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**Dadeland Depot, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.**

MARSHAL: HEAR YE. HEAR YE. HEAR YE. THE SUPREME COURT OF THE GREAT STATE OF FLORIDA IS NOW SESSION. ALL WHO HAVE CAUSE TO PLEA, DRAW NEAR, GIVE ATTENTION AND YOU SHALL BE HEARD. GOD SAVE THESE UNITED STATES, THE GREAT STATE OF FLORIDA AND THIS HONORABLE COURT. LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT. PLEASE BE SEATED.

CHIEF JUSTICE: GOOD MORNING, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, AND WELCOME TO THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT. THE FIRST CASE ON THIS MORNING'S DOCKET IS DADELAND DEPOT, INC., VERSUS ST. PAUL, AND JUSTICE CANTERO IS RECUSED ON THIS CASE. I UNDERSTAND WE HAVE GOT MR. BURLINGTON, YOU MAY PROCEED.

MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT. I AM PHILLIP BURLINGTON HERE ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT, DADELAND ASSOCIATES AND DADELAND DEPOT. WE ARE HERE ON FIVE QUESTIONS CERTIFIED BY THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS INVOLVING CLAIMS OF BAD FAITH AGAINST A SURETY, ARISING FROM A PERFORMANCE BOND. THE UNDERLYING CASE -- MR. CHIEF JUSTICE

JUST BEFORE YOU, JUST EXPLAIN, ASSUMING THERE WAS A BAD FAITH CAUSE OF ACTION, WHAT IS THE BAD FAITH? WHAT IS THE -- A BAD FAITH CAUSE OF ACTION, WHAT IS THE BAD FAITH? WHAT IS THE UNDERLYING IS SUE AND SOMEHOW JUST SET IT OUT. I KNOW IT HAPPENED, BUT I AM TRYING TO UNDERSTAND HOW IT HAPPENED.

RIGHT. THE BAD FAITH THAT WE CLAIM IS, ONCE WE NOTIFIED THE SURETY AND THE CONTRACTOR OF THE FAILURE TO PERFORM, THE SURETY DID NOT CONDUCT A REASONABLE INVESTIGATION. THEY WENT TO, BASICALLY, TWO MEETINGS. THAT WAS ALL. THEY BASICALLY SIDED WITH THE CONTRACTOR. THEY DID NOT MAKE ANY ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE OR TO STIMULATE, SHALL WE SAY, PERFORMANCE OF THE CONTRACT. THAT WAS PLACED ENTIRELY ON US, AND MY CLIENTS HAD THE FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS OF AN ONGOING PROJECT THAT WERE DIFFICULTIES WITH TENANTS WHO WERE IN AND SO FORTH.

BUT IT WENT TO ARBITRATION, RIGHT?

YES, IT DID.

AND THE PARTIES TO THE ARBITRATION, WERE THE CONTRACTOR.

YES.

AND DADELAND AND THE SURETY.

YES.

AND THERE WAS A DETERMINATION MADE AS TO THE AMOUNT OF MONEY OWED, AND THAT NET WAS DETERMINED BY THE ARBITRATION.

CORRECT.

AND THAT AMOUNT WAS PAID BY THE CONTRACTOR.

YES.

NOW, IN A SURETY RELATIONSHIP, IN A CONTRACT SURETY CONSTRUCTION RELATIONSHIP, DIDN'T JUDGE HURLEY HAVE IT RIGHT IN THAT, WHAT IS GOING ON, IS THAT YOU HAVE THE PRINCIPAL IS THE CONTRACTOR, AND THE CONTRACTOR IS THE PRIMARY ONLY GORE IN THAT SITUATION. -- OBLIGOR, IN THAT SITUATION. YOU HAVE AN OBLIGEE, WHO IS DADELAND IN THIS INSTANCE, AND YOU HAVE A SURETY WHO IS GUARANTEEING FROM A FINANCIAL STANDPOINT AND PERFORMANCE STANDPOINT, THAT THE CONTRACTOR IS GOING TO PERFORM, BUT THE CONTRACTOR IS PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE.

CORRECT.

AND THE SURETY HAS A RIGHT OF INDEMNIFICATION FROM THE PRINCIPLE.

CORRECT.

AND THAT MAKES IT ENTIRELY DIFFERENT FROM AN INSURANCE CONTRACT, IN TERMS OF HOW THIS WHOLE OPERATION, THIS WHOLE RELATIONSHIP OF SURETYSHIP IS SET UP, ISN'T IT?

NOT UNDER THE FLORIDA INSURANCE CODE, WHICH THIS COURT HAS SPECIFICALLY NOTED TWICE, SURETIES ARE CLEARLY INSURERS. FURTHERMORE, THE DEFINITION OF INSURANCE UNDER THE FLORIDA INSURANCE CODE, IS BROAD ENOUGH TO ENCOMPASS SURETIES.

CHIEF JUSTICE: BUT MY THOUGHT ABOUT THIS, AND MAYBE IT IS JUST FROM LOOKING AT TRADITIONAL BADFAITH, IS THAT THE ESSENCE, AT LEAST OF COMMON LAW BADFAITH, IS THAT THERE IS A FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP THAT THE DEFENSE GIVES CONTROL OF THE DEFENSE IN ORDER TO ALLOW THE INSURER TO CONDUCT THE DEFENSE, AND THERE IS NO FED YOU SHALL AREA -- FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP IN AN INSURANCE RELATIONSHIP, IS THERE?

THERE IS A PRIMARY DUTY TO PROTECT THE OBLIGEE, AND THE BOND IS -- THE BOND IS TO PROTECT THE OBLIGEE, AND THE OBLIGEE IS NOT IN A POSITION TO PROTECT WHERE IT CANNOT PERFORM, AND THE SURETY IS THERE SIMPLY TO ENSURE THAT THE OBLIGEE CAN OBTAIN PERFORMANCE FROM THE CONTRACTOR. IT IS A PERFORMANCE BOND, AND IF YOU LOOK IN TERMS OF THE BOND, THEY ARE TO EITHER CAUSE THE CONTRACTOR TO PERFORM OR GO OUT AND OBTAIN OTHER CONTRACTORS TO PERFORM. IT ISN'T JUST TO MAKE SURE THAT WE HAVE A SATISFIED JUDGMENT AT THE CONCLUSION OF TWO AND-A-HALF YEARS OF LITIGATION.

WHY ISN'T THAT JUST A SIMPLE BREACH OF CONTRACT ON THE SURETY'S PART AS OPPOSED TO BAD FAITH?

BECAUSE THE BOND ONLY PROVIDES FOR THEM TO ASSURE PERFORMANCE AND, IF NECESSARY, PAY FOR THAT PERFORMANCE, BUT THE OBLIGATION TO THE OBLIGEE, IS TO PROTECT US FROM THE LOSSES THAT WOULD ARISE FROM THE FAILURE TO PERFORM THE CONTRACT, AND IN THIS CASE WE HAD AN ONGOING DEVELOPMENT. WE HAD TENANTS. WE HAD BUSINESS LOSSES WHICH WOULD NOT FALL WITHIN THE PERFORMANCE OF THE CONTRACT DAMAGES, MEANING THE CONTRACTOR'S CONTRACT. WE HAD DAMAGES RESULTING FROM THE DELAY OF THE SURETY, TO CONDUCT A GOOD FAITH INVESTIGATION AND MAKE A GOOD FAITH EFFORT TO --

BUT WHAT, THE WHOLE THING REVOLVES AROUND WHETHER THE CONTRACT IS PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS SET FORTH IN THE CONTRACT, IS IT NOT?

CORRECT.

OK AY. NOW, IN THIS SITUATION, THE SURETY IS, REALLY, STANDING BEHIND THE CONTRACTOR, BUT IF THE SURETY STEPS OUT IN FRONT AND VOLUNTEERS AND MAKES A PA

YMENT , BEFORE THE CONTRACTOR IS IN DEF AULT , OR IN AN INS TANCE BEFORE THERE IS AN ADJUDICATION OF THOSE RIGHTS, THE SU RETY IS A VOLUNTEER, ISN'T THAT RIGHT?

IT DEPENDS ON THE FA CTS .

WELL , UNDER THESE FACTS, WOULDN'T THAT HAVE BEEN THESITUATION?

WELL , WHETHER OR NOT THEY VOLUNTEER IS A FACT UAL QUESTION. AND THE PO INT IS , PART OF THE SPECIF ICATIONS OF THE CONTRACT IS THE TIME TABLE U NDER WHICH THE CONTRACT IS TO BE PERFO RMED , SO THEIR OBLIGATION, AND AS I SAID , IF YOU LO OK AT THE TERMS OF THE BOND --

DID YOU RE COVER DELAY DAMAGES?

EXCUSE ME?

DID YOU RECOVERCAL I DAMAGES UNDER THE -- DID YOU RECOVER DELAY DAMAGES UNDER THE CONTRACT?

WE RECEIVED IN TEREST.

THAT WAS PRESUMABLY TO COVER THE DELAY I N THE PERFORMANCE, IN THE PAYMENT , WAS IT N OT?

THE INTEREST WAS SIMPLY INTEREST ON THE MO NIES DUE FOR WHAT S HOULD HAVE BEEN DONE. THE BOND , MONEY THAT WE HADTO PAY TO GET THIN GS D ONE, IN ORDER TO GET THE CONTRACT COMPLETED, BUT THAT DID NOTGET US TI MELY COMPLETION OF THE CONTRACT, WHICH HAD BUSINESS CONSEQUEN CES , THAT WERE NOT --

WAS PROVISION IN THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT , TO COVERDELL I?

THERE IS A -- TO COVER DELAY?

THERE IS A PROVISION, NO, NOT IN THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT. THE RE IS A PROV ISION IN THE B OND THAT HAS TO DO WITH COSTS OF DELAY , BUT AS THIS COURT NOTED , IN JUSTICE McDONALD'S OP INION , THERE IS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DELAY DAMAGES RESULTING FROM THE CONTRACTOR AND DELAY DAMAGES RESULTING FROM THE SURETY'S OBLIGATION TO PERFOR M, ANDTHE SURETY'S OBLIGATION IS NOT SIMPLY TO STAND BEHIND THE CONTRACTOR . THEY HAVE THE OBLIGATION AND THE RI GHT TO G O OUT AND E ITH ER OBTAIN OTHER CONTRACTORS OR TO PURSUE THE OTHER PE OPLE INVOLVED IN THE PROJECT, BEC AUSE THEY ARE SUBROGATED TO OUR RIGHTS, FOR THE ARCHITECT AND SO FORTH , AND WE WERE THE ONES THAT HAD TO DO ALL OF THAT , AND WE OBTAINED NOTHINGOTHER THAN AN ADDITIONAL ADVERSARY FROM THE SURETY.

WAS THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT INCORPORATED IN THE SURETY BOND?

YES.

AND THAT WAS WHAT WAS GUARANTEED BY THE SURETY , WOULD BE PERFORMED. CORRECT?

WAS TO BE PERFORMED.

AND THEN THERE WERE CERTAIN PROVISIONS AS TO WHAT WOULD HAPPEN , IN , THERE WERE CERTAIN PROVISIONS IN THE BOND, THAT WHAT WOULD O CCUR UP ON THERE BEING A DEFAULT.

CORRECT .

AND ALL OF THAT WAS WRAPPED UP AND PUT BEFORE THE ARBITRATION PANEL, WAS IT NOT?

WE WERE NOT ENTITLED TO BRING A CLAIM FOR BAD FAITH, UNTIL WE ESTABLISHED THAT WE HAD A VALID CLAIM UNDER THE CONTRACT.

BUT YOU PRESENTED ALL OF THE ISSUES HAVING TO DO WITH THE CONTRACT. THE SURETY.

YES, BUT WE WERE NOT ALLOWED TO SEEK CERTAIN DAMAGES, AND WE WERE NOT ALLOWED TO CLAIM THAT THEY DIDN'T DO A VALID INVESTIGATION OR A GOOD FAITH EFFORT TO SETTLE OR PERFORM THE CONTRACT, BECAUSE THAT IS A SEPARATE CAUSE OF ACTION THAT DOESN'T ACCRUE UNTIL WE OBTAIN THE ARBITRATION AWARD AND HAVE ESTABLISHED A VALID CLAIM.

CHIEF JUSTICE: THE CERTIFIED QUESTION UNDER, IS A STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION QUESTION AS TO WHETHER A SURETY IS CONSIDERED AN INSURER.

YES. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE

AS OF TODAY WITH THE NEW LEGISLATION, THAT QUESTION HAS BEEN ANSWERED, AT LEAST FOR THE FUTURE.

YES, WITH RESPECT SOLELY TO PERFORMANCE AND PAYMENT BONDS FOR CONSTRUCTION MAINTENANCE OF BUILDINGS OR ROADWAYS AND NOT ANY OTHER SURETY, BUT, YES, AND IF YOU LOOK, OF COURSE, FIRST OF ALL THAT IS A SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE, AND WHILE IT PRETENDS TO BE A CLARIFICATION, IT IS 23 YEARS AFTER THE INITIAL ACT.

CHIEF JUSTICE: SO YOU ARE SAYING IT WOULDN'T, THAT CHANGE WOULDN'T, IF THIS CASE WAS BROUGHT AFTER THAT CHANGE, IT WOULD AFFECT THIS CASE?

IT, WHAT, IT WOULD BE THE DATE OF THE CONTRACT. THE SPONSOR OF THE BILL--

CHIEF JUSTICE: THE SURETY, YOU ARE SAYING, IT DOESN'T APPLY TO ALL SURETIES?

IT IS LIMITED IN ITS APPLICATION TO PERFORMANCE AND PAYMENT BONDS ON CONSTRUCTION OR MAINTENANCE OF BUILDINGS AND ROADWAY PROJECTS, NO OTHER SURETIES, WAS A VERY SPECIFIC -- MR. CHIEF JUSTICE

SO, A GAIN, YOUR SURETY --

OUR SURETY WOULD FALL WITHIN THAT, BUT OUR CONTRACT WAS EXECUTED IN 1995. NOW --

LET ME ASK YOU THIS, IS WHETHER OR NOT YOU CAN, IN FACT, PROVE THAT THERE IS A BAD FAITH, THAT QUESTION IS NOT REALLY BEFORE US, IS IT? I MEAN, AREN'T YOU HERE TO TRY, TRYING TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO ACTUALLY BRING THIS BAD FAITH ACTION?

CORRECT.

AND SO I, REALLY, WOULD LIKE TO HEAR YOUR ARGUMENT ON WHY YOU BELIEVE THAT THIS IS, YOUR CLIENT IS AN INSURED UNDER THIS PERFORMANCE BOND.

BECAUSE THIS COURT HAS HELD THAT THE PURPOSE OF A SURETY BOND IS TO PROTECT THE OBLIGEE. THE FLORIDA LEGISLATURE HAS CLEARLY DEFINED SURETIES WITHIN INSURERS, FOR PURPOSES OF THE FLORIDA INSURANCE CODE. IT IS DEFINED IN INSURANCE CONTRACTS OFFICIALLY BROADLY, TO ENCOMPASS THIS TYPE OF INSURANCE.

IS IT ACTUALLY DEFINED IN THE SECTION THAT YOU ARE BRINGING THIS ACTION UNDER , THE BAD FAITH ACTION?

THERE IS NOT A SPECIFIC DEFINITIONAL SECTION IN THAT STATUTE. THESE ARE DEFINITION THAT IS ARE GIVE N AT THE , 624. 02 AND .03 , WHICH ARE AT THEBEGINNING OF THE INSURANCE CODE.

SO YOU ARE BO RROW ING FROM THAT GENE RAL STAT UTE, TO MAKE THE ARGUMENT THAT YOUR CLIENT IS INSURED UNDER THIS PREMISE.

BEAR IN MIND THERE IS NO S PECIFIC DEFINITION IN THECODE FOR INSURED, WE ARE GOING FROM THE PREMISE THAT A SURETY CONTRACT IS DEEMED TO IT BE AN INSURANCE CONTRACT UNDER THE CODE, ASURETY IS DEEMED TO BE AN INSURER, AND IN THE RELATIONSHIP , THE PART Y TO BE PROTECTED IS THE OBLIGEE , AND WE HAVE CITED CASES FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS THAT SAY THAT THE OBLIGEE IS THE EQUIVALENT O F THE INSURED. OBVIOUSLY IT IS NOT THE PRINCIPLE , BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT PROTECTED FROM THE LO SS.

SO UNDER YOUR ANALYSIS, BOTH THE PRI NCIPLE AND THE OBLIGEE ARE INSURED.

NO. ONLY THE OBLIGEE , AND IN FACT, THERE IS THE SHANNON G LENN CASE, WHICH IS A FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT ACTION WHICH DETERMINES THE PRINCIPLE WOULD NOT BE AN INSURED , AND IRONICALLY , IT WAS WRITTEN BY THE SAME DISTRICT JUDGE IN THIS CASE , SPECIFICALLY SAID THAT THE OBLIGEE WOULD BE THE ONE WHO WOULD BE ABLE TO BRING A BADEAUX FAITH ACTION, BUT IT IS -- A BAD FAITH ACTION,BUT IT IS --

AS WE GO TH ROUGH , ISN'T IT TRUE , IN MA NY CASES, CERTAINLY HAVI NG TO DO WITH COMMON LAW ACTIONS , WHICH WE ARE NOT CONCERNED WITH A T ALL. S ELF -- SOME OF THE CASESH AVE SPECIFIC STATE STATUTORY PROVISIONS BUT DO NOT HAVE A PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE STATUTETHAT THEY DISCUSS. I WOULD LI KE FOR YOU AND YOUR OPPOSITION , TO PLEASE DIRECT OUR ATTENTION TO WHAT YOU BELIEVE T O BE THE CASE FROM OUT-OF-STATE THAT MAYINVOLVE A STATUTORY ACTION INVOLVES THE PRIVATE CAUSEOF ACTION THAT WOULD BE THE LEADING CASE IN THIS AREA. IF THERE IS SUCH A CASE.

ALL RIGHT . IF I CAN ADDRESS THAT ON REBUTTAL.

THAT IS FINE . AND GOING THROUGH IT , THEREASON FOR MY QUESTION IS THAT, IN GOING THROUGH AND READING ALL THESE CASES , WE FIND IT DIFFICULT TO FI ND A LEA DING CASE ON THIS,BECAUSE THE CO MMON LAW PRINCIP LES THAT WE ARE DISCUSSING IS NOT WHAT THIS CASE IS A B OUT. WE ARE STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.

CORRECT.

AND I THINK ALL OF US WOULD LIKE TO KNOW HOW AN IDENTICAL STATUTE HAS BEEN INTERPRETED , SOMEPLACE E LSE , TO APPLY FOR US TO TAKE A LOOK AT FOR GU IDANCE.

WELL , I WOULD NOTE GENERALLY, AND I WILL TR Y TO G IVE YOU A MORE SPECIFIC ANSWER ON MY REBUTTAL TLCHT IS A CASE OUT OF MONDAY -- REBUTTAL. THERE IS A CASE OUT OF MONTANA, WHICH HAS THE PRE CISE DEFINITION OF INSURANCE AND INSURED THAT WE HAVE IN OUR CODE. I DON'T BELIEVE THEY HAVE, AND I BE LIEVE IT I S A COM MON L AW CASE , BUT THEY RELY ON THE LEGISLATURE'S DEFINITION OF INSURER AS INCLUDING SURETY AND THE BROAD DEFINITION OF INSURANCE CONTRACT THAT ACTUALLY ENCOMPASSES SURETY CONTRACTS, AND THEY GO FROM THERE TO THE PREMIS E, BUT IT IS NOT EXACTLY WHAT --

BUT THEY USE THE STATUTETO SUPP ORT A COMMON LAW ACTION RATHER THAN THE PURE STATUTORY --

CORRECT, BUT THEY HAVE THE SAME DEFINITIONAL STANDARDS THAT WE HAVE HERE.

I THINK YOU SHOULD SEE WHAT IS GOING ON THIS MORNING. THERE IS A CONCERN THAT THIS RELATIONSHIP AND THE INDEMNIFICATION ASPECTS, JUST DON'T FIT THE TRADITIONAL MOLD THAT ALL OF US HAVE BEEN ACCUSTOMED TO FOR THE LAST 50 YEARS HERE, IN FLORIDA, WITH THE ADVENT OF BAD FAITH AND THOSE KINDS OF WOULD YOU PLEASE DIRECT US AS DIRECTLY AS YOU CAN, WHY THAT IS NOT A CONCERN AS YOU TAKE INTO ACCOUNT TODAY.

YOU MEAN THE CONCERN ABOUT --

THIS RELATIONSHIP. THE WHOLE RELATIONSHIP DOES NOT FIT THE WHOLE TRADITIONAL BAD-FAITH KIND OF CONCEPT, WHICH IS THE TENET OF THE QUESTION THAT WE HAVE BEEN TALKING ABOUT.

WELL THERE, ARE MANY CASES FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS AND MOST OF THEM ARE ONES THAT RECOGNIZE A COMMON LAW CLAIM THAT IS THAT THIS FITS PERFECTLY INTO THE SAME MODEL AS INSURANCE, FOR PURPOSES OF THIS KIND OF CLAIM, BECAUSE WHAT IS BEING HAPPENING IS THE OBLIGEE IS THE ONE WHO IS TO BE PROTECTED. THE OBLIGEE IS THE ONE WHO IS ESSENTIALLY AT THE MERCY OF THE SURETY, WHEN THE CONTRACT IS NOT PERFORMED, VERY SIMILAR TO AN INSURED

HOW DOES THIS INDEMNIFICATION WORK, THOUGH, BECAUSE IN THE THIRD PARTY BAD FAITH THERE, IS NO INDEMNIFICATION IN THIS BAD-FAITH CONTEXT. IN THE U.S., AS WE KNOW, THERE IS NO COMPARABLE INDEMNIFICATION -- COMPARABLE INDEMNIFICATION, AS JUST TEST WELLS HAS VOICED CONCERN WITH. SO HOW DO YOU INTEND TO INCLUDE YOUR PARTY AND HOW DO YOU EVALUATE THIS WHOLE PROCESS.

WELL, THEY ARE ALLOWED TO GO AFTER THE PRINCIPLE, OBVIOUSLY, FOR WHAT IS DETERMINED TO BE THE DAMAGES FOR FAILURE TO PERFORM. ALL WE ARE SAYING IS THEY HAVE THE OBLIGATION TO CONDUCT A REASONABLE INVESTIGATION, AND IF IT IS REASONABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE THEMANY OF THE OUT-OF-STATE CASES AND -- RESOLVE IT. MANY OF THE OUT-OF-STATE CASES ACKNOWLEDGE THAT, IF YOU ARE LIMITED TO CONTRACT DAMAGES, THE SURETY HAS NO MOTIVATION TO PAY TIMELY OR PURSUE ANY INTEREST OF THE OBLIGEE, BECAUSE THE LONGER THEY WAIT, THEY HAVE NO ADDITIONAL EXPOSURE OTHER THAN INTEREST, AND THE LONGER THEY WAIT, THE OBLIGEE WILL HAVE TO CAVE IN DUE TO BUSINESS CONCERNS, AND SO THE EQUITIES OF THE SITUATION ARE NO DIFFERENT, AND IN FACT, ONE OF THEM SAYS THAT THIS IS ESSENTIALLY IDENTICAL TO THE MODEL FOR INSURANCE AND WHY BAD FAITH CLAIMS IN THE INSURANCE CONTEXT WERE DEVELOPED, BECAUSE THE PERSON OTHERWISE HAS NO LEVERAGE, BECAUSE THE SURETY HAS TOTAL CONTROL, THE INSURER HAS TOTAL CONTROL OVER THE DECISION TO EITHER PAY THE CLAIM OR --

MY CONCERN, QUITE FRANKLY, IS WHEN YOU HAVE A SOLVENT CONTRACTOR LIKE YOU HAVE IN THIS CASE, THE BATTLE AND THE DISAGREEMENT, IS, REALLY, BETWEEN THE OWNER AND THE CONTRACTOR, AND WHAT THE SURETY IS DOING, IS STANDING IN SECOND PLACE, TO BE THEREIN THE EVENT THAT THERE IS NOT A PERFORMANCE, BUT IT ALL COMES BACK TO THE OBLIGATION OF THE CONTRACTOR UNDER THE CONTRACT, WHERE YOU HAVE GOT A SOLID, BECAUSE IN THE END, IF YOU COLLECT AGAINST THE SURETY, THEN THE SURETY HAS A RIGHT TO GET EVERYTHING BACK FROM THE CONTRACTOR, AND THAT JUST DOESN'T FIT IN THE NORMAL INSURANCE CONTEXT.

BUT AS NOTED IN THE UNITED BONDING CASE OUT OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT, A SURETY IS NOT SIMPLY A GUARANTEE THAT YOUR JUDGMENT WILL BE SATISFIED AFTER PROLONGED LITIGATION. IT IS A BUSINESSMAN'S ASSURANCE THAT HIS BUSINESS VENTURE CAN GO ON, THE CONTRACT WILL BE PERFORMED TIMELY. IT IS NOT SIMPLY COMPLETION OF THE CONTRACT. IT IS TIMELY

PERFORMANCE , AND THAT IS WHY THE SURETY HAS THE OBLIGATION NOT SIMPLY TO STAND BACK AND SUPPORT FINA NCIALY THE CONTRACTOR, BUT U PON PRO PER NOTICE, COME IN AND INSURE THAT THAT CONTRACT IS PERFORMED , E ITH ER WITH THAT CONTRACTOR OR OTHER CONTRACTORS , AND I F THEY SIMPLY SIT BACK AND PERFORM NO INVESTIGATION -- MR. CHIEF JUSTICE

I WANT TO REMIND EVERYBODY YOU ARE SUBSTANTIALLY IN YOUR REBUTTAL.

IF HE WANTS TO SAVE TIME --

I WOULD LIKE TO RESERVE A LITTLE TIME.THANK YOU.

CHIEF JUSTICE: O KAY . MR . C RAIG , NOW , THEDEFENDANT , THE APPELLEES , THEY ARE GO ING TO BE DIVIDING THEIR TIME. YOU ARE TAKING 17 MINUTES AND THEN MR . MI LLS THREE MINUTES.

THAT'S CORR ECT.

CHIEF JUSTICE: THE Y E LLOW LIGHT WILL COME ON A T 17 MINUTES.

THAN K YOU FOR THAT GUIDANCE. MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT. WHEN A DISPUTE AR ISES O N A BOND -- MR. CHIEF JUSTICE

IF YOU CAN STATE YOUR APPEARANCE FOR THE RECORD.

MY NAME IS LEE CRAIG , YOUR HONOR, AND I A M HERE FOR THE APPELLEES IN THIS CASE. WHEN A DISPUTE ARI SES ON A BONDED PROJ ECT, WHA T YOU HAVE IS THE OBLIGEE , THE O WNER ON ONE SIDE , SAYING, LOOK, THE PROJECT IS NOT BEING CONSTRUCTED PROPERLY. I WANT THE SURETY TO COME IN AND PAY TO FIX T BUT ON THE OTHER SIDE, YOU HAVE GOT THE PRINCIPAL , THE CONTRACTOR SAYING, NO, NO , NO , THE PROJECT IS BEING CONSTRUCTED PROPERLY, AND DON'T GO I N AND ELBOW ME OUT OF THE WAYTO FIX IT , BECAUSE IF YOU DO THAT, YOU ARE GOING TO BE EXPENDING MY MONEY BECAUSE OF THE GE NERAL INDEMNITY OBLIGATION IN THE CONTEXT OF A BOND , SO THE SURETY IS STUCK IN THE MI DDLE OF THIS CONTROVERSY OF THIS DISPUTE , AND IT WOULD BE PATENTLY UNFAIR, IT IS NOT UNLIKE JUSTICE WELLS 'S CONCURRENCEIN THE ZABRASKY CASE, WHICH IS RECOGNIZED THAT THE UNFAIRNESS OF AN INSURANCE COMPANY TO WE IGH COMP ETING OBLIGATIONS IT TO PART IES. THIS CASE, THIS CASE THAT WE ARE HERE ON TODAY , IS THE P OSTER CHILD OR IS THE PERFECT EXAMPL E OF THE POTENTIAL IN JUSTICE THAT WOULD RESULT FROM THE LAW REQUIRING A SURETY TO FAVOR THE INTERE ST OF THE OBLIGEE OVER THE INTEREST O F THE PRINCIPAL

CHIEF JUSTICE: I KNOW W E T ALK A LOT ABOUT THE GENERAL POLICY, BUT YOU AGREE WE ARE HERE TODAY AS TO WHAT THE FLORIDA LEGISLATURE INTEND AS TO WHETHER THE CONTRACT OF A SURETY IS TO BE CONSIDERED UNDER 621.4155, CORRECT?

YES, YOUR HO NOR.I BELIEVE THAT, WHEN THE LEGISLATURE, WHEN THE ELEVENTH CIRC UIT CERTIFIED THE FIRST QUESTION HERE TODAY , WHICH IS ESSENTIALLY WHETHER AN OBLIGEE IS INSURED UNDER THE CI VIL REMEDY STATUTE, NINE MONTHS LATER I BELIEVE THAT THE LEGISLATURE ANSWERED THAT QUESTION. NOW, THEY ANSWERED IT IN A BROADWAY, B Y T ELLING US THAT SURETIES ARE NOT INSURED S UNDER THE CIVIL REMEDIES STATUTE.

CHIEF JUSTICE: BUT YOUUNDERSTAND THAT NO NE OF OUR CASE LAW WOULD SAY THAT THE LEGISLATURE CAN ANSWER A QUESTION BY AM ENDING A STATUTE, A STATUTE THAT WAS PUT INTO PLACE SOME 20 YEARS BEFORE, SO THAT IS N ICE FOR THE FUTURE, BUT IT DOESN'T, IT COULD BE JUST AS MUCH TO SAY , MY GOODNESS , THEY DECIDED THAT THEY DIDN'T WANT TO HAVE IT AS BROAD, SO THEY WE NT AND NARROWED IT, SO WE CAN'T REALLY TAKE THAT THEY

ANSWERED THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT QUESTION FOR THE PAST.

WELL, I WOULD SAY THAT, YOUR HONOR, THIS CASE DIDN'T ARISE 20 YEARS AGO. THIS CASE AROSE TODAY, AND THE CERTIFIED QUESTION CAME OUT IN THIS CASE LAST SEPTEMBER AND THEN THE LEGISLATURE ACTED, AND WE CAN SPECULATE ABOUT WHAT WAS IN THE MIND OF THE LEGISLATURE IN 1982, WHEN THE CIVIL REMEDY STATUTE CAME INTO BEING, BUT WE KNOW ONE THING FOR ABSOLUTE CERTAIN. WE KNOW WHAT THE LEGISLATURE THINKS THAT STATUTE MEANS TODAY, AND WE KNOW THE PUBLIC POLICY.

WELL, LET'S GO BACK TO WHEN THE LEGISLATION WAS ENACTED.

YES, YOUR HONOR.

IT IS UNFORTUNATE, BUT ALL TOO OFTEN, THE LEGISLATURE ACTS FROM, REALLY, A SIMPLE MODEL. JUSTICE LEWIS HAS ADDRECEMBER DOCTORED IT -- HAS ADDRESSED IT TO SOME EXTENT, AND THAT IS MAYBE THE PEOPLE, MAYBE BECAUSE ONE OF THEIR RELATIVES HAD A BAD EXPERIENCE WITH AN INSURANCE COMPANY, WHATEVER THE SITUATION MAY BE, SO THEY SEE THAT, PERHAPS THERE HAVE BEEN UNFAIR CLAIMS PRACTICES, YOU KNOW, THAT WE ALL HAVE INSURANCE, BECAUSE HOPEFULLY, IF OUR ROOF IS DAMAGED OR OUR AUTOMOBILE IS DAMAGED OR WHATEVER THE SITUATION IS, OUR INSURANCE COMPANY, WHEN WE FILE A CLAIM, THE TIME THAT THEY GIVE US AND ALL OF THAT KIND OF THING LIKE THAT, THAT THEY WILL EVALUATE IT, AND THEY WILL PAY IT, YOU KNOW, AND THE LEGISLATURE SEES THAT SIMPLE MODEL, AND THEN THEY SAY, WELL, IF THE INSURANCE COMPANY IS GOING TO HAS SLE FLORIDA INSUREDS, AND IF THEY REALLY HASSLE THE M TO A GREAT DEGREE, WE ARE GOING TO GIVE INSUREDS THE RIGHT TO, A LSO, SUE FOR BAD FAITH.

THAT'S RIGHT.

THE PROBLEM COMES, THOUGH, IN THE FACT THAT THEY MAY HAVE HAD THAT IS SUE IN THEIR MINDS WHEN THEY DRAFTED THE LEGISLATION, BUT WHEN THEY USE TERMS LIKE INSURED AND INSURER AND THE OTHER TERMS HERE, THEY WRITE THOSE TERMS RATHER BROADLY, AND WE SEE IN OTHER ASPECTS OF THE INSURANCE CODE OR OTHER PROVISIONS IN THE STATUTE, THAT SEEM TO INCLUDE SURETIES, YOU KNOW, WITHIN THAT, SO THAT SORT OF, I WOULD POSIT THAT AS THE DEL I AM A THAT -- DILEMMA THAT WE FACE, YOU KNOW, TODAY. OBVIOUSLY THERE ARE DIFFERENCES IN ALL OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT MIGHT BE FACED, BUT HOW DO WE OVERCOME THESE RATHER BROAD DEFINITIONS THAT SEEM TO BE IN PLACE IN DEFINING AN INSURER AS INCLUDING A SURETY? THAT IS SORT OF, WHAT WE ARE INITIALLY CONFRONTED WITH, AND, OF COURSE, THAT IS THE FLAG THAT YOUR OPPONENT IS CARRYING, IS ALL OF THESE OTHER PLACES THE INSURANCE CODE SEEMS TO SUGGEST THAT ASURETY IS, ALSO, AN INSURER, FOR PURPOSES OF THIS LEGISLATION. COULD YOU HELP US WITH THAT SORT OF HEAD ON, RECOGNIZING, AS WE, YOU KNOW, THAT THERE ARE ALWAYS SORT OF A SIMPLE SCENARIO THAT THE LEGISLATURE IS FACING TO BEGIN, WITH THEN THE QUESTION, YOU KNOW, BECOMES WHEN THESE OTHER SITUATIONS OCCUR, HAD THEY WRITTEN IT SO BROADLY, TO INCLUDE THAT. CAN YOU HELP ME WITH THAT. ISN'T THAT THE ISSUE THAT WE, REALLY, FACE?

WELL, I WILL DO MY BEST TO ANSWER THAT, JUSTICE ANSTEAD. I THINK THAT WHAT YOU HAVE JUST SAID IS TRUE. THAT THE LEGISLATURE WAS DEALING WITH A SIMPLE MODEL IN 1982, AND JUST AS YOU HAVE OUTLINED, AND DID NOT HAVE IN MIND, THE RAMIFICATIONS THAT THAT WOULD HAVE ON CONTRACTS, ON BONDED CONTRACTS, ON PUBLIC PROJECTS, ON SURETIES, ON OWNERS, ON CONTRACTORS, AND YOU KNOW, THE HISTORY THAT WE HAVE, THE BILL ANALYSIS THAT IS IN THE RECORD, IS VERY SKETCHY, BUT IT CERTAINLY MAKES NO MENTION OF ANY OF THOSE THINGS. IT IS CONSISTENT WITH WHAT YOU JUST SAID. ANOTHER PROBLEM THAT WE HAVE, IS WE ALWAYS START WITH THAT IT IS FUNDAMENTAL, THAT IS THE LANGUAGE THAT THE LEGISLATURE USES, IT THAT WE ARE GENERALLY BOUND BY, SO IF THEY USE A TERM THAT

IS OTHERWISE BROADLY DEFINED IN OTHER PLACES IN THE STATUTORY SCHEME, THAT ORDINARILY WE ARE STUCK WITH THAT, YOU KNOW, AND WE STOP RIGHT THERE AND SAY THAT IS, YOU KNOW, UNLESS IT WOULD ACHIEVE, REALLY, AN IRRATIONAL OUTCOME.

WELL, LET ME OFFER THIS AS WHAT I THINK SHOULD PROVIDE SOME GUIDANCE TO THE COURT IN THAT REGARD. I DON'T DISPUTE, OF COURSE, THE DEFINITION OF INSURER THAT INCLUDES SURETIES. AND SO IT IS CLEAR THAT THE LEGISLATURE DID INTEND SURETIES TO BE ENCOMPASSED BY THE INSURANCE CODE TO SOME EXTENT, BUT I WOULD OFFER THAT, NOT IN EVERY INSTANCE IS AN INSURER, IS ASURETY AN INSURER UNDER THE CODE, AND LET ME GIVE YOU AN EXAMPLE. WHEN THE LEGISLATURE WANTED TO MAKE IT EXPLICIT THAT SURETIES WERE BEING ADDRESSED AND ENCOMPASSED IN THE INSURANCE CODE, THEY SAID SO. IN SECTION 627.752 THROUGH SECTION 627.759, THE CODE SPECIFICALLY APPLIES TO SURETIES. IT IS THERE, THAT THE RIGHT TO ISSUE BONDS IS SET FORTH IN THE STATUTE, AND I WOULD POINT OUT THAT ONE OF THOSE SECTIONS 627.756, SPECIFICALLY INCORPORATES OWNERS, OBLIGEEES, INTO THE ATTORNEY FEE SHIFTING PROVISION OF THE CODE. IT SAYS OWNERS, SUBCONTRACTORS AND SO ON, SHALL BE DEEMED TO BE INSURED UNDER THE FEE SHIFTING STATUTE. AND I WOULD SAY THAT, IF THE LEGISLATURE, IN DEFINING INSURER, INTENDED FOR SURETY SHIFT TO BE ENCOMPASSED BY THE WHOLE INSURANCE CODE, THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO NEED FOR THAT CLARIFICATION THAT I JUST QUOTED YOU FROM THE ATTORNEY FEE STATUTE.

DID WE HAVE, PRIOR TO THE ADOPTION OF 624.155, ANY CASE WHICH YOU ARE AWARE OF OUT OF THIS COURT OR THE DISTRICT COURTS, THAT HAD HELD THAT THERE WAS A BAD-FAITH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST A CONTRACT SURETY?

PART OF THE ADOPTION -- PRIOR TO THE ADOPTION OF THE STATUTE?

THAT'S RIGHT.

I AM NOT AWARE OF ANY SUCH CASE, YOUR HONOR.

ARE YOU AWARE OF ANY CASE IN WHICH THAT HAS ACTUALLY BEEN DEBATED?

I JUST STATED, NO, YOUR HONOR, I AM NOT. I THINK THIS IS TRULY A CASE OF FIRST IMPRESSION.

THERE HAD BEEN ADOPTED, PRIOR TO 624.155, KRR CONSIDERABLE -- CONSIDERABLE LITIGATION OVER THIRD PARTY LIABILITY BAD FAITH.

OF COURSE.

AND THERE HAD BEEN A DEBATE CONCERNING FIRST PARTY LIABILITY UNDER UNINSURED MOTORIST CLAIMS UNDER BAXTER VERSUS ROYAL INDEMNITY, CORRECT?

CORRECT.

SO THOSE ARE ALL MATTERS WHICH WERE IN THE FLORIDA COURT SYSTEM, PRIOR TO THE ADOPTION OF THE STATUTE.

THAT'S RIGHT, AND I BELIEVE THAT THE STATUTE WAS ATTEMPTED TO ADDRESS THAT DEBATE, AND ESTABLISH THE LAW THAT WOULD GOVERN.

WOULD YOU GO BACK AND, ALSO, RESPOND TO THE QUESTION I PROPOUNDED TO YOUR OPPONENTS, WITH REGARD TO OTHER STATES. AS I HAVE GONE THROUGH AND READ EVERY ONE OF THESE CASES, I CAN'T FIND ONE THAT, REALLY, ANSWERS THE QUESTION BEFORE US TODAY, BUT WHAT I DO FIND IS THAT EVEN STATES THAT REFUSE TO DO A COMMON LAW ACTION, THAT

THEY SAY WE CANNOT, BECAUSE OUR STATUTE DOES NOT PROVIDE A PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION , OR THEY USE THAT AS YOUR OPPOSITION AS SUGGESTED TO SUPPORT A COMMON LAW. DO YOU HAVE A CASE YOU CAN POINT TO FOR US , WHERE THERE IS A PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER A STATE STATUTE THAT HAS BEEN INTERPRETED AS THIS ONE, BECAUSE I CANNOT.

I DON'T THINK THERE IS A CASE THAT FITS EXACTLY IN THAT PIGEON HOLE , YOUR HONOR.

WHAT IS THE ONE THAT YOU SAY WE SHOULD FOLLOW THE BEST.

THE CASE CONSTRUCTION CASE OUT OF CALIFORNIA.

I AGREE IT IS COMMON LAW AND THE DISSENT IS QUITE STRONG AND QUITE PERSUASIVE ON THAT CASE , DON' T YOU AGREE?

I THINK THERE ARE GOOD ARGUMENTS ON BOTH SIDES , BUT CALIFORNIA AND TEXAS AND THE LEADING STATES IN THE COUNTRY , HAVE GONE THE CORRECT WAY ON THE ISSUE.

WOULD YOU SHARE -- CORRECT WAY ON THE ISSUE.

WOULD YOU SHARE WITH ME WHY YOU BELIEVE THAT THE COMMON LAW ANALYSIS IS THE CORRECT ANALYSIS FOR THIS STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION THAT WE HAVE TO DEAL WITH.

I WOULD SAY THAT THE COMMON LAW ANALYSIS IS A BROADER ANALYSIS. WHEN I POINT TO THE CASE DECISION, I AM TALKING ABOUT THE RATIONALE FOR THE SORT OF DISTINCTIONS THAT JUSTICE WELLS SPOKE OF , BETWEEN INSURANCE AND SURETYSHIP, AND THE SORT OF RAMIFICATIONS THAT I HOPE I MADE CLEAR EARLIER, FOR ATTEMPTING TO FIT WHAT IS ESSENTIALLY A SQUARE PEG INTO A ROUND HOLE . IT JUST DOESN'T FIT, SO THE RATIONALE IN CASES IS WHAT I HOPE THE COURT WOULD ACCEPT AND PAY ATTENTION TO. I DON'T - -

WELL, COULD YOU SPEAK JUST TO THE ISSUE OF THE DIFFERENCE IN THE NATURE OF THE FORMATION OF THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE TYPICAL INSURANCE CASE AND THE SURETY CASE. IN THE CASE HERE , WE HAVE AN INDUSTRY AIA FORM , THAT , IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING IT IS TO BALANCE THE INTEREST OF ALL THREE PARTIES INVOLVED. COULD YOU JUST SPEAK TO THAT ISSUE.

WELL , I DON'T KNOW IF I CAN ANSWER YOUR QUESTION , JUSTICE BELL. ONE OF THE DISTINCTIONS , I WILL ANSWER IT THIS WAY , ONE OF THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN AN INSURANCE POLICY AND A BOND, IS THAT AN INSURANCE POLICY TYPICALLY IS A CONTRACT OF ADHESION. IT IS A FORM THAT IS APPROVED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES ON FILE. IT IS OFFERED TO THE INSURED , THE POTENTIAL POLICYHOLDER ON A TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT BASIS. A BOND IS COMPLETELY DIFFERENT FROM THAT. FIRST OF ALL , IT INCORPORATES A CONTRACT THAT WAS NEGOTIATED BETWEEN THE OWNER, THE OBLIGEE AND THE CONTRACTOR, THE PRINCIPLE , BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY IT IS THE BOND , THE FORM OF THE BOND IS EITHER SELECTED BY OR DRAFTED BY THE OBLIGEE AND CONTAINS THE RIGHT TO CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES THAT THE OBLIGEE PUTS IN THERE AND IS -- REMEDIES THAT THE OBLIGEE PUTS IN THERE AND IS ON A TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT TYPE OF BASIS , AND TO PERFORM --

IT IS IN THE FILING WITH THE STATE?

THAT'S CORRECT, YOUR HONOR, AND THERE ARE MANY, AS OPPOSED TO INSURANCE POLICY FORMS, THERE ARE TREMENDOUS NUMBER OF BOND INSURANCE FORMS USED IN THE STATE OF FLORIDA.

CHIEF JUSTICE: WHAT ABOUT , A GAIN , WHEN THE LEGISLATURE WAS SEEKING TO ENACT 624.155 , AS JUSTICE ANSTEAD SAID , WE MIGHT NOT KNOW WHAT THEY INTENDED, BUT DON'T YOU HAVE

A SITUATION THAT, IF, THIS ISN'T RECOGNIZED AS A CAUSE, A STATUTORY CAUSE OF ACTION THAT YOU CAN HAVE SURETY THAT DOES NOT PERFORM DILIGENT INVESTIGATIONS AND HAVE NO MOTIVATION TO PAY THEIR OBLIGATION IN A TIMELY MANNER?

NO, YOUR HONOR. I THINK THAT THERE ARE SUFFICIENT DETERRENTS IN PLACE, WITHOUT RECOGNIZING A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE STATUTE, FOR SURETIES TO PERFORM THEIR OBLIGATIONS. I WOULD POINT OUT, FIRST OF ALL, THAT AS WE KNOW FROM THE DAVID BO LAND CASE HAD, THAT THE, AND FROM THE STATUTE, THAT THE SURETY IS EXPOSED TO ATTORNEY FEES, AND THAT THEY CAN, IF THERE IS A SEPARATE FAULT ON THE PART OF THE SURETY, EXCEED THE PENAL SUM OF THE BOND. I WOULD SAY, ALSO, THAT THEY ARE LIABLE FOR INTEREST AS THEY WERE IN THIS CASE. ATTORNEY FEES WERE PAID THIS THIS CASE IN EXCESS OF \$700,000. I WOULD SAY THAT, THIS IS, AS I MENTIONED A MOMENT AGO, AN ARM'S LENGTH TRANSACTION, IN WHICH THE OBLIGEE IS FREE TO PUT WHATEVER CONTRACTUAL REMEDIES THE OBLIGEE THINKS IT NEEDS INTO THE AGREEMENT, TO PROTECT ITSELF, AND I WOULD SAY FRANKLY, IN GENERAL, IT WOULD BE BAD FOR BUSINESS, FOR SURETIES TO SIMPLY DISREGARD THEIR OBLIGATIONS UP UNDER THEIR BOND, AND THEY WOULD QUICKLY BE BLACKLISTED, AND YOU WOULD HAVE OBLIGEE'S REFUSING TO ACCEPT THE SURETY'S BOND. OF COURSE THERE IS, ALSO, REGULATION BY THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, SO ALL OF THOSE THINGS ARE DETERRENTS TO SURETIES RUNNING WILLY-NILLY OVER THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER A BOND. I DON'T THINK IT IS NECESSARY TO PUT INTO EFFECT, A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE STATUTE THAT WOULD, AS I SAID, PLACE THE SURETY IN A POSITION OF HAVING TO FAVOR THE OBLIGEE OVER THE PRINCIPLE IN ITS EVALUATION, AND BAUFT FEAR OF BAD FAITH -- BECAUSE OF THE FEAR OF A BAD-FAITH ACTION COMING DOWN AND THE BALANCED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THESE TWO PARTIES.

CHIEF JUSTICE: BECAUSE THE STATUTORY CHANGE DOES EXTEND TO THIS TYPE OF PERFORMANCE BOND, DOES IT, IS IT INCLUDING OR EXCLUDING EVERY TYPE OF SURETY RELATIONSHIP, EVERY TYPE OF BOND IN THE AMENDMENT TO THE STATUTE?

WELL, THE AMENDMENT TO THE STATUTE DOES NOT ENCOMPASS EVERY TYPE OF BOND, BUT I WOULD ARGUE THAT THE CIVIL REMEDY STATUTE WAS NOT, WAS NOT INTEND AND DOES NOT ENCOMPASS SURETY RELATIONSHIPS AT ALL.

CHIEF JUSTICE: BUT ISN'T THAT, REALLY, A PROBLEM, AGAIN, IF WE WERE TO LOOK TO THE FUTURE, THAT IS TO WHAT HAPPENED, THE FACT IS THAT THEY COULD HAVE JUST MADE A STATEMENT FOR THE FUTURE THAT A SURETY IS NOT AN INSURER FOR ANY PURPOSE UNDER THIS STATUTE. THEY DIDN'T DO THAT.

NO. BUT I THINK THAT THIS COURT NEED ONLY ANSWER THE CERTIFIED QUESTION.

CHIEF JUSTICE: BUT IN DOING SO, AGAIN, YOU POINTED AND YOU SAID, WELL, WE SHOULD REALLY LOOK TO WHAT THEY INTENDED. WELL, THIS SOUNDS LIKE NOW THEY ARE SAYING, LISTEN, WE WERE REALLY SLICING IT HALFWAY. WE WERE GOING TO INCLUDE CERTAIN BONDS AND EXCLUDE CERTAIN BONDS, IF YOU WERE TO LOOK RETROSPECTIVELY. SO I AM NOT SURE THAT REALLY HELPS AGAIN, HELPS US VERY MUCH, IN LOOKING BACK 23 YEARS, BUT, NOW, 23 YEARS LATER, THEY ELIMINATE CERTAIN TYPES OF SURETY RELATIONSHIPS FROM THE STATUTE BUT NOT ALL OF THEM.

WELL, THE ONE THING THAT I THINK DOES HELP, IS THE LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE THAT SPECIFICALLY DEMS OBLIGEE'S TO BE COVERED BY THE FEE STATUTE, BUT THE FEE-SHIFTING STATUTE, BECAUSE AS I SAID, IT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN NECESSARY TO DO THAT, IF THE LEGISLATURE INTENDED SURETIES TO BE IN FOR ALL PURPOSES. WITH THE COURT'S PERMISSION, I WANT TO CEDE MY REMAINING TIME TO THE AMICUS ON THE SIDE OF THE SURETY, THANK YOU

GOOD MORNING. MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT. MY NAME IS SETH MILLS REPRESENTING THE SURETY ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA AND ITS 500-MEMBER COMPANIES WHO WRITE MOST OF THE BONDS IN THIS COMPANY PARTICULARLY IN FLORIDA. I WOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS A FEW OF THE QUESTIONS, IF I MAY, THAT HAVE ALREADY BEEN ASKED HERE TODAY. WITH REGARD TO JUSTICE ANSTEAD'S QUESTION RELATING TO THE DEFINITION OF A TERM, WE ARE HERE ON A CERTIFIED QUESTION ON A TERM THAT IS NOT DEFINED IN THE STATUTE, THAT IS WHETHER OR NOT THE OBLIGEE IS THE INSURED. IT IS TRUE THAT THE CODE IS DEFINED, THE SURETY FOR REGULATORY PURPOSES AS AN INSURER. THAT HAS ALREADY BEEN ADDRESSED BY OTHER COUNSEL HERE TODAY, BUT THERE IS NO DEFINITION AS TO INSURED. I WOULD SUBMIT TO THE COURT THAT IF THERE IS NO POLICY OF INSURANCE AND I WOULD SUBMIT HERE FROM ALL OF THE DISTINCTIONS ALREADY BROUGHT OUT, THERE CAN BE NO INSURED. WE ARE ATTACHED IF YOU WILL, TO THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, FOR REGULATORY MATTERS, BUT NOT AS A MATTER OF BAD FAITH. I WOULD, ALSO, LIKE --

IT SEEMS AS THOUGH COUNSEL IN THE PREVAILING AUTHORITY, EVEN FOR COMMON LAW ACTIONS, THEY TREAT THAT AS A SUFFICIENT RELATIONSHIP, THOUGH, EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF THE STATUTE. THEY MAY LOOK TO THE STATUTE FOR SOME GUIDANCE AS IF, AS SURETYSHIP REGULATED, BUT ISN'T THERE A CASE THAT APPROACHED THIS ON THE BASIS THAT THERE IS NO INSURANCE CONTRACT, NO INSURANCE INSTRUMENT TO SUPPORT A CAUSE OF ACTION? I DIDN'T SEE ONE OF THOSE, I DON'T BELIEVE.

YOUR HONOR, I BELIEVE THAT, IF, AT LEAST WE READ THE MASTER CLEAN DECISION OUT OF SOUTH CAROLINA THAT IS CITED IN OUR BRIEF, AND, ALSO, THE GREAT AMERICAN CASE OUT OF THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT. MASTER CLEAN WAS OUT OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT.

TEXAS CASE GOES THE OPPOSITE WAY. THEY GO WITH THE STATUTE, DID THEY NOT?

THEY DID GO THE OPPOSITE WAY, YOUR HONOR, HOWEVER THEY HAD STATUTORY REGULATION THAT DEFINED SURETY AS AN INSURER THAT HELD THAT THERE WAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BAD FAITH UNDER COMMON LAW, IN BOTH MASTER KLEIN AND IN THE -- MASTER CLEAN AND IN THE GREAT AMERICAN CASE OUT OF TEXAS.

WAS THAT A CASE WHERE THERE WAS NO INSURANCE INVOLVED?

NO.

THAT IS WHY I AM ASKING, BECAUSE YOU TOOK THE POSITION, THE LEGAL POSITION THAT THERE IS NO INSURANCE EVIDENCE UPON WHICH YOU CAN PREDICATE THE CLAIM. MASTER CLEAN SAYS THAT?

NO, AND I MIGHT HAVE SPOKEN TOO BROADLY. THE MERE FACT THAT WE ARE REGULATED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE SERVICES AS AN INSURER, DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY LEND ITSELF TO THE CONCLUSION ON AN UNDEFINED TERM IN THIS STATUTE, THAT AN OBLIGEE IS AN INSURED. I WOULD, ALSO, LIKE TO ADDRESS, JUST ADD VERY BRIEFLY -- MR. CHIEF JUSTICE

YOUR THREE MINUTES GO VERY QUICKLY.

THANK, YOUR HONOR.

CHIEF JUSTICE: THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

IN MY BRIEF TIME, I WOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS, JUSTICE -- TO ADDRESS, EXCUSE ME, JUSTICE LEWIS'S INQUIRY. THE MONTANA CASE WAS AN ISSUE THAT ADDRESSED WHETHER A NATIONAL SURETY IS AN INSURED WITHIN THE MEANING OF A PARTICULAR STATUTE

AND THEREFORE SUBJECT TO SUIT UNDER THAT STATUTE FOR BAD-FAITH INSURANCE PRACTICES. THE SPARCOWSKY CASE OUT OF NORTH DAKOTA INVOLVED A CASE THAT THE SURETY WAS INSURED FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE UNFAIR INSURANCE PRACTICES ACT. I COULD NOT TELL WHETHER IT WAS A SPECIFIC CIVIL CAUSE OF ACTION, BUT THE MAJORITY OF CASES AS CITED IN OUR BRIEF, HOLDS THAT THERE IS A DUTY IN THIS CASE THAT IS NOT FORCIBLE, SEPARATE AND APART FROM THE CONTRACT. THE JURISDICTION THAT IS FOUND IN SUCH DUTY ARE ONES WHERE THEY LOOKED AT THE LEGISLATION AND SURETIES ARE EXEMPTED FOR WHATEVER REASON, SEPARATELY REGULATED OR NOT DEFINED. IT WAS SUGGESTED HERE THAT YOU HAVE TO HAVE A POLICY OF INSURANCE TO HAVE AN INSURED, BUT WHAT WAS OVERLOOKED WAS 624.02 DEFINES INSURANCE CONTRACT IN OUR FLORIDA INSURANCE CODE, BROADLY ENOUGH TO INCLUDE SURETY, AND DEFINES SURETY AS AN INSURER, SO HOW, THE OBLIGEE, WHO IS CONSISTENTLY RECOGNIZED AS THE MOST SIMILAR TO AN INSURED, AND THAT THAT IS THE PERSON TO BE PROTECTED BY THE BOND.

CHIEF JUSTICE: BUT IS THIS THE PROBLEM, AND, AGAIN WHEN WE SWITCH IT AROUND, THE QUESTION IS NOT WHETHER THE SURETY IS AN INSURED BUT WHETHER THE OBLIGEE IS AN INSURED, AND THE FACT THAT THEY ARE RECOGNIZED SPECIFICALLY FOR THE ATTORNEYS FEES, FOR THAT PURPOSE, SEEMS TO SUGGEST THAT, WHEN THE LEGISLATURE WANTED TO INCLUDE THEM AS INSURED, THEY SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED IT, AND UNDER OUR THEORY OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, THAT WOULD MEAN THE ABSENCE OF INCLUDING THEM IN THIS STATUTE WOULD SAY THAT THEY COULDN'T BE QUALIFIED AS AN INSURED.

NO, YOUR HONOR. THE REASON WHY THEY ARE SPECIFIED IN THAT STATUTE IS TO EXCLUDE PRINCIPLES FROM OBTAINING ATTORNEYS FEES BECAUSE THE PRINCIPLE IS NOT INSURED UNDER ANYBODY'S ANALYSIS. WHAT THAT STATUTE DOES IS SPECIFIES MATERIAL MEN, OWNERS, THE PEOPLE WHO ARE THE OBLIGEE, AND THE REASON THEY DID THAT IS BECAUSE OTHERWISE, IF YOU SIMPLY SAID ANYBODY WITH A BENEFICIARY, UNDER A BROADER TERM UNDER AN INSURANCE CONTRACT, IF YOU CONSTRUCT THAT TO INCLUDE SURETIES, THAT WOULD BE A PRINCIPLE, WHICH NO JURISDICTION, UNDER THE MASTER CLEAN CASE THAT THE AMICUS CITED, WAS A PRINCIPLE TRYING TO SUE FOR BAD FAITH. THAT COURT NEVER ADDRESSED OBLIGEE, BUT THE REASON IT IS IN THE ATTORNEYS FEES STATUTE IS TO MAKE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THOSE THAT ARE DEEMED TO BE PROTECTED BY THE BOND AND THE PRINCIPLE, WHO IS NOT IN THE SAME RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SURETY AND SHOULD NOT HAVE A RIGHT TO ATTORNEYS FEES, BECAUSE UNDER NO ANALYSIS CAN THEY BE ANALOGIZED TO INSURE.

LET ME ASK YOU ONE QUESTION. WHAT ARE THE DAMAGES THAT IS YOU ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THAT COULD NOT HAVE BEEN INCORPORATED IN THE CONTRACT AT THE OUTSET, EITHER IN THE PERFORMANCE BOND OR IN THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT, AS JUSTICE WELLS WAS ASKING, THE DELAYED DAMAGES OR FEES THAT YOU MAY HAVE HAD TO PAY TO THE TENANTS THAT WERE SUPPOSED TO COME IN AND THOSE THINGS. WHICH OF THOSE ELEMENTS OF DAMAGE IN THIS ARM'S LENGTH TRANSACTION COULD NOT HAVE BEEN INCORPORATED AS A DAMAGE WITHIN YOUR CONTRACTS?

WELL, THEORETICALLY, I SUPPOSE YOU COULD SAY WE COULD DRAFT A CONTRACT TO PROVIDE FOR ANY CONCEIVABLE DAMAGES. BUT WE DIDN'T HAVE THAT DUTY. WE HAD A STANDARD SURETY CONTRACT, AND IF THEY HAD PERFORMED IT PROPERLY, THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO NEED FOR ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS OF DAMAGE, BUT YOU CAN SAY THE SAME THING ABOUT OTHER CONTRACTS THAT ARE ENFORCEABLE, EXCUSE ME, WHERE INSURERS ARE OBLIGATED UNDER BAD FAITH. YOU CAN SAY THE INSURANCE CONTRACT WOULD -- YOU CAN SAY THE INSURANCE CONTRACT WOULD PROVIDE IT.

WOULD YOU AS DIG DEGREE -- -- WOULD YOU DISAGREE WITH THE STANDARD INSURANCE CARRIER POLICY AS OPPOSED TO THIS ARM'S LENGTH COMMERCIAL TRANSACTION?

THERE IS NOTHING IN THIS RECORD AND I DON'T THINK WE CAN TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE THAT SURETY BONDS ARE NEGOTIATED AT ARM 'S LENGTH. THEY ARE FORMS. THEY ARE REGULATED. THERE IS CERTAINLