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**Jesse L. Blanton v. State of Florida
SC04-1823**

MARSHAL: LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT. PLEASE BE SEATED.

CHIEF JUSTICE: BEFORE YOU GET STARTED, I WANT TO NOTE THAT THE NEXT THREE CASES, BLANTON, LOPEZ AND CONTRARY AS, ARE ALL -- AND CONTRERAS ARE ALL CRAWFORD ISSUES. THE REASON WE DIDN'T CONSOLIDATE THEM IS BECAUSE THEY HAVE DIFFERENT ISSUES ON WHETHER THE STATEMENTS ARE TESTIMONIAL OR NOT, BUT I BELIEVE THEY ALL HAVE THE SAME ISSUE AS TO WHAT IS ADEQUATE, MEANINGFUL CROSS-EXAMINATION, SO HOPEFULLY WE WILL BE ABLE TO, EVEN THOUGH WE DIDN'T CONSOLIDATE THEM, WE WANT TO MAKE SURE THAT WE TREAT THEM TOGETHER, WHICH IS WHY WE SET THEM IN SERIES. SO YOU WILL START WITH BLANTON, MS. LEVERING.

THANKS. MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT. MY NAME IS ROSE LEVERING. I REPRESENT THE PETITIONER JESSE BLANTON. AFTER THE SUPREME COURT DECIDED CRAWFORD V WASHINGTON, IT LEFT THE LOWER COURTS SCRAMBLING, TRYING TO DEAL WITH IMPLICATIONS THAT WERE RAISED IN THAT CASE.

CHIEF JUSTICE: SCRAMBLING WOULD BE ONE WAY TO PUT IT.

AS YOU KNOW, THE COURT HELD THAT TESTIMONIAL HEARSAY STATEMENTS ARE INADMISSIBLE IN A CRIMINAL TRIAL, UNLESS THE DECLARANT IS UNAVAILABLE AND UNLESS THE STATEMENT IS, THE PARTY AGAINST WHOM THE STATEMENT IS SUBMITTED HAD A PRIOR OPPORTUNITY FOR CROSS-EXAMINATION. IN DOING SO, THE COURT ABROGATED THE DECISION IN --

CHIEF JUSTICE: RATHER THAN GOING OVER WHAT CRAWFORD SAYS BECAUSE WE ARE FAMILIAR WITH THAT, IN THIS CASE, I THINK THERE IS A STIPULATION THAT THE STATEMENT IS TESTIMONY. IS THAT CORRECT? -- TESTIMONIAL. IS THAT CORRECT?

THE STATEMENT IS TESTIMONIAL.

CHIEF JUSTICE: WHICH GOES TO THE COMMENT ABOUT ALL THREE CASES ABOUT WHETHER THE DISCOVERY DEPOSITION IS EQUIVALENT TO THE PRIOR OPPORTUNITY TO CROSS-EXAMINE, AND THEN ADDRESS THE HARMLESS ERROR ISSUE AS WELL.

THE ERROR IN THE BLANTON CASE IS THAT THE FIFTH DCA HAS LOOKED, HAS REALLY LOOKED ONLY AT THE WORDS "PRIOR OPPORTUNITY" TO CROSS-EXAMINE, AND HELD THAT OR SAID THAT THE MERE OPPORTUNITY, THE FACT THAT AN OPPORTUNITY EXISTED TO TAKE AN EXAMINATION, IN THIS CASE A DISCOVERY EXAMINATION WAS TAKEN OR IN A SENSE COUNSEL ATTEMPTED TO TAKE ONE, AND THE COURT HELD THAT IT MADE NO DIFFERENCE. THE FIFTH DCA HELD THAT IT MADE NO DIFFERENCE.

JUSTICE: WHEN DID THE DEPOSITION TAKE PLACE WITH REFERENCE TO THE DECISION IN

CRAWFORD. IN THIS CASE, DID THE DEPOSITION TAKE PLACE BEFORE THE ISSUANCE OF CRAWFORD?

YES, IT DID, AND IN FACT THE TRIAL ITSELF TOOK PLACE DURING THE ISSUANCE OF CRAWFORD. CRAWFORD CAME DOWN AS THE CASE WAS ON APPEAL AND SUBMITTED SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFS IN CRAWFORD. THE DEPOSITION WAS ACTUALLY TAKEN, ABOUT, I THINK, EIGHT OR NINE MONTHS BEFORE THE TRIAL, VERY SHORTLY, THE WEEK OR TWO BEFORE THE TRIAL, THE MOTION HEARING WAS HELD ON THE ADMISSION OF TRIAL VICTIM HEARSAY STATEMENTS. THE COURT FOUND THAT UNDER THE CUYLER V ROBERTS RULE, WHICH IS WHAT OUR STATUTE IS BASED ON

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JUSTICE: WHAT WAS THE EXTENT OF THE OBJECTION TO THE DEPOSITION USE HERE?

AT THE PRESENT TRIAL?

JUSTICE: RIGHT.

THE DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS MAKING A UNIQUE ARGUMENT IN THE FACT THAT THE STATUTE ALLOWS THE ADMISSION OF A STATEMENT OF A CHILD 11 YEARS OLD. THE CHILD WAS 11 YEARS OLD WHEN SHE MADE THE STATEMENT IN THE CAPITAL SEXUAL BATTERY CASE BUT IN FACT SHE WAS 13 YEARS OLD AT THE TIME OF TRIAL. COUNSEL'S ARGUMENT WAS THAT THE STATUTE SHOULD BE READ TO ALLOW HER TESTIMONY, NOW THAT SHE WAS 13.

JUSTICE: CAN I ASK FOR CLARIFICATION WHY YOU DO THIS, WAS THIS AFTER THE DEPOSITION AND THE STATE HAD NOTIFIED THAT IT WAS GOING TO SEEK ADMISSION UNDER THE HEARSAY RULE?

NO. I WAS ABOUT TO SAY THAT THE DEPOSITION TOOK PLACE EIGHT OR NINE MONTHS BEFORE THE HEARING ON THE MOTION TO ADMIT THE CHILD VICTIM'S STATES.

JUSTICE: HAD THE MOTION BEEN FILED? WAS THERE ANY KNOWLEDGE ON BEHALF OF DEFENSE COUNSEL THAT THE STATE WAS GOING TO ATTEMPT TO GET THIS STATEMENT ADMITTED AND NOT HAVE THE CHILD ACTUALLY TESTIFY, WHICH IS QUITE COMMON IN THESE CASES.

RIGHT. IN FACT THE MOTION ITSELF IS NOT EVEN FILED IN THE RECORD BELOW, SO I AM NOT CERTAIN AT WHAT POINT THE PARTIES ACTUALLY KNEW THAT. I BELIEVE IT IS NOT UNUSUAL THAT THESE MOTIONS ARE FILED AND HEARD SHORTLY BEFORE TRIAL.

JUSTICE: YOU EXPLAIN, AT THE DEPOSITION THAT OCCURRED, DID THE DEFENSE COUNSEL ACTUALLY CROSS-EXAMINE THE WITNESS ABOUT THE STATEMENTS SHE MADE?

THE ONLY INDICATION THAT WE HAVE, THE DEPOSITION WAS NOT FILED IN THIS CASE. THE ONLY INDICATION THAT WE HAVE IS THAT THE CHILD WAS RELUCTANT TO COME FORWARD. SHE WAS IN A FRAGILE EMOTIONAL STATE ADMITTEDLY. AND THE PROSECUTOR IN FACT, EVEN, THIS ALL CAME OUT AT THE MOTION HEARING, THE PROSECUTOR IN FACT ADMITTED THAT THE CHILD, IT WASN'T A VERY ADEQUATE DEPOSITION. THE CHILD DID NOT WANT TO GO FORWARD AND THAT IS ALL.

CHIEF JUSTICE: YOU HAVE ADMITTED OR I THINK YOU HAVE, THAT THIS IS A CASE WHERE THIS WITNESS REALLY IS UNAVAILABLE IN TERMS OF HER VERY FRAGILE EMOTIONAL STATE. IS THAT CORRECT?

AT LEAST UNDER, AT LEAST UNDER THE OLD ROBERTS TEST SHE WAS UNAVAILABLE.

CHIEF JUSTICE: IF THIS WERE TO BE REVERSED BECAUSE THERE, THIS PARTICULAR DISCOVERY

DEPOSITION WAS NOT AN ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY FOR CROSS-EXAMINATION, AND IT WENT BACK , AND THE SAME SITUATION EXISTED WITH THIS WITNESS, THAT IS SHE REALLY WAS STILL IN A VERY FRA GILE STATE , WOULD YOU , WHY COULDN'T THIS BE C U RED , IF SHE WERE ANOTHER DEPOSITION TAKEN , WHERE THERE WOULD BE CROSS-EXAMINATION BUT ITJUST WOULD N'T BE CROSS-EXAMINATION THAT WOULD EXIST AT THE TIME OF TRIAL . IN OTHER WORDS CAN THIS BE C U RED , I G UESS IS MY QUESTION.

I THINK THAT THAT SON OF THE BIG ISSUES THAT THIS COURT IS GOING TO HAVE TO ADDRESS , IS WHETHER DEPOSITION TO SAY PERPETUATE DISCOVERY WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY THAT PRIOR OPPORTUNITY FOR CROSS-EXAMINATION. WHEN WE LOOK BACK HISTORICALLY AT WHAT HAS BEEN CONSIDERED TO BE MEANINGFUL AND ADEQUATE PRIOR OPPORTUNITIES FOR CROSS-EXAMINATION, IT HAS GENERALLY BEEN TESTIMONY THAT HAS BEEN ADMITTED IN A TRIAL CONTEXT , AND WE LOOK AT MARY LAND V CRAIG AND THE CASES THAT FOLLOWED AFTER THAT , AND WE SEE THAT THE COURTS HAVE LOOKED FOR SITUATIONS RESEMBLING CONDITIONS THAT EXIST AT TRIAL. THEY HAVE LOOKED AT THE FACT THAT THE TESTIMONY WAS UNDER OATH, THAT THE TESTIMONY TOOK PLACE IN FRONT OF THE TRIER OF FACT .

CHIEF JUSTICE: BUT IN THIS CASE , BECAUSE YOU SAID IT SHOULD BE CASE SPECIFIC. DO WE DO ANYTHING WITH THE FACT THAT THIS TESTIMONY IN BLANTON WAS NOT, THIS IS NOT A SITUATION OF UNCORROBORATED SEXUAL ABUSE. THIS IS SOMETHING WHERE THERE IS A GRAPHIC VIDEOTAPE AND PHOTOGRAPH, AND THE MOTHER WAS ABLE TO AUTHENTICATE IT MAYBE I AM GETTING TO HARMLESS ERROR , BUT I GUESS THE QUESTION FOR MEANINGFUL CROSS-EXAMINATION , IS WHAT KIND OF CROSS-EXAMINATION WOULD BE MEANINGFUL, WHEN YOU HAVE GOT A VIDEOTAPE AND WHAT KIND OF IMPEACHMENT COULD BE DONE, OTHER THAN CAUSING THIS POOR VICTIM MORE EMOTIONAL HARM ?

THIS IS KIND OF GETTING A LITTLE BIT INTO THE HARMLESS-ERROR ANALYSIS .

CHIEF JUSTICE: MAYBE IT IS.

BUT I WOULD ASK THE COURT TO REMEMBER FIRST OF ALL , THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS FOUND GUILTY OF FOUR COUNTS OF SEXUAL BATTERY AND 13 COUNTS OF PROMOTING SEXUAL PERFORMANCE , BUT THE ASIDE , IF YOU TAKE OUT THE CHILD'S TESTIMONY AND THE AUDIO-TAPED STATEMENT, THE INTERVIEW WITH THE POLICE OFFICER , IN WHICH SHE AUTHENTICATED EACH OF THOSE PHOTOGRAPHS AND THE VIDEO AND SAID , IN MOST CASES THESE ARE ME AND IN SOME CASES THIS IS ME AND JEFF AND JESSIE BLANTON. WHAT YOU ARE LEFT WITH IS THE MOTHER EYEDIFYING THE DAUGHTER IN ONLY -- IDENTIFYING THE DAUGHTER IN ONLY FOUR OF THE PHOTOGRAPHS AND

CHIEF JUSTICE: THAT GOES TO HARMLESS ERROR.

AND MR . BLANTON 'S VOICE ONLY, IN THE VIDEO, SO IN A NEW DEPOSITION IF IT WERE DONE TO PERPETUATE TESTIMONY, I THINK THAT THE TRIAL ATTORNEY WOULD HAVE TO FOCUS ON THE CREDIBILITY OF THE CHILD , HER ABILITY TO TELL THE TRUTH OR A LIE . HE WOULD HAVE TO FOCUS ON WHETHER THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN OTHER CHILDREN IN THOSE OTHER PHOTOGRAPHS , OTHER THAN THIS PARTICULAR CHILD IN ALL THE PHOTOGRAPHS.

JUSTICE: IN RESPECT, SINCE YOUR TIME IS ABOUT UP, TO HARMLESS ERROR , WHERE WERE THOSE PHOTOGRAPHS OBTAINED?

I AM S O R R Y ?

JUSTICE: WHERE WERE THOSE PHOTOGRAPHS OBTAINED?

THEY WERE SEIZED IN EVIDENCE BY THE SHERIFF AFTER THE DAUGHTER CAME FORWARD .

JUSTICE: THEY WERE SEIZED FROM HIS?

AT MR. BLANTON'S RESIDENCE.

JUSTICE: MR. BLANTON'S RESIDENCE.

THAT IS CORRECT.

JUSTICE: IS ANY DETAIL ABOUT WHERE THEY WERE AT MR. BLANTON'S RESIDENCE?

IN ONE OF THE DETAILS OF THE PHOTOGRAPHS, THERE WAS A BACKGROUND WALL WHICH HAD DISTINCTIVE PAINT SPLATTERS ON THE WALL AND THEY MATCHED THE PAINT SPLATTERS IN THE DEFENDANT'S BEDROOM.

JUSTICE: THANK YOU.

CHIEF JUSTICE: DO YOU WANT TO SAVE THE REST OF YOUR SECONDS?

THANK YOU.

MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT. MY NAME IS WESLEY HEIDT AND I REPRESENT THE STATE IN THIS CASE.

JUSTICE: SINCE YOU DON'T HAVE MUCH TIME, LET ME GET RIGHT TO THE CORE POINT. WHAT DOES THE STATE SAY SHOULD BE THE PRIOR OPPORTUNITY TO CROSS-EXAMINE? OBVIOUSLY WE NEED TO GIVE SOME MEANING TO THE WORDS "OPPORTUNITY FOR" BECAUSE THE SUPREME COURT DIDN'T SAY YOU HAD TO HAVE PRIOR CROSS-EXAMINATION. ONLY PRIOR OPPORTUNITY FOR. ON ONE END OF THE SPECTRUM, YOU CAN SAY WELL, AS LONG AS THE STATE NOTIFIES THE DEFENDANT THAT THEY INTEND TO USE HEARSAY, INTRODUCE HEARSAY TESTIMONY AT TRIAL, THE RULES GIVE THE DEFENDANT AN OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE DEPOSITION, IF THE DEFENDANT CHOOSES, AND THAT IS THE ONLY THING THAT THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES. ON THE OTHER END, IT HAS TO HAVE BEEN A DEPOSITION AT WHICH THE DEFENDANT ACTUALLY CROSS-EXAMINED THE WITNESS, SO WHAT DOES THE STATE SAY SHOULD BE THE MEANING OF THE OPPORTUNITY FOR?

I THINK THE WORD OPPORTUNITY MEANS WHAT IT SAYS. THE OPPORTUNITY IS THERE FOR THE DEFENSE TO USE IT AS IT WISHES. THAT IS THE HOLDING IN PLANT ONE. THAT IS THE LANGUAGE USED SPECIFICALLY BY THE U.S. SUPREME COURT.

JUSTICE: BUT DOES THAT CREATE SOME CONFLICT WITH AUTHORITIES FROM THIS COURT, WITH REGARD TO DEPOSITIONS?

TRADITIONALLY DEPOSITIONS WERE NOT DONE WITH THAT INTENT. THAT CASE LAW PREDATED THE LANGUAGE IN CRAWFORD.

JUSTICE: RIGHT.

AND I THINK THAT, IF YOU LOOK AT THE LANGUAGE FOR EXAMPLE, IT EMPHASIZES THAT THE PURPOSE IS FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO CROSS-EXAMINE. IT SAYS CROSS-EXAMINATION AND THEY FELT THAT THE DEPOSITIONS WERE NOT BEING USED AS SUCH, BUT, A GAIN, THE OPPORTUNITY IS THERE AND USING THE LANGUAGE "OPPORTUNITY FOR". WHEN YOU LOOK AT THE DEPOSITION, THEY ARE ALWAYS PORTRAYED TO AND FRIENDLY TYPE OF ATMOSPHERE AND SOMETIMES THEY NOT THAT WAY. SOMETIMES THE VICTIM IS PROVED TO HAVE A WEAK CASE, AND IN THIS CASE --

CHIEF JUSTICE: ARE YOU SAYING THAT WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE HAS NOTICED THAT THEY ARE NOT GOING TO CALL THE VICTIM AT TRIAL, THAT JUST HAVING THE OPPORTUNITY TO DEPOSE THE VICTIM, EVEN IF THEY HAVEN'T DONE IT OR HAVEN'T DONE IT WITH THE PURPOSE OF USING IT AS SUBSTITUTE FOR CROSS-EXAMINATION, THAT THAT SATISFIES CRAWFORD?

CRAWFORD SAYS OPPORTUNITY.

CHIEF JUSTICE: I KNOW WHAT IT SAYS.

I THINK THE OPPORTUNITY IS MET WHEN THERE IS AN OPPORTUNITY TO DEPOSE.

CHIEF JUSTICE: SO THAT NO OBLIGATION ON THE STATE TO FIRST TELL THE DEFENDANT THAT THEY ARE NOT PLANNING TO USE THE TESTIMONY, THE LIVE TESTIMONY OF THE VICTIM OR THE WITNESS? DOES IT DEPEND ON THAT?

I DON'T THINK SO, YOUR HONOR.

CHIEF JUSTICE: WHAT ABOUT THE RULE THAT RIGHT NOW ACTUALLY PREVENTS DEFENDANTS FROM BEING THERE, UNLESS THERE IS COURT PERMISSION? DON'T WE HAVE TO, WOULDN'T WE HAVE TO AMEND THE RULE?

THE WAY THE RULE IS CURRENTLY WRITTEN, THE RULE SPECIFICALLY PROVIDES FOR THE PHYSICAL PRESENCE OF THE DEFENDANT AND MAKE ALLOWANCES UPON MOTION BY THE DEFENSE.

CHIEF JUSTICE: BUT IF THEY DON'T KNOW THIS IS THE ONLY OPPORTUNITY THAT IS WHERE IT SEEMS THE PROCEDURE RIGHT NOW NEEDS TO BE LOOKED AT, TO REALLY TAKE ACCOUNT FOR THIS NEW, IN THE POST CRAWFORD WORLD.

ADMITTEDLY THIS IS POST CRAWFORD, BUT EVEN PRECRAWFORD, WHEN YOU LOOK AT THE RULING IN CRAWFORD, IT TAKES ABOUT -- IT TALKS ABOUT THE SITUATION WHEN IT IS TESTIMONIAL, WHICH LATER MY ATTORNEY GENERAL WILL GET INTO, AND LATER IT SAYS UNAVAILABLE. IN THIS CASE IDEALLY, THE STATE WANTS THE WITNESS THERE. THE DECLARANT, AND IN A LOT OF OTHER CASES YOU MIGHT NOT HAVE THE CORROBORATING EVIDENCE THAT YOU HAVE, PICTURES AND VIDEO, ETCETERA, AND WHEN WE ASK THE VICTIM IF THEY WANT TO BE ON THE STAND, MOST OF THE TIME THEY SAY THEY DO NOT. WE WANT THE VICTIM TO LOOK THE JURY IN THE FACE AND SAY THIS, THIS AND THIS. WHEN THE GLARE AND THE IS UN -- WHEN THE DECLARANT IS UNAVAILABLE IN A LIMITED NUMBER OF CASES, AND WHEN THIS OPPORTUNITY IS TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF, THAT, LIKE IN THIS CASE, IS ADMISSIBLE.

JUSTICE: THERE IS ALSO LANGUAGE IN CRAWFORD CONCERNING FACE TO FACE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE DEFENDANT AND HIS OR HER ACCUSER, SO WHERE DOES THAT FIT INTO IT, WHEN YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT A DISCOVERY DEPOSITION?

THE LANGUAGE IN CRAWFORD AND A LOT OF THE CONFRONTATION LANGUAGE RESTS WITH THE OPPORTUNITY FOR EXAMINATION AND THE OPPORTUNITY FOR FACE TO FACE CONFRONTATION. WHEN YOU LOOK AT CASE LAW LIKE MARYLAND V CRAIG, IT PUTS FACE TO FACE CONFRONTATION IN A BALANCING CHECK, THE BALANCING OF THE COMPETING INTERESTS, AND IT IS THE STATE'S POSITION THAT --

JUSTICE: IN THIS SERIOUS CASE OF WHERE MR. BLANTON WAS CONVICTED OF SEVERAL COUNTS OF CAPITAL SEXUAL BATTERY, IN A SERIOUS CASE LIKE THAT, YOU BELIEVE THAT IT IS O.K. AND IT IS NOT A VIOLATION OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE, IF MR. BLANTON NEVER GETS TO FACE HIS ACCUSER PERSONALLY. FACE TO FACE.

I DON'T THINK THAT IS A CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT. WE CITED CASE LAW IN OUR BRIEF

FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS WHICH HOLD IT IS NOT A CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT, AND THE RULE PROVIDES THAT HE CAN BE THEREUPON MOTION, AND THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS , IN A CASE SUPPLEMENTED WITH , ROSE TO THE FACT THAT MO VING TO MEET THE CASE OF CRAWFORD , BY A DEFENSE ATTORNEY, COULD BE DONE.

JUSTICE: I N THIS CASE CRAWFORD IS NOT A DECISION OF THE COURT AT THE TIME THAT AL L OF THIS WE NT ON IN THE TRIAL COURT.

ADMITTEDLY.

JUSTICE: S O H E CERTAINLY DIDN'T HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO AS K THE TRIAL COURT TO LET HIM B E PRESEN T AT ANY KIND OF DEPOSITION.

THIS IS A 2001 CASE. CRAWFORD WAS 2004.

CHIEF JUSTICE: JUSTICE CANTERO.

YOU WOULD AGREE THAT , IF THE STATE PROV IDED THE DEFENDANT WITH A NOTICE OF USING HEARSAY TESTIMONY AT TRIAL AND THE DEFENDANT NOTICED THE WITNES S FOR DEPOSITION AND THEN FILED A MOTION FOR THE DEFENDANT TO BE PRESENT AT THE DEPOSITION , THAT UNDER THE RULE , EVEN AS PRESENTLY CONSTITUTED , 3. 220 , THAT, THE FACT THAT CRAWFORD SEEMS TO REQUIRE THE DEFENDANT'S PRESENCE, WOULD FUR NISH GOOD CAUSE IN THAT CIRCUMSTANCE, FOR THE DEFENDANT TO BE PRESENT AT THAT DEPOSITION.

YES, YOUR HONOR. IF THE DEFENSE WANTS THE DEFENDANT TO BE THERE FACE TO FACE , THEN THEY HAVE THAT R IGH T UNDER THE C URR ENT WAY IT IS WRITT EN.

JUSTICE: DOES THE DEFENSE MAINTAIN THAT IF THIS WAS ERROR, THIS WAS HARMLESS ERROR.

CLEARLY, YOUR HONOR .

JUSTICE: AND THAT WAS WHAT THE FIFTH DISTRICT DETERMINED, BUT HOW CAN IN THIS INST ANCE, WHERE THI S VICTIM IDENTIFIED AND MADE THESE IDENTIFICATIONS AND HOW CAN IT BE HARMLESS, WHAT THE VICTIM SAID?

WHEN YOU LOOK , THIS WAS A BENCH TRIAL. THE DEFENSE AND THE STATE WAIVED THE RIGHT TO A JURY , AND THE HEARSAY WAS ADMISSIBLE PRE-CRAWFORD , AND WE WA LKED STEP-BY-STEP FROM PHOTOGRAPH TO PHOTOGRAPH , IN FRONT OF JU DGE E ATON WHO HAD ALREADY SEEN THE VIDEOTAPE AND THE PHOTOS JUST A F EW WEEKS BEFORE AT THE UNAVAILABILITY HEARING AND PRESENTED THE VICTIM , WHAT THE VICTIM TOLD YOU AND YES, YES, THIS IS THE DEFENDANT AND THE VICTIM. THE MOTHER WAS PUT ON THE STAND . SHE WAS THERE FOR THE PRESENTATION. WE ONLY HAD TH REE WITNESSES.

CHIEF JUSTICE: GO BACK TO THE STATE'S POSITION, BECAUSE I CAN SEE A SITUATION WHERE WE COULD F RAME THIS PERSPECTIVELY TO SAY THAT , A FTER , AS JUSTICE CANTERO WAS SUGGESTING , THAT AFTER THERE IS A NOTICE OF UNAVAILABILITY , THAT THEN THE DEFENDANT KNOWS THAT THIS IS GOING TO HAPPEN, AND THEN E ITH ER HAS A SE COND CHANCE AT A DEPOSITION FOR CROSS-EXAMINATION PURPOSES OR TO PERPETUATE UNDER 3 ., TO LOOK AT HOW THIS WOR KED, B UT ARE YOU SAYING THAT, IN ANY CASE , THE MERE EXISTENCE OF 3 . 220 , WHICH IS WHATEVER , IN THE FLORIDA RULES OF CIVIL PRO CEDURE, JUST EXISTENCE OF THAT , SATISFIES CRAWFORD?

YES. THE WAY THE RULE IS W RITTEN , THE DEFENSE CONCURRENTLY MOVES THE TRIAL COURT TO HAVE THE DEFENDANT THERE. THAT IS THEIR WISH , AND PERSPECTIVELY THERE HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGING DEFENSE ATTORNEYS TO GET MORE AGGRESSIVE IN DEPOSITION.

JUSTICE: WITH THAT HYPOTHESIS, WHAT IF THE DEFENDANT NOTICES WITNESS FOR DEPOSITION AND LET'S SAY THE DEFENDANT IS AWARE OF THESE STATEMENTS AND IS ALREADY AWARE THAT THE STATEMENTS ARE GOING TO BE USED AT TRIAL, AND AS HAPPENS IN MANY OF THESE CASES, WE, IT IS INVOLVING A CHILD. THE CHILD IS SOMETIMES VERY YOUNG. LET'S SAY IT IS A SEVEN-YEAR-OLD CHILD AND THEY SET THE DEPOSITION. THE CHILD ATTENDS THE DEPOSITION AND THE CHILD JUST SHUTS DOWN, WILL NOT SPEAK AT ALL, REFUSES TO SPEAK, REFUSES TO ANSWER QUESTIONS FROM THE DEFENSE ATTORNEY. HAS THE DEFENDANT THEN BEEN GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO CROSS-EXAMINE IN THAT INSTANCE?

YES. IF YOU PUT THAT CHILD ON THE STAND, CRAWFORD DOES NOT APPLY. DECLARANT IS AVAILABLE AND IF THE CHILD COLLAPSE UP AT TRIAL --

JUSTICE: HOW CAN THE DEFENDANT HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO CROSS-EXAMINE IF THE WITNESS IS REFUSING TO ANSWER QUESTIONS? ISN'T CROSS-EXAMINATION THE VERY PURPOSE OF ANSWERING QUESTIONS FROM COUNSEL?

CHANGE OF SCENARIO. PUT THAT SAME SEVEN-YEAR-OLD ON THE STAND AND CRAWFORD HAS ABSOLUTELY NO APPLICATION. IF THE DECLARANT WAS AVAILABLE, CRAWFORD DOES NOT APPLY. THE VICTIM CLAMPS UP, THAT EVIDENCE COMES IN. UNDER OUR RULES OF EVIDENCE, CRAWFORD SAYS WHEN DECLARANT IS AVAILABLE, IT TURNS TO RULES OF EVIDENCE.

JUSTICE: BUT CRAWFORD DOESN'T EVEN APPLY IF THE WITNESS TESTIFIES AT TRIAL.

CORRECT.

JUSTICE: SO WE ARE TALKING ABOUT WHEN CRAWFORD APPLIES, WHICH IS IN THE PRIOR DEPOSITION, HOW CAN THERE BE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR CROSS-EXAMINATION IF THE WITNESS REFUSES TO ANSWER QUESTIONS?

THEN YOU ASK FOR A SECOND OPPORTUNITY TO DEPOSE AND USE THAT OPPORTUNITY AS A MOTION TO PERPETUATE AND THAT OPPORTUNITY IS THERE AND CRAWFORD DID CHANGE THE WAY THAT WE WOULD, HOW DEFENSE ATTORNEYS APPROACH DEPOSITIONS, AND WHEN YOU LOOK AT THE SITUATION AND THE OPPORTUNITIES, WE DID NOT ANTICIPATE THE CHILD BECOMING UNAVAILABLE IN THIS CASE. THE STATE THEN IDEALLY --

CHIEF JUSTICE: YOUR TIME IS UP. IT STRIKES ME AND THERE ARE SUCH POLICY ISSUES WHILE WE TRY TO CONFRONT THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES, THE WHOLE PURPOSE OF THE TRIAL HEARSAY RULE IS TO OVERCOME THE HARM FROM THE ADVERSARIAL TRIAL PROCESS AND NOW WE ARE TALKING ABOUT SOMETHING, WHICH SEEMS TO BE JUST TO GET THIS OPPORTUNITY, TWO OR THREE DEPOSITIONS WHICH COULD BE EQUALLY HARMFUL TO THIS CHILD, SO JUST AS WE THINK ABOUT THIS, WE HAVE GOT SOME TIMES IN THESE CHILD CASES, THE GREATEST NEED FOR CROSS-EXAMINATION, TO MAKE SURE THAT THE INCIDENT OCCURRED, BUT THEN THE GREATEST HARM TO THE VICTIM FROM THIS PROCESS, AND I THINK THAT IS A VERY, VERY DIFFICULT ISSUE.

IF I CAN MAKE ONE CONCLUDING POINT, THE RULE OF FORFEITURE WHICH WE ALSO REFERENCED IN OUR BRIEF, SAYS THAT YOU CANNOT TAKE ADVANTAGE EQUITYBLY. THE REASON THE --

CHIEF JUSTICE: YOU DON'T RECALL SOMETHING CALLED INNOCENT UNTIL PROVING GUILTY. THAT IS ASSUMING THE DEFENDANT DID IT.

YOU HAVE A PRELIMINARY HEARING, IF THE SITUATION WAS NOT WHAT WE CHARGED THEM WITH AND THERE ARE CASE LAWS THAT CITE THAT THIS IS THE REASON THAT THE CLIENT WAS NOT AVAILABLE -- THAT THE VICTIM WAS NOT AVAILABLE, WE CAN CITE CASES DIRECTLY ON POINT FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS AND ASK YOU TO FOLLOW THAT RULE AND FIND IT

HARMLESS.

JUSTICE: 804.1.B IN RESPONSE TO YOUR ANSWER TO JUSTICE CAN TERO 'S Q UESTION , DECLARES THAT A WITNESS IS UNAVAILABLE IF THEY PERSIST IN REFUSING TO TESTIFY CONCERNING THE SUBJECT M ATTER OF THE DECLARANT STATEMENT, DE SPITE AN OR DER OF THE COURT TO DO SO. SO UNDER YOUR SCENARIO, IF YOU PU T THE WITNESS ON AND THE WITNESS REFUSES T O TESTIFY , DESPITE A COURT ORDER , THEN THAT WOULD MAKE THE WITNESS UNAVAILABLE. UNDER CRAWFORD , CORRECT?

CORRECT. IF YOU LOOK AT THE SIT UATION , OWNS WHEN WE CITED IN OUR B RIEF SAYS A RECENT CASE A VICTIM WAS HIT ON THE HEAD WITH BARBELLS AND REMEMBERED NOTHING AND YET ST ILL WASTHERE FOR TESTIMONY. CHIEF WE WILL HEAR MO RE OF THIS IN THE OTHER CASES .

WITH REGARD TO THE , JUST RESPONDING TO THE FORFEITURE ARGUMENT, I JUST RELY O N PEOPLE V NE LSON CITED IN MY BRIEF , WHERE THE ILLINOIS COURT EXAMINED A CONSIDERABLE BODY OF CASE LAW ON THIS ISSUE ANDDECIDED THIS THAT MOTIVE AND INTENT IN FACT ARE NECESSARY.

JUSTICE: L ET ME REAFFIRM WITH YOU THAT WE REALLY KNOW NOTHING ABOUT THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THEDEPOSITION IN THIS C ASE. IS THAT CO RRECT?

EXCEPT THAT IT WAS NOT VERY THOROUGH. THE CHILD DID NOT WANT TO DO IT.

JUSTICE: WE TALK ABOUTTHE VARI ETY OF CIRCUMSTANCES THAT COME UP ESPECIALLY PRE-CRAWFORD, INCLUDING THE POTENTIAL FOR THE PROSECUTOR ACTUALLY TO REQUEST OF THE DEFENSE LAWYER NOT T O HAVE THE DEFENDANT PRESENT D URING A CHILD'S DEPOSITION OR THE CONDUCT OF DEFENSE COUNSNECESSARILY MANY INSTANCES, BECAUSE THEY ARE TRYING TO NEGOTIATE A P LEA , TO LIMIT , REALLY , THEIR EXAMINATION, DO WE KNOW WHETHER IN THIS I N STANCE , ANY OF THOSE THING S OCCURRED?

NO , WE DO NOT. NO , WE DO NOT. IT SEEMS AS IF THE DEFENSE COUNSEL DELIBERATELY DID NOT GO FORWARD, BECAUSE THE CHILD DID NOT GO FORW ARD. I WOULD LI KE TO TAKE MY REMAINING 30 SE CONDS AND JUST ADDRESS A COUPLE OF POLICY ISSUES.

CHIEF JUSTICE: YOU ARE ACTUALLY OV ER THE TIME BUT YOU MAY TAKE 30 SECONDS MORE.

POL ICY ISSUES. I WOULD WISH THE COURT IN TERMS OF DISCOVERY DEPOSITIONS, TO THINK ABOUTTHE CHIL LING EFFECT IT WOULD HAVE TO ADMIT TESTIMONY FROM DISCOVERY DEPOSITIONS THAT W OULD HAM PER DISC OVERY FROM DEFENSE COU NSEL . DEFENSE COUNSEL WOULD BEHESTTANT TO ASK INFORMATION-SEEKING QUESTIONS FOR FEAR OF WHATINFORMATION WOULD COME OUT. IT IS THE STATE'S OBLIGATION TO PROVE THEIR CASE NOT THEDEFENSE COUNSEL.

JUSTICE: I DON'T UNDERSTAND, WHERE IF IT IS A MOTION, THE DEPOSITION TO PERPETUATE TESTIMONY , A REYOU SAYING THAT IN THAT CASE THERE WAS AN ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY TO CROSS-EXAMINEBUT NOT IF IT IS A DISCOVERYDEPOSITION?

I THINK THAT IS A ISSUE THAT REMAINS TO BE DECIDED. I THINK THAT --

JUSTICE: WHAT IS YOUR POSITION, THAT ANYDEPOSITION IS INADEQUATE?

NO. NO. I THINK, A GAIN , YOU WOULD , DEPOSITIONS TO PERPETUATE TESTIMONY IN LI GHT OF CRAWFORD, I THINK , MAY BE ADMISSIBLE UNDER OUR NEWRULES , BUT I THINK THAT YOU WOULD STILL HAVE TO LOOK AT WHETHER THERE WAS MEANINGFUL AND EFFE CTIVE CROSS-

EXAMINATION, AND I --

JUSTICE: HOW ARE WE GOING TO LOOK AT THAT? NOW WE HAVE TO SEE WHETHER THE DEFENDANT, WHAT IF THERE IS A DEPOSITION AND THE DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL DOES N'T WANT TO CROSS-EXAMINE, FOR WHATEVER REASON? ARE WE NOW GOING TO, THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE TESTIMONY AT TRIAL NOW GOING TO DEPEND ON THE DEFENDANT HAVING VETO POWER? BECAUSE IF HE DOESN'T CHOOSE TO CROSS-EXAMINE AT THE DEPOSITION, THEN IT CAN'T BE USED AT THE TRIAL.

ANTICIPATING THE RULES OF DISCOVERY ARE GOING TO BE REWRITTEN IN LIGHT OF THIS CASE, I AM THINKING OF STATE V LASLELIER, WHERE THIS COURT -- THE STATE V LASLELIER, WHERE THIS COURT HELD THAT IT WAS FOR THE CONSIDERED TO BE A WAIVER.

CHIEF JUSTICE: NOW THAT SOME OF THE OTHER LAWYERS KNOW OUR QUESTIONS ABOUT HOW THIS WOULD WORK POST CRAWFORD BUT YOU ARE 3 MINUTES OVER YOUR TIME. THANK YOU. WE WILL CALL THE NEXT CASE, AND I SUGGEST THAT ALL OF THE LAWYERS IN BOTH LOPEZ AND CONTRERAS, COME AND SIT IN FRONT OF THE BENCH, SO WE CAN GO FROM ONE TO THE OTHER.

GOOD MORNING. MY NAME IS LISA WILCOX, AND I WILL REPRESENT THE STATE OF FLORIDA IN THIS CASE. OUR CONFLICT CASE IS CONSISTENT WITH THE STATE'S POSITION IN BLANTON, SO I WOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS, SPEND MY TIME SO FOCUSING ON THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION IN THIS CASE, WHICH I BELIEVE THIS COURT SHOULD DECIDE THE CASE ON AND IT HAS TO DO WITH WHETHER OR NOT WE HAVE A TESTIMONIAL STATEMENT IF WE DON'T HAVE A TESTIMONIAL STATEMENT, THEN WE ARE OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF CRAWFORD AND THIS COURT NEED NOT ADDRESS WHETHER CONSTITUTIONAL --

JUSTICE: IS IT YOUR POSITION THAT EXCITED UTTERANCE NEVER BE TESTIMONIAL?

THAT IS OUR POSITION BECAUSE BY DEFINITION, EXCITED UTTERANCE DOES NOT ALLOW FOR THE TIME FOR REFLECTION OR CONFRONTATION.

JUSTICE: LET ME ASK YOU A CORE LARRY, THAN IS CAN A REPORT TO A POLICE OFFICER THAT IS NOT THERE WHEN THE EVENT OCCURS, BE OTHER THAN A TESTIMONY THING? IN OTHER WORDS, THE STATEMENT.

ABSOLUTELY, YOUR HONOR. IN OUR POSITION, IN OUR POSITION IS THAT A STATEMENT MADE IN THE QUARTERS OF AN OFFICER ASSESSING THE SITUATION, AN EMERGENCY, TRYING TO SECURE THE SITUATION, A NON-TESTIMONIAL THAT IS NOT A STATEMENT OBTAINED FOR PURPOSES OF PROSECUTION.

JUSTICE: WHAT IF, OBVIOUSLY THERE ARE SOME EVENTS THAT PEOPLE WOULD BE EMOTIONAL ABOUT, WEEKS AFTER THE EVENT OR CERTAINLY DAYS AFTER THE EVENT.

IT IS CONCEIVABLE. THAT'S CORRECT.

JUSTICE: DOES THAT MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE?

YOU HAVE TO LOOK AT THE CONTEXT OF WHEN THE STATEMENT IS MADE. IF THE PURPOSE OF THE STATEMENT, BASED ON THE OBJECTIVE FACTS TO OBTAIN HELP, FOR EXAMPLE, A 911 CALL OR A CALL OF A PERSON RUNNING TO AN OFFICE SAYING HE HAS GOT A GUN, THAT IS NOT NECESSARILY A TESTIMONIAL STATEMENT. THAT IS A STATEMENT TRYING TO SEEK HELP FROM THE OFFICER, PROTECTION.

CHIEF JUSTICE: ARE YOU SEEKING A PER SE RULE ON EXCITED UTTERANCES? THAT IS THAT ANY STATEMENT FOUND TO BE AN EXCITED UTTERANCE BY THE TRIAL JUDGE, IS PER SE NOT

TESTIMONIAL UNDER THE THIRD PRONG OF CRAWFORD?

THAT IS THE STATE'S POSITION.

CHIEF JUSTICE: AS OPPOSED TO LOOKING AT WHETHER THE , AS JUDGE PADOVANO DID , WHETHER A REASONABLE DECLARANT WOULD HAVE HAD -- DECLARANT HAVE HAD THE CAPACITY TO UNDERSTAND THE POTENTIAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE STATEMENT?

THAT IS THE STATE'S POSITION, YOUR HONOR .

JUSTICE: DOESN'T THE VERY HOLDING OF CRAWFORD SAY WE NO LONGER CAN RELY ON THE DEFINITION OF EXCITED UTTERANCE FOR PURPOSES OF DETERMINING WHETHER THIS THAT IS AN EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE AND ALL OF THE REAL ABILITY FACTORS THAT MIGHT GO INTO THAT , THAT NOW IN ADDITION TO THAT HURDLE, THAT THE STATE HAS TO JUMP THE HURDLE OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AS WE ARE NOW INTERPRETING IT IN CRAWFORD, WHICH ESSENTIALLY IS THIS TESTIMONIAL DISCUSSION, SO WE COULDN'T HAVE A PER SE RULE AFTER CRAWFORD, COULD WE, BECAUSE THE FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED DID NOT INCLUDE THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE TESTIMONIAL ANALYSIS, SO HOW COULD WE DO THAT?

YOUR HONOR , I WOULD RESPECTFULLY DISAGREE THAT WE CAN HAVE STATEMENTS THAT ARE OUTSIDE OF CRAWFORD. AN EXCITED UTTERANCE , IN THAT CRAWFORD SPECIFICALLY LEFT OPEN THE ADMISSION OF DYING DECLARATION, WHICH IS A FIRMLY -ROOTED EXCEPTION TO HEARSAY , AND WE WOULD ARGUE THAT THAT IS THE SAME, THEY ALSO LEFT THAT WITH RESPECT TO THE EXCITED UTTERANCE.

CHIEF JUSTICE: I GUESS MY PROBLEM IS THAT, IF THE SUPREME COURT WANTED TO MAKE IT THAT SIMPLE FOR ALL OF US , WHICH IS TO SAY IF IT IS A FIRMLY ROOTED EXCEPTION , THEN IT IS NON-TESTIMONIAL, WE WOULDN'T BE ON HERE, AND I GUESS IS THIS ONE OF THE ISSUES THAT THE U.S. SUPREME COURT WILL BE GIVING US SOME DIRECT ANSWER ON, THAT IS WHETHER SOMETHING -- SOME GUIDANCE ON, THAT IS WHETHER SOMETHING BEING AN EXCITED UTTERANCE , TAKES IT OUT OF BEING TESTIMONIAL, SO THAT WE DON'T HAVE , WE CAN DISCUSS THIS HERE BUT WE WILL HAVE AN ANSWER IN A COUPLE OF MONTHS MAYBE?

YES, YOUR HONOR. IT IS OUR POSITION THAT THE SUPREME COURT WILL SPEAK TO THIS MATTER. HOWEVER , THE SUPREME COURT CASES ON THIS , WHILE THE FACTS ARE VERY SIMILAR TO MY CASE THEY ARE NOT IDENTICAL, SO WE WANT TO MAKE IT CLEAR TO THE COURT THAT , WHILE THE SUPREME COURT CASES WILL HAVE AN IMPACT ON OUR CASE , IT MAY NOT NECESSARILY BE CONTROLLING .

CHIEF JUSTICE: WHAT I UNDERSTAND YOU SAYING IS THE REASON YOU SAY THERE SHOULD AND PER SE RULE WITH EXCITED UTTERANCE , IS THAT YOU SAY THE VERY DEFINITION OF EXCITED UTTERANCE WOULD MEAN THAT THEY WOULDN'T HAVE THE CAPACITY TO UNDERSTAND THE RAMIFICATIONS OF THE STATEMENT. WOULD THAT BE YOUR --

YES , YOUR HONOR.

CHIEF JUSTICE: AND JUDGE PADOVANO SAID, NO , THOSE ARE TWO SEPARATE INQUIRIES AND HAVING JUST SAID SOMETHING BEING THE VICTIM OF A CRIME, DOESN'T MEAN THAT YOU COULDN'T APPRECIATE THE PERSON YOU ARE TALKING TO, RELATING WHAT HAD HAPPENED , IS THE POLICE OFFICER TRYING TO DECIDE WHO TO ARREST FOR THIS CRIME, AND I THINK THAT IS WHERE YOUR PER SE RULE FALLS DOWN, BECAUSE I DON'T KNOW THAT THE INQUIRY REALLY IS THE SAME.

WE BELIEVE THAT THE JUDGE PADOVANO ANALYSIS OF THE TESTIMONIAL NATURE OF THE STATEMENT IS INCORRECT, BASED ON THE FACT THAT THE DEFINITION OF AN EXCITED

UTTERANCE, BUT WE ALSO ARGUE THAT JUDGE PADOVANO'S DEFINITION OF TESTIMONIAL IS INCORRECT BECAUSE IT IS TOO BROAD. IN FACT, AS INDICATED IN THE CASES THAT ARE SUBMITTED TO THE SUPREME COURT FOR ANALYSIS AND THE TRANSCRIPT THAT I HAVE SUBMITTED TO THIS COURT, THERE IS AN EXCEPTION TO TESTIMONIAL STATEMENTS, WHERE THE STATEMENTS ARE MADE IN AN EMERGENCY SITUATION. BASICALLY --

JUSTICE: LET'S STOP RIGHT THERE. SOMEONE, ANY VICTIM IS, SAY, BEING BEATEN OR SOMETHING AND THE POLICE GET THERE, AND THE VICTIM SAYS, LOOK, HE JUST HIT ME. I WANT YOU TO TAKE HIM TO JAIL. CHARGE HIM WITH BATTERY. WHATEVER. AND YOU ARE TELLING ME THAT JUST BECAUSE THE PERSON IS EXCITED AND IS CONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF THE BATTERY, THAT THAT PERSON DOES NOT UNDERSTAND THAT SHE IS ACCUSING SOMEONE AND WANTS THAT PERSON PROSECUTED?

IF IT IS A TRUE EXCITED UTTERANCE. IF IT IS A STATEMENT --

JUSTICE: IT IS THE SAME SORT OF SITUATION AS THIS. WE ARE TALKING ABOUT THE POLICE HAS COME TO THE SCENE, AND THE PERSON, IT JUST HAPPENED A FEW MINUTES AGO. SAYING I WANT THIS PERSON ARRESTED. THEY DID THIS TO ME.

THERE IS GOING TO HAVE TO BE SOME ANALYSIS WITHIN THOSE FEW MINUTES, WHETHER THERE IS TIME FOR CONTEMPLATION, AND WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS TIME FOR FABRICATION OF THE STATEMENT. IF THE COURT CONSIDERED THAT THOSE FEW MINUTES THAT, THERE WAS NO TIME FOR CONTEMPLATION OR FABRICATION --

JUSTICE: DON'T YOU SEE US GETTING INTO A PROBLEM OF WHAT IS ENOUGH? WHAT IS A FEW MINUTES? ONE OF THESE CASES INVOLVES A SITUATION WHERE IT WAS 6-TO-8 MINUTES. IS THAT THAT NOT SUFFICIENT? IS -- IS THAT NOT SUFFICIENT? IS TEN MINUTES SUFFICIENT?

ADMITTEDLY THE AREA OF EXCITED UTTERANCE, LAWSUIT TO THE CASES WE APPLY AS EXCITED UTTERANCE MAY HAVE TO BE NARROWLY CONSTRUED IN THE NUT YOUR, BUT IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE WE DO HAVE A TRULY EXCITED UTTERANCE, BUT BEFORE WE MOVE ON I WOULD LIKE TO ALSO GIVE THE COURT AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW OF THAT PARTICULAR SITUATION. AS NOTED IN THE CASES THAT ARE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, IF THERE IS A CIRCUMSTANCE OF A CRY FOR HELP, JUST BECAUSE IT IS AN ACCUSATION DOESN'T NECESSARILY MAKE IT A TESTIMONIAL STATEMENT. IF THE WITNESS IS MOTIVATED BY OR MAKES A STATEMENT TO MAKE AN ACCUSATION, ARREST HIM, THAT NECESSARILY IS NOT A SITUATION WHERE SHE IS SEEKING HELP FROM PROTECTION OR SAFETY. THAT MAY BE A SITUATION WHERE SHE IS SEEKING --

JUSTICE: IT WASN'T AN EXCITED UTTERANCE. SO IF YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT A PER SE RULE.

IDEALLY WE BELIEVE EXCITED UTTERANCE CARVES OUT TESTIMONY THAT IS NOT TESTIMONIAL, BUT ALTERNATIVELY, BASED ON THE ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT, THE COURT CAN CARVE OUT AN EXCEPTION FOR STATEMENTS THAT ARE PERCEIVED AS A CRY FOR HELP OR AS STATEMENTS THAT WERE DERIVED FROM AN OFFICER TRYING TO ASSESS THE SITUATION OR CARETAKING OR COMMUNITY SAFETY, AND THAT IS A SITUATION, THE DECLARANT IS NOT SEEKING TO MAKE AN ACCUSATION.

CHIEF JUSTICE: YOU ARE IN YOUR REBUTTAL BUT JUSTICE CANTERO HAS QUESTION BEFORE YOU SIT DOWN. JUST JUST IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IF WE ARE --

JUSTICE: IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IF WE ARE GOING TO APPLY A PER SE RULE FOR EXCITED UTTERANCE THAT WE NEED TO, IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATES, NARROW THE EXCITED UTTERANCE EXCEPTION. I SEE A LOT OF CASES WHERE, WHETHER THE STATEMENT WAS AN EXCITED UTTERANCE IS REALLY QUESTIONABLE, AND THE TRIAL COURT

WAS AFFIRMED BECAUSE IT WASN'T AB USE OF DISCRETION TO ALLOW THE TESTIMONY , BUT IF WE KBRING TO FULFILL A CON -- IF WE ARE GOING TO FULFILL A CONFRONTATION CLAUSE MANDATE, IT SEEMS THAT WE HAVE TO INTERP THE EXCITED UTTERANCE EXCEPTION PR ETTY NARROWLY , AT LEAST WHERE THE THE IMPLICATION CLAUSE IS -- AT L EAST WHERE THE CLA USE IS IMPLICATED .

THAT MAY BE SO.

JUSTICE: THIS CASE , WHEREI THINK IT WAS 6-TO-8 M INUTES BEFORE THE OFFICER ARR IVED, I SN'T THAT SUFFICIENT TIME FOR REFLECTION, SO THAT SOMEBODY IS NO LO NGER JUST WITNESSING AN EVENT AN NEX CLAIMING AS THE PERSON IS WITNESSING AN E VENT , SOMETHING WHOSE RELIABILITY IS DETERMINED AND MORE PARTICULARLY THAT IT CAN'T BE TESTIMONIAL , BECAUSE YOUR INTENT IS NOT TO PRE SERVE A STATEMENT FOR TRIAL. ISN'T THAT FOR PURPOSES OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE , 6-TO-8 MINUTES ALREADY PRETTY FAR AFIELD?

NO, SIR. I WOULD D I RECT THE COURT TO THE SPECIFIC FACTS. THIS IS AN O N GOING SITUATION. THE OFFICERS, WHEN THEY ARRIVED ON THE SCENE , THEYDID NOT KNOW WHO WAS WHO. THEY DIDN'T KNOW THE PERPETRATOR OR THE VICTIM IN THIS CASE AND THEY SEPARATED THEM BUT THE GUN WAS ST ILL UNSECURED , AND THE CLOSE PROXIMITY OF THE PAR TIES , THE EXCITED EVENT , KIDNAPING WAS STILL GOING ON AND THE DANGER WAS STILL PRES ENT, UNTIL THE OFFICER HADSECURED THAT DEFENDANT AN ARRESTED HI M AND RE MOVED THE D ANGER AND SECURED THAT GUN , SO IT IS OUR POSI TIONTHAT THAT STATEMENT , WHEN TAKEN IN CONTEXT , WAS MADE DURING THE STARTLING EVENT , BECAUSE THE STARTLING EVENTDID NOT END UNTIL THAT GUN WAS SE CURED AND THAT VICTIM WAS SAFE .

CHIEF JUSTICE: MS. WILCOX , WE HAVE USED UP YOUR EN TIRE ARGUMENT , SO I THINK YOUHAVE MADE YOUR POINT VERY FORCEFULLY, AND WE WILL TAKE THAT UNDER CONSIDERATION AND H EAR FROM MR . SP IVEY. THA NK YOU VERY MUCH.