. WELL, RIGHT , THE PROSECUTOR , BUT SHE WASN'T, THE PROSECUTOR DIDN'T BECOME THE JUDGE ASSIGNED TO THAT PARTICULAR CASE , BUT BECAUSE OF THE PROBLEM WITH ONE SITTING JUDGE EVALUATING THE TESTIMONY AND CREDIBILITY OF ANOTHER SITTING JUDGE , EVEN THOUGH THE JUDGE THAT IS PRESIDING OVER THE CASE HAD NO DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN THE CASE , WARRANTED , IN THAT CASE, THE CIRCUIT WAS RECUSED IN THE CASE AND IT MOVED TO BROWARD COUNTY. I THINK HERE WE CERTAINLY HAVE A REASONABLE LIMIT CERTAINLY IF AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING WAS GRANTED AND THE TESTIMONY OF TRIAL COUNSEL WHO IS NOW A SITTING JUDGE IN THAT CIRCUIT IS NEEDED , AND THE CREDIBILITY OF THAT TESTIMONY HAS TO BE EVALUATED, AND THAT IS A CIRCUMSTANCE WHERE I THINK CERTAINLY WOULD BE A REASONABLE PRO SE RULE , PER SE RULE . EXCUSE ME.

CHIEF JUSTICE: HOW ABOUT , YOU SAID YOU WERE ALSO GOING TO ADDRESS THE SECOND POINT.

YES .

CHIEF JUSTICE: NOW , MY CONCERN WITH THAT SECOND POINT WHICH IS ABOUT THE FAILURE OF THE JUDGE TO REVIEW RECORDS, WHICH IS , IN THIS, MAYBE PART OF IT IS UNFORTUNATELY AS YOU SAID, IT WENT THROUGH A LOT OF ATTORNEYS , THAT THIS WAS DURING THE TRANSITION OF THE, YOU KNOW , DISINTEGRATION OF CCR-NORTH, BUT IT DOESN'T APPEAR THAT THERE WAS ANY ATTEMPT TO , ON THE PART OF THE , ANY ATTORNEY , INCLUDING THE LAST ONE WHO HAD BEEN INVOLVED, TO, REALLY , PURVIEW THE ISSUE OF THE RECORDS OF THE -- PURSUE THE ISSUE

OF THE RECORDS OF THE SHERIFFS OFFICE AND THE STATE ATTORNEYS OFFICE.

IT DEPENDS ON WHAT YOU MEAN BY PURSUE. I DISAGREE. THERE WAS AN INITIAL IN CAMERA INSPECTION, THE TRANSCRIPT OF WHICH IS SEALED BEFORE THIS COURT SO WE DON'T KNOW EXACTLY WHAT WAS REVIEWED DURING. THAT ALL WE KNOW IS THAT, FOLLOWING THAT INITIAL IN CAMERA INSPECTION, THERE WAS AN UPHOLDING EXEMPTIONS BY THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS. THERE WERE SUBSEQUENT STATUS HEARINGS AND CONFERENCES, DURING WHICH TIME THE ISSUE WAS RAISED TO THE COURT ABOUT ADDITIONALLY WILL -- ADDITIONAL PUBLIC RECORDS AND WHAT HAD HAPPENED TO THEM. THE TRIAL COURT THEN, THE JUDGE CONSULTED WITH HIS CLERK AND THEY DISCOVERED THAT APPARENTLY OTHERS HADN'T BEEN ENTERED TO ACTUALLY HAVE THE EXEMPTED MATERIAL SENT FROM HERE IN THE TALLAHASSEE REPOSITORY TO THE CLERK FOR JUDGE SOUTHWARD TO REVIEW, AND THOSE BEING THE STATE ATTORNEY FILES AND DUVAL COUNTY SHERIFFS OFFICE FILES, SO THOSE ORDERS WERE ISSUED TO HAVE THOSE SENT. AT THAT POINT THE RECORD IS STYLING AS TO WHETHER THE IN -- IS SILENT AS TO WHETHER THE IN CAMERA REVIEW OCCURRED. WHAT NEXT HAPPENED IS SUBSEQUENT COUNSEL, I THINK AT THIS POINT TALKING ABOUT MR. WESTLING, DID FILE A MOTION, ASKING AGAIN FOR THESE PUBLIC RECORDS. THE RECORDS WERE, THEN, SENT. WE DO KNOW THAT THEY WERE FORWARDED TO THE COURT AND AT THAT POINT THE RECORD IS SILENT AS TO WHAT HAPPENED.

CHIEF JUSTICE: AND THE ATTORNEY STARTS THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING.

CORRECT.

CHIEF JUSTICE: AND DOESN'T SAY, WAIT A SECOND, I NEED TO, IF I DON'T HAVE A RULING ON THE SHERIFFS OFFICE AND STATE ATTORNEYS OFFICE RECORDS, I CAN'T PROCEED. DON'T WE EXPECT SOME, YOU KNOW, THERE TO BE SOME AFFIRMATIVE OBLIGATION, IF THIS IS SO IMPORTANT TO AN ISSUE IN THE CASE, AS OPPOSED TO JUST, YOU KNOW, GENERALIZED FILING EXPEDITION, THAT THERE BE AN ATTEMPT TO SAY I CAN'T START THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING.

OKAY. FIRST OF ALL IT IS NOT A GENERALIZED FILING EXPEDITION WHEN YOU ARE ASKING FOR EXEMPT MATERIALS FROM THE STATE ATTORNEY AND SHERIFFS OFFICE. AS THIS COURT IS AWARE, IT HAS SEEN A NUMBER OF CASES WHERE THE BRADY VIOLATION ISN'T FOUND, SO THIS ISN'T SOMETHING WHERE THESE WERE REQUESTS THAT WERE MADE FOR RECORDS THAT REALLY WERE QUESTIONABLY RELEVANT. I MEAN, THESE WERE NOTES FROM THE SHERIFF AND THE STATE ATTORNEYS OFFICE.

DIDN'T MR. MELNIK GIVE SOME INDICATION THAT HE WANTED TO LOOK AT THESE RECORDS, AND IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WHAT WE HAVE HERE IS WE DON'T KNOW WHETHER OR NOT HE, IN FACT, GOT AN OPPORTUNITY TO SEE THEM. WE KNOW THAT THE RECORDS WERE ACTUALLY SENT OVER. WE DON'T KNOW IF THE TRIAL JUDGE LOOKED AT THEM, AND WE DON'T KNOW IF THE STATE ATTORNEY, THE FINAL ATTORNEY ON THIS CASE ACTUALLY GOT AN OPPORTUNITY TO SEE THEM. HE SAID HE DIDN'T.

WE FINALLY GOT AN OPPORTUNITY AT A HEARING, THIS IS ARGUMENT THREE IN THE BELIEF, THE STATE -- IN THE BRIEF, THE STATE ATTORNEY CALLED A BOUT SOME MATTERS THAT THERE WERE GOING TO BE A HEARING ON, AND IN THE MATTER OF CROSS, THE DETECTIVE DISCLOSED THAT HE HAD HIS NOTES FROM HIS INTERVIEWS WITH MR. MUNGIN, WHEN MR. MUNGIN HAD BEEN ARRESTED. MR. MALNIK, COLLATERAL COUNSEL, THEN ASKED TO SEE THE NOTES. THE STATE OBJECTED.

IS THERE SOME INDICATION THAT THESE NOTES WERE A PART OF THE RECORDS THAT HAVE PREVIOUSLY BEEN ASKED FOR?

WELL, ALL WE KNOW, THE REQUEST WAS MADE FOR ANY AND ALL RECORDS FROM THE

SHERIFFS OFFICE , AND SO WE CAN ONLY, I MEAN, WE DON'T KNOW WHAT THEY WOULD HAVE PUT IN THERE OR WHAT THEY WOULD HAVE EXEMPTED. MAYBE THAT IS PART OF THE PROBLEM, BUT CERTAINLY WE CAN PRESUME THAT THEY WOULD HAVE COMPLIED FULLY WITH THE REQUEST, AND SO WE HAVE TO PRESUME THAT THE LEAD DETECTIVE'S NOTES OF AN INTERVIEW WITH THE DEFENDANT ABOUT HIS INVOLVEMENT IN THE CASE, WOULD HAVE BEEN PART OF THAT COMPLIANCE WITH PUBLIC RECORDS , SO WE HAVE THE STATE OBJECTING TO MR . MALNIK'S WANTING TO LOOK AT THE NOTES . MR. MALNIK SAYS I WANT TO LOOK AT THE NOTES. I HAVE NEVER SEEN THEM BEFORE.

CHIEF JUSTICE: AREN'T THE NOTES, THOUGH, WOULDN'T THOSE BE EXEMPT MATERIALS UNDER JERROLD'S?

JERROLD'S, I BELIEVE , IS A DIRECT APPEAL , THE ONE THAT THEY CITE, THE STATE CITES IN THEIR BRIEF. I FRANKLY DON'T SEE HOW NOTES AND WRITTEN NOTES OF THE LEAD DETECTIVE'S INTERVIEW WITH THE DEFENDANT WOULD BE EXEMPT. THIS IS NOT A SITUATION WHERE THE INTERVIEWS, THE INTERROGATIONS BY THE DETECTIVE WITH MR. MUNGIN WERE TAPE-RECORDED OR AUDIOTAPES, SO THE NOTES WOULD ESSENTIALLY BE --

BUT, AGAIN, WE ARE LARGELY LEFT TO SPECULATE, ARE WE NOT, BECAUSE THERE HASN'T BEEN A PREGESSING AS TO EXACTLY WHAT IS IN THOSE RECORDS OR AS TO WHAT HAPPENED, WHEN THE RECORDS WERE SENT BACK.

WELL, I THINK WHAT WE KNOW IS THAT AN IN CAMERA INSPECTION DID NOT TAKE PLACE. THERE IS NO DISPUTE ABOUT THAT, AND SO I SUBMIT , I GUESS AGAIN WE GO BACK TO , AGAIN , WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY PURSUE. THEY ASK FOR THE RECORDS. THE RECORDS WERE SENT TO THE COURT. IT IS THE TRIAL COURT , UNDER 3.852 THAT HAS THE AFFIRMATIVE OBLIGATION TO CONDUCT THE IN CAMERA INSPECTION, AND WHEN HE DOESN'T DO THAT --

WE KNOW HE DIDN'T BECAUSE THE TRIAL JUDGE SAID HE NEVER LOOKED AT THEM? HOW DO WE KNOW THAT THAT IN CAMERA INSPECTION DID NOT TAKE PLACE?

THERE IS A ORDER -- THERE IS NO ORDER . NO ORDER FOLLOWING THE FIRST IN CAMERA INSPECTION AND NO ORDER FOLLOWING THE BRIEFS , AND IN FACT I CONTACTED MR . FRENCH.

MR. MALNIK NEVER BROUGHT THAT TO THE COURT'S ATTENTION.

THE COURT HAD THE RECORDS. MAYBE MR. MALNIK DIDN'T KNOW THAT THE COURT , I DON'T KNOW. ALL I KNOW IS THAT THE COURT --

ARE YOU GOING TO HIT A LICK ON THE DISQUALIFICATION ?

YES. AND THIS IN SOME ACTION RESPECTS RELATED TO -- IN SOME RESPECTS RELATED TO ARTICLE I , BECAUSE PARTICULARLY AS TO THE HEARING ON THE NEIL SLAPPY VIOLATION. AS THIS COURT IS PROBABLY AWARE ON DIRECT APPEAL THERE WAS AN ISSUE RAISED ABOUT TRIAL COUNSEL'S OBJECTIONS TO THE STATE'S STRIKING OF JUROR GALLOWAY FOR RACIAL REASONS. THE ISSUE WAS FULLY PRESERVED BELOW. THE ISSUE WAS RAISED ON DIRECT APPEAL. THE STATE ARGUED AND THIS COURT FOUND THAT THE ISSUE--

CHIEF JUSTICE: THE ISSUE WAS NOT FULLY PRESERVED BELOW. ISN'T THAT THE ISSUE?

I MEANT FULLY , THEY ARTICULATED ALL OF THE REASONS.

CHIEF JUSTICE: THEY JUST SEND THE JURY.

THEY SEND THE JURY , CORRECT, AND THIS ISSUE WAS PRESERVED ON APPEAL.

CHIEF JUSTICE: I WANT TO ASK A QUESTION THAT HAS TO DO WITH MR . FREN CH AND REALLY AS TO WHET HER, HOW THE PREJUDICE PRONG IS LOOKED AT WHEN WE HAVE THIS TYPE OF CHALLENGE AND I HAVE THOUGHT ABOUT IT A LOT. NORMALLY IT IS A QUESTION OF WHETHER IT WOULD UNDERMINE OUR CONFIDENCE IN THE OUTCOME, AND IF WE HAVE A CASE WHERE THERE IS NO ALLEGATION THAT A RACIAL LY-BIASED JURY SET, AND WE KNOW THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE NEIL SLAP IS REALLY AS MUCH TO VINDICATE THE RIGHTS OF THOSE WHO -- NEIL SLAPPY VINDICATE THE RIGHTS OF THOSE WHO ARE BEING EXCLUDED, WHAT IS THE PROPER TEST FOR THE PREJUDICE PRONG AS IT APPLIES TO SOMETHING LIKE THIS, THE VOIR DIRE AND FAILURE TO PRESERVE A CHALLENGE TO A JUROR THAT HAD BEEN STRICKEN?

WELL , IN MY MY VIEW , I MEAN, BECAUSE THE INEFFECTIVE NESS CLAIM , REALLY, SORT OF PRECEDES THE UNDERLYING SUBSTANTIVE CLAIM, AND SO I THINK THE REAL ISSUE IS WHETHER TRIAL COUNSEL PERFORMED DEFICIENTLY IN FAILING TO PRESERVE OR -- CLEAV

CHIEF JUSTICE: LET'S ASSUME THAT HE DID. THEN --

I THINK THE PREJUDICE PRONG IS REALLY HAD THE ISSUE BEEN RAISED AND PRESERVED , WHETHER THERE WAS A REASONABLE PROBABILITY THAT THIS COURT WOULD HAVE GRANTED RELIEF ON THE NEIL SLAPPY ISSUE THAT WAS RAISED.

CHIEF JUSTICE: DON'T WE LOOK AT IT IF IT UNDERMINES OUR CONFIDENCE IN THE TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS, NOT WHETHER YOU COULD HAVE GOTTEN A REVERSAL ON WHAT SOME PEOPLE THINK WOULD BE A TECHNICALITY.

I AM NOT SURE I WOULD CALL A NEIL SLAPPY VIOLATION A TECHNICALITY .

CHIEF JUSTICE: YOU ARE NOT SAYING SOMEBODY SAT THAT SHOULDN'T HAVE SAT. YOU HAVE GOT A RACIAL LY -DIVERSE JURY.

RIGHT, BUT THE LAW SAYS AND IS PLAIN IF THERE WAS ONE STRUCK FOR RACIAL REASONS, THAT IS SUFFICIENT.

ISN'T THERE A SHOWING PRELIMINARILY OF A PATTERN OF MISCONDUCT OR A PATTERN OF STRIKING RACIAL -- MY UNDERSTANDING IS FOUR AFRICAN-AMERICANS SET .

CORRECT.

THREE WERE STRICKEN PREEMPT OR ILLY -- PREEMPTORY , AND THE OTHER WAS STRUCK.

YES AND JUST BECAUSE OTHER AFRICAN-AMERICANS SET ON THE JURY DOES NOT ALLEGE --

RIGHT. YOU ARE NOT ALLEGING THERE WAS A PATTERN. THE ONLY THING YOU ARE ALLEGING IS OF THE SEVEN OR EIGHT , FOUR SERVED , THREE WERE STRICKEN, ONE WAS NOT PROPERLY PRESERVED FOR APPEAL. THE STRIKING OF ONE .

CORRECT. CORRECT. AND THE PROBLEM HERE IS THAT --

YOU ARE NOT EVEN ALLEGING THERE WAS NO OBJECTION, BECAUSE THERE WAS AN INITIAL OBJECTION, AND THEN THE STATE GAVE THE RACE NEUTRAL REASON.

RIGHT AND THEY FOUND THAT WAS RACE NEUTRAL. THE SIMPLE PROBLEM IS THE ACCEPTING OF THE JURY AND WE KNOW FOR EXAMPLE THERE WASN'T A STRATEGIC REASON HERE, BECAUSE THERE ARE SOME CASES FROM THIS COURT THAT TALK ABOUT THE FACT THAT PERHAPS TRIAL COUNSEL ULTIMATELY BECAME SATISFIED WITH THE JURY AS JURY SELECTION WENT ON , BUT WHAT WE HAVE HERE IS A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL IN THE DOCUMENT ITSELF AND AT THE

MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL AT THE HE ARING , THERE WAS EXTENSIVE ARG UMENT BY COUNSEL.

CHIEF JUSTICE: ON THIS POINT HOW WOULD THE JUDGE EVALUATE IT? CAN 'T WE LOOK AT IT AS A QUESTION OF LAW, IF YOU A RESAYING IT HAD TO BE DEFICIENT DON'T - - DE FICIENT CONDUCT, AND ALL WE W OULDNEED TO LOOK AT THIS IS I F IT NE EDED -- IF I T WAS PROPERLY PRESERVED, RI GHT?

IF THAT IS SO , BUT I CITED A NUM BER OF CASES FROM THE DISTRICT COURT WHERE I T WAS SENT BACK AND WE DON'T KNOW WHETHER THERE WAS A STRATEGY REASON, AND ALL W E NEED TO DO IS HAVE TRIAL COUNSEL EX PLAIN , GIVE TESTIMONY IF HE DIDN'T UNDERSTAND THE LA W AND IF HE DIDN'T PRESERVE THAT OBJECTION PRIOR TO THE JURY BEING ACCEPTED, I ALSO SUBMIT THAT THAT REALLY CALLS INTO QUESTION WHAT THE LOWER COURT FOU ND TO BE HIS ULTIMATE COMPETENCE OVER ALL, IN THE CASE, BECAUSE I THINK NOT KNOWING TO OBJECT WHENYOU HAVE A NEIL SLAPPY VIOLATION THAT YOU THINK I S SO STRONG, A FA IRLY FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE .

HE DID OB. THE QUESTION IS WHETHER HE PRESERVED .

I MEAN PRESERVED IT.

THE QUESTION IS WHETHER IT WAS INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE FOR AM NOT TO STATE A RACE NEUTRAL REA SON AND THEN OBJECT TO THE JURY 'S EMPANELMENT.

THE REAL ALLEGATION IS THAT HE FAILED TO KNOW THE LAW WITH RESPECT TO --

HOW DO WE KNOW HE F AILED TO KNOW THE LAW?

THAT IS THE HEARING ALLEGATION.

CHIEF JUSTICE: YOU ARE SAYING HE BROUGHT IT U P AGAIN O PPOSE THE TRIAL.

CORRECT.

CHIEF JUSTICE: WHICH WAS ALREADY WEIGHED. I THINK WITH OUR HELP , YOU ARE VERY WELL INTO YOUR REBUTTAL. YOU MIGHT WAN T TO SAVE SOME TIME. MR. FREN CH.

MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT. CURTIS FRENCH REPRES ENTING THE STATE OF FLORIDA IN THIS CAUSE.

CHIEF JUSTICE: J UST FORWARD, HOW MA NY ATTORNEYS AFTER C CR GOT OFF THIS CASE , DID MR. MU NGIN GO THROU GH?

THERE WAS AN ATTORN EY NAMED HENDERSON AND THEN DALE WESTLING WAS HIRED, AND THEN -- AND THEN. DALE WESTLING WAS HIRED OR APPOINTED AND THEN KEN NETH MALNIK WAS HIRED, SO THERE WERE THREE.

CHIEF JUSTICE: THREE FROM THE REGISTRY?

YES. WELL, NOT ACTUALLY REG ISTRY BECAUSE MR . MALNIK WAS RETAINED, BUT THE OTHER TWO , I ASSU ME, WERE . SINCE YOU HAVE ASKED ABO UT THAT, ILL ADD RESS THAT ONE FIRST. INITIALLY -- I WILL ADD RESSTHAT ONE FIRST. INITIALLY THE STATE DOES NOT AGREE THAT NO IN CAMERA INSPECTION TOOK PLACE . I DON'T KNOW IF IT DID OR NOT. THE RECORD DOESN'T SA Y, ONE WAY OR ANOTHER. WHAT WE KNOW I S --

CHIEF JUSTICE: JUDGE THAT IS DO IN CAMERA INSP ECTION KEEP A RECORD. WE HAVE GOT UNDE R SEAL , AN IN CAMERA INSPECTION THATWAS DONE . YOU ARE NOT SAYING THAT WE HAVE

SITUATIONS WHERE JUDGES DO IN CAMERA INSPECTIONS AND DON'T ISSUE ORDERS AND WE DON'T --

WELL, IN THIS CASE THE JUDGE MAY HAVE TURNED THESE EXEMPT DOCUMENTS OVER TO COUNSEL, WHICH IS WHAT COUNSEL ASKED FOR. ACTUALLY NONE OF THESE ATTORNEYS EVER ASKED FOR AN IN CAMERA INSPECTION. HENDERSON STATED THAT HE WAS GOING TO ASK FOR AN IN CAMERA INSPECTION AND NEVER ACTUALLY FILED THE MOTION. THE JUDGE DECIDED TO DO AN IN CAMERA INSPECTION ON HIS OWN MOTION. FOR SOME REASON APPARENTLY HE ONLY INSPECTED THE D.O.C. EXEMPT DOCUMENTS AND NOT THE OTHER TWO. THERE IS SOME DISCUSSION ABOUT THAT. SUBSEQUENT TO THAT TIME HENDERSON GOT OFF THE CASE AND MR. WESTLING WAS APPOINTED AND MR. WESTLING JUST ASKED THAT THESE EXEMPT DOCUMENTS BE TURNED OVER TO HIM. WE HAVE AN ORDER SHOWING THAT THE JUDGE REQUESTED THAT THE REPOSITORY SEND THOSE EXEMPT DOCUMENTS TO THE COURT. WE DON'T KNOW WHAT HAPPENED TO THEM AFTER. THAT THERE WERE NO FURTHER MOTIONS BY MR. WESTLING ON THAT SUBJECT. MR. WESTLING GOT OFF THE CASE AND MR. MALNIK, RETAINED COUNSEL, GOT INTO THE CASE A YEAR AND A HALF BEFORE THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING AND MADE NO MOTION WHATSOEVER, ABOUT ANY EXEMPT DOCUMENTS, AND I THINK THIS CASE IS CONTROLLED BY PAGE WHICH I CITED IN MY BRIEF, WHICH BASICALLY SAYS IF YOU SIT FOR A YEAR AND A HALF AND DON'T INVOKE ANY SORT OF RULING FOR THE COURT AND DON'T MAKE ANY COMPLAINTS OR MOTION TO SAY COMPETENT OR ANYTHING, THAT YOU WAIVE THE ISSUE ABOUT IT. FOR ISSUE ONE, I CAN TELL IT IS QUITE CLEAR THAT OPP OSING COUNSEL IS, IN FACT, ASKING FOR A PER SE RULE. THE ONLY GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION PROVIDED IS THAT THE TRIAL COUNSEL IN THIS CASE IS NOW A SITTING JUDGE IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT, A SITTING COUNSEL JUDGE. HE HAS ALLEGEDLY NOT HAD ANYTHING TO DO WITH ANY CLOSE PERSONAL OR PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIP. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT IS BASICALLY DUVAL COUNTY AND ANOTHER COUNTY OR TWO, SO IT IS A VERY LARGE METROPOLITAN AREA. I DON'T KNOW HOW MANY CIRCUIT JUDGES ARE IN THIS CIRCUIT OR COUNTY JUDGES, BUT I WOULD IMAGINE IT IS QUITE A NUMBER. THERE HAS JUST BEEN SIMPLY, I DON'T KNOW IF THEY HAVE ANY RELATIONSHIP WHATEVER.

CHIEF JUSTICE: I THINK, AGAIN, THE ISSUE HERE TO ME, IS I DON'T KNOW HOW WE WOULD REVERSE SOMETHING WHERE IT WASN'T BROUGHT UP BY COUNSEL, AND EARLY COUNSEL MUST HAVE BEEN COMFORTABLE, AT LEAST WE HAVE GOT TO PRESUME THAT COUNSEL IS COMFORTABLE, BUT IT IS A MATTER OF SOME CONCERN, WHEN YOU DO HAVE THE JUDGES ARE OBVIOUSLY HAVING TO MAKE RULINGS ON THE CREDIBILITY OF SOMEBODY AS A SITTING JUDGE, AND IT SAYS HERE ON PAGE 4 OF HIS ORDER IT WAS CLEAR TO THIS JUDGE BASED ON THE CREDIBLE TESTIMONY PRESENTED BY JUDGE COFFER THAT THIS CLAIM IS MERITLESS. IT WOULD BE SOMEWHAT DIFFICULT FOR A JUDGE TO BE SAYING I DO NOT FIND JUDGE COFFER'S TESTIMONY TO BE CREDIBLE. THAT IS THE FACTS OF LIFE.

YOU JUST REPRIMAND A JUDGE THIS MORNING SO I DON'T KNOW THAT THAT WOULD BE DIFFICULT. I DON'T KNOW THAT THERE WAS ANY PARTICULAR CREDIBILITY WITH REGARD TO COVER ANYWAY. THERE WAS NO COFFER ANYWAY. WE HAVE OPPOSED AND CERTAINLY PRESERVED OUR OBJECTION ON THE BASIS OR ON THE GROUND THAT THIS ISSUE CERTAINLY WASN'T RAISED BELOW AND IS RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL, AND OF COURSE THERE IS A STATUTE THAT SAYS THAT THAT IS NOT A REASONABLE GROUND.

CHIEF JUSTICE: THAT IS YOUR BEST --

BUT AT ANY RATE WE DO THINK, ALSO, THAT YOU WOULD HAVE TO ALLEGGE SOMETHING BESIDES MERELY THAT A SITTING COUNTY, OR THAT THE ORIGINALLY TRIAL COUNSEL IS NOW A ORIGINAL TRIAL COUNSEL IS NOW A JUDGE IN THE CIRCUIT. THIS COURT HAS ADDRESSED THE ISSUE BEFORE AND I CITED TWO CASES, ONE OF WHICH WAS MELTON, IN WHICH THE PETITION WAS DENIED FOR PREJUDICE, VERY SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES, AND BY THE WAY THE COMPLAINT IS ALSO UNTIMELY, BECAUSE MR. COFFER WAS APPOINTED A JUDGE IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT,

BEFORE JUDGE SOUTHWOOD WAS PRESIDED TO -- WAS APPINTED TO PRESIDE OVER THIS CASE AND NO BODY SAID ANYTHING ABOUT JUDGE SOUTHWOOD BEING DISQUALIFIED. IN ANY CASE, THE JUDGE RULING DID NOT RISE TO AN OPINION BUT THIS COURT HAS ADDRESSED THE ISSUE AND REJECTED IT.

CHIEF JUSTICE: ON THE ROUGH NOTES USED TO MEMORIALIZE THE REPORT, ARE THOSE, UNDER OUR CASE LAW, WOULD THOSE NOTES BE DISCOVERABLE? THEY ARE THE NOTES THAT THE SHERIFFS DEPUTY IS USING TO MEMORIALIZE THE REPORT?

MY UNDERSTANDING OF THE CASE LAW IS IT IS NOT DISCOVERABLE. NOW, OPPOSE THE CONVICTION, PERHAPS IF THERE WERE A BRADY CLAIM, WHICH IN THIS CASE THERE WAS NOT, THE COURT MIGHT HAVE TO REVIEW THE NOTES FOR BRADY MATERIAL, BUT JUST AS A MATTER OF ARE THEY DISCOVERABLE, THE ANSWER WOULD BE NO.

CHIEF JUSTICE: MAY IT BECOME RELEVANT, I MEAN, CERTAINLY IF THERE IS AN ISSUE ABOUT THE REPORT AND WHETHER THERE IS SOMETHING--

THERE AT LEAST HAS TO BE A CLAIM TO WHICH THESE NOTES WOULD BE RELEVANT AND LET ME POINT OUT THAT TRIAL COUNSEL WAS AWARE THAT THESE NOTES EXISTED. THERE WAS TESTIMONY ABOUT THESE NOTES, IN THE PRETRIAL DEPOSITION OF DETECTIVE GILLBREATH, AND JUDGE COFFER NEVER SOUGHT THOSE NOTES, AND SEVERAL YEARS OF POSTCONVICTION LITIGATION, NO ONE EVER SOUGHT THOSE NOTES. DETECTIVE GILLBREATH TESTIFIED THAT HE DID NOT TURN THEM OVER TO THE SHERIFF AND THEY WERE NOT PART OF ANY FILES THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN SENT TO ANY REPOSITORY OR CONTAINED WITHIN SOME EXEMPT DOCUMENTS.

CHIEF JUSTICE: SO WHAT WOULD HAVE BEEN, ALL RIGHT, BUT ONCE HE IS USING THEM TO TESTIFY, DIDN'T HE USE THEM TO TESTIFY?

I AM SORRY. HE DID NOT USE THEM TO TESTIFY. ON CROSS-EXAMINATION, APPELLATE COUNSEL OR POSTCONVICTION COUNSEL ASKED IF HE HAD THE NOTES AND HE SAID YES. BUT HE DIDN'T TESTIFY. HE DIDN'T USE THEM TO TESTIFY ABOUT ANYTHING. THE ONLY REASON THE DETECTIVE WAS CALLED TO TESTIFY WAS JUST TO ESTABLISH THAT THE PRELIMINARY REPORT THAT HE GAVE TO MR. COFFER BEFORE TRIAL WAS IDENTICAL TO THE FINAL REPORT, AND THE ONLY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO, IS THAT THE FINAL REPORT WAS APPROVED BY THE SUPERVISOR.

CHIEF JUSTICE: WHAT WAS THE RELEVANCE OF THAT TO ANY CLAIM?

PART OF THE STATE'S PRESENTATION WAS THAT, IN TERMS OF WHAT COFFER'S STRATEGY WAS WITH REGARD TO THE ALIBI HAD TO FIT WITHIN THE INFORMATION HE KNEW, AND MUNGIN HAD GIVEN A STATEMENT TO POLICE, SETTING OUT HIS WHEREABOUTS, IN WHICH HE ADMITTED THE FIRST TWO CRIMES IN MONTICELLO AND TALLAHASSEE BUT DENIED HAVING COMMITTED THE MURDER OF MS. WOODS IN JACKSONVILLE AND GAVE AN ACCOUNT OF HIS WHEREABOUTS AT THAT TIME.

CHIEF JUSTICE: SO IF, SO THE FACT THAT IF COFFER DIDN'T HAVE THOSE NOTES, THEN IT REALLY DOESN'T GO TO ANY ISSUE OF COFFER'S --

STRATEGY. AND THAT IS WHAT THE TRIAL JUDGE RULE SAYS, THAT THIS DOESN'T GO TO ANY ISSUE THAT YOU HAVE PENDING, AND HE WAS ASKED TO IDENTIFY WHAT ISSUE DOES IT GO FOR AND COUNSEL COULDN'T -- GO TO AND COUNSEL COULDN'T SAY AT THIS POINT, ANY ISSUE THAT HE COULD IDENTIFY THAT THIS WOULD BE RELEVANT TO. KIEF

CHIEF JUSTICE: LET'S GO TO THE ISSUE OF THE NEIL SLAPPY QUESTION, AND I HAVE BEEN TROUBLED BY THIS ISSUE FOR SOME TIME, ALTHOUGH I DON'T KNOW IF WE HAVE HAD A

CHANCE TO RULE DIRECTLY ON IT AND JUST LET'S ASSUME THE TRIAL COUNSEL WOULD SAY, YOU KNOW WHAT? I SCREWED UP. I THOUGHT I PRESERVED IT. I DIDN'T. I CERTAINLY INTENDED TO BECAUSE I FILED POST TRIAL AND I KNEW THE LAW BUT I JUST FORGOT, AND LET'S ASSUME THAT IF I HAD BEEN PROPERLY PRESERVED, THAT THIS COURT WOULD HAVE FOUND IT WAS -- THAT THIS COURT WOULD HAVE FOUND IT IS PROTECTURAL. DOES THAT JUST GIVE MR. MUNGIN A NEW TRIAL, OR IS THERE SOME OTHER STANDARD THAT APPLIES, WHEN IT IS, BECAUSE IT IS ON A STRICKLAND POSTCONVICTION, AS TO WHAT THE PREJUDICE MEANS IN THE CONTEXT OF SOMETHING LIKE THAT?

OUR POSITION WOULD HAVE TO BE THAT THE STRICKLAND STANDARD APPLIES AND THAT IS A DIFFERENT RESULT AT TRIAL NOT ON APPEAL. HOWEVER, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, I CERTAINLY THINK --

CHIEF JUSTICE: WHAT WOULD IT BE?

A REASONABLE PROBABILITY OF A DIFFERENT VERDICT BY THE JURY.

BUT DON'T YOU, WHEN YOU DEAL WITH JURY CONCERNS, AREN'T YOU TRYING TO DETERMINE WHETHER YOU EVER HAVE A PROPERLY CONSTITUTED DECISION-MAKING BODY, NOT WHETHER THAT BODY MADE THE RIGHT DECISION OR THAT THE DECISION IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE, AND IN MOST THINGS, DEALING WITH THE COMPOSITION OF A -- COMPOSITION OF A JURY THAT, IS THE FUNDAMENTAL MENTAL PROCESS.

THAT WOULD BE TRUE ON DIRECT APPEAL BUT AT THIS POINT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT WHETHER HE HAS HECA N'T I HAVE ASSISTANCE -- INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

BUT YOU ARE STILL TALKING ABOUT THE COMPOSITION OF THE DECISION-MAKING BODY AND IT CHANGES THE DYNAMICS.

YES.

WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE HERE BETWEEN IF WE WERE CONSIDERING THIS AS APPELLATE COUNSEL'S FAILURE, WHEN THE ISSUE WAS PRESERVED, WE APPARENTLY JUST DO A PRETTY STRAIGHTFORWARD ANALYSIS AS TO WHETHER OR NOT IF THE ISSUE, THEN, HAD BEEN RAISED, AS TO WHAT THIS COURT WOULD HAVE DECIDED ON THE MERITS. WHY SHOULDN'T THE SAME TEST APPLY AND, OF COURSE, WITH APPELLATE COUNSEL WE DO THE STRICKLAND ANALYSIS, SO WHY WOULDN'T WE DO THE SAME THING WHERE THERE, ASSUMING THAT, AND I NOTICE YOU SAID YOUR OTHER POSITION WOULD BE, AND I WANT TO HEAR ABOUT THAT, BUT WHY WOULDN'T THE SAME ANALYSIS APPLY TO COUNSEL, WHERE THERE IS A MERITORIOUS ISSUE BUT HE DOESN'T DO ONE OF THE THINGS REQUIRED TO PRESERVE IT HERE, BY FAILING TO OBJECT, YOUKNOW, WHEN THE JURY IS FINALLY EMPANNELED. WHY SHOULDN'T WE TREAT IT THE SAME WAY WE TREAT APPELLATE COUNSEL?

THE EASIER WAY TO ANSWER THE QUESTION IN THIS CASE MIGHT JUST BE WHETHER THIS COURT WOULD HAVE AFFIRMED IT ON APPEAL AND I THINK THE COURT CLEARLY WOULD HAVE, BECAUSE --

IN OTHER WORDS THAT THE ISSUE HAS NO MERIT, IS YOUR--

THAT IS OUR POSITION ABSOLUTELY. YOU KNOW, WE ARE ONLY TALKING ABOUT ONE CHANGED JUROR, JUROR GALLOWAY. THERE WERE FOUR BLACK JURORS THAT SAT ON THE JURY. THE PROSECUTOR OF FERED --

WE HAVE ALWAYS SAID THAT IT DOESN'T REALLY MATTER HOW MANY ACTUALLY SET ON THE JURY. IT IS WHETHER OR NOT THIS PARTICULAR JURY WAS IMPROPERLY EXCLUDED.

TRUE. I AM SO RRY.

CORRECT? I MEAN, WE REALLY HAVE SAID, REALLY, THE QUESTION IS WHETHER THIS PARTICULAR JUROR WAS IMPROPERLY EXCLUDED.

CORRECT.

AND NOT THE COMPOSITION OF THE JURY.

IF THE PROSECUTOR STRUCK ONE JUROR FOR RACIAL REASONS, THAT WOULD BE ENOUGH. THERE IS NO QUESTION ABOUT IT. IN THIS CASE, THE PROSECUTOR OFFERED A, WHAT ON ITS FACE APPEARED TO BE A NEUTRAL EXPLANATION FOR THIS CHALLENGE, AN ACCEPTABLE EXPLANATION, AND WHAT HE IS REALLY ARGUING IS THAT EXPLANATION IS SUSPECT, LOOKING AT OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES. OUR POSITION IS, IF YOU LOOK AT THE TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS CASE, THERE IS NOTHING THAT NEGATES THE INITIAL NEUTRALITY OF THE PROSECUTOR'S RESPONSE.

BUT YOUR ARGUMENT THAT THERE WAS A SIMILARLY-SITUATED WHITE MALE JUROR WHO MADE THE --

CORRECT.

-- SAME KIND OF ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS AND YET THE PROSECUTOR DID NOT CHALLENGE THAT JUROR PREEMPTORILY.

YES. HE ACTUALLY SAYS THERE WERE TWO SIMILARLY-SITUATED JURORS, AND I WILL ADDRESS THE SECOND ONE FIRST, JUROR GOODMAN, SELECTED AS AN ALTERNATE. HOWEVER, THE STATE CHALLENGED THIS JUROR FOR CAUSE, AND IN THIS CASE THE JUROR'S ANSWER WAS NOT ONLY SIMILAR IN THAT SHE SAID SHE HAD MIXED EMOTIONS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY BUT SHE ALSO SAID SHE WASN'T SURE SHE COULD IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY, EVEN IF THE FACTS WARRANTED IT. THE STATE MOVED TO CHALLENGE AND THE STATE WAS DENIED, AND AT THAT TIME CHALLENGED PREEMPTORILY, AND THE STATE DID EVERYTHING THE STATE COULD DO TO GET HER OFF THE JURY AND IT FAILED TO DO SO AND THE OTHER JUROR SAID IN TOTALITY, IT DEPENDS ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND IF THE EVIDENCE OF HIS GUILT IS STRONG AND HE HAS COMMITTED A VIOLENT CRIME, I AM FOR THE DEATH PENALTY, AND I WOULD SUGGEST THAT JUROR IS NOT COMPATIBLE TO ONE WHO HAS -- COMPATIBLE TO ONE WHO HAS MIXED EMOTIONS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY.

BUT DIDN'T SHE SAY THAT, UNDER THE PROPER CIRCUMSTANCES, THAT SHE COULD FIND -- THAT IS WHAT SHE SAID.

"GUILTY AND IMPOSE THE DEATH SENTENCE? SO SHE WAS JUST LIKE HE EXPLAINED HIS STATEMENT, EVEN THOUGH HE HAD MIXED FEELINGS, SHE IN FACT, WENT ON TO SAY THAT SHE COULD PROPERLY FOLLOW THE LAW, ALSO.

SHE WAS NOT CHALLENGEABLE FOR CAUSE. THAT IS ABSOLUTELY TRUE. JUROR ANATAZI NEVER SAID HE HAD MIXED FEELINGS ABOUT IT AND I READ HIS ANSWERS AND I THINK THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY COULD REASONABLY HAVE READ HIS ANXIETY THAT SAID BASICALLY WHETHER OR NOT HE WOULD VOTE ON THE DEATH PENALTY WOULD DEPEND ON THE FACTS OF THE CASE AND I THINK HIS ANSWERS WERE CLEARLY MORE STRONGLY IN FAVOR OF THE DEATH PENALTY THAN JUROR GALLOWAY WHO WAS CHALLENGED PREEMPTORILY BY THE STATE.

BACK TO JUSTICE WISE'S QUESTION, IT, AREN'T WE, WHEN WE GET TO POSTCONVICTION, AS

OPPOSED TO WHERE WE ARE ON DIRECT APPEAL, DEALING WITH AN ISSUE OF PREJUDICE IN WHICH MR. SCHER, IF HE IS REPRESENTING THE DEFENDANT, HAS TO CARRY A BURDEN OF DEMONSTRATING THAT THIS ERROR, REGARDLESS OF WHERE IT OCCURRED DURING THE TRIAL, IS SO GRIEVOUS THAT IT WOULD UNDERMINE CONFIDENCE IN THE OUTCOME? I MEAN, ISN'T THAT THE STRICKLAND TEST?

THAT IS OUR POSITION, YES.

SO YOU WOULD LOOK AT THE WHOLE TRIAL, RATHER THAN AS YOU WOULD ON DIRECT APPEAL, JUST AT THE RELATED MATTER OF THE JURY SELECTION.

THAT'S CORRECT, AND I WOULD POINT OUT, TOO, HIS MERITS ARGUMENT IS EXACTLY SAME AS THE MERITS ARGUMENT THAT HE MADE ON APPEAL AND IN FACT IT IS LIFTED VERBATIM IN HIS RESPONSE AND MY IS LIFTED VERBATIM FROM MINE IN THE BRIEF.

CHIEF JUSTICE: BUT WE DIDN'T RESPOND BECAUSE IT WASN'T PRESERVED.

THAT IS THE ARGUMENT AND IT WAS ALLEGED, WE THINK IT IS PROCEDURALLY BARRED, BUT EVEN IF IT IS NOT, I JUST HAVE TO SAY I REALLY DON'T SEE HOW HE CAN ESTABLISH A NEIL SLAPPY VIOLATION IN THIS CASE, WHEN YOU LOOK AT ALL OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE, THE PATTERN OF STRIKES IN THIS CASE, THE TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS CASE, THEY SIMPLY DON'T REBUT THE OFFICIALLY NEUTRAL EXPLANATION OFFERED BY THE PROSECUTOR IN THIS CASE. IF THE COURT HAS NO FURTHER QUESTIONS, THANK YOU.

I WOULD JUST VERY BRIEFLY AS TO THE JUROR ISSUE, FIRST OF ALL I DON'T SEE HOW THE CLAIM COULD BE PROCEDURALLY BARRED. I THINK I HAVE ADDRESSED THAT SUFFICIENTLY IN THE BRIEFS.

HOW DO YOU RESPOND TO THE STATE'S ASSERTION THAT, AS TO MS. GOODMAN WHO DID GIVE SIMILAR RESPONSES ON VOIR DIRE, THE STATE DIDN'T HAVE ANY MORE PREEMPTORY CHALLENGES, SO IT IS NOT THAT THE STATE CHOSE NOT TO STRIKE HER. IT COULDN'T. IT TRIED TO STRIKE HER FOR CAUSE AND IT FAILED.

I THINK THAT PARTICULAR JUROR WAS MORE THE FOCUS OF SOME OF THE ARGUMENTS THAT WERE MADE ON DIRECT APPEAL. I REALLY FOCUS, AND I THINK THE LOWER COURT, IN 3.850 WAS MORE FOCUSED ON THE COMPARISON BETWEEN GALLOWAY AND BENATAZI AND I THINK AS JUSTICE QUINCE POINTED OUT, IF YOU LOOK AT BOTH OF THE COLLOQUYS OF BOTH OF THESE JURORS, AS I SET OUT IN MY REPLY BRIEF, THERE REALLY IS NO DIFFERENCE WITH RESPECT TO THE RESPONSES, AND WHAT IS INTERESTING IS THAT THE PROSECUTOR NEVER FOLLOWED UP, EITHER, WITH JUROR ANATAZI. IT WAS DEFENSE COUNSEL WHO PUSHED BOTH OF THE JURORS AND GOT BOTH OF THEM TO SAY ESSENTIALLY THE SAME THING.

AS TO JUROR ANATAZI, THE OTHER JUROR, THE STATE SAID THAT LATER IN VOIR DIRE, IF THE PERSON IS GUILTY AND IT WAS A VIOLENT, MALICIOUS, I BELIEVE IN THE DEATH PENALTY. THEREFORE IT DEPENDS ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND NOT THAT HE HAD MIXED EMOTIONS.

THAT IS WHAT THEY SAY.

IS THAT WHAT HE SAID, THAT IF IT WAS VIOLENT AND MALICIOUS, THAT I BELIEVE IN THE DEATH PENALTY?

HE SAYS IF THEY PROVE THAT THE PERSON IS GUILTY, IF YOU ALL PROVE TO ME THAT HE WAS GUILTY AND IT WAS VIOLENT AND MALICIOUS, I BELIEVE IN THE DEATH PENALTY. I DON'T NECESSARILY FEEL THAT DEATH GOES WITH THE GUILTY CHARGE. DEFENSE COUNSEL. OKAY.

DOUBTFUL AS THOUGH THERE WOULD BE SOME CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE YOU WOULD WEIGH MITIGATION AGAINST ANY POTENTIAL AGGRAVATION? JUROR, YES, SIR, AND DEFENSE COUNSEL AND VOTE FOR A LIFE SENTENCE? VONSE -- VENIRE PERSON, YES. EVEN IF IT WAS GIVEN TO YOU? THE JUROR, YES.

SO YOU DON'T THINK IT IS DIFFERENT?

YES. I THINK IT IS FUNCTIONALLY THE SAME. I SEE I HAVE RUN OUT OF TIME SO I REQUEST THAT THE COURT REVERSE AND REMAND FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING CONSISTENT WITH MY BRIEF. THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

CHIEF JUSTICE: THANK YOU VERY MUCH.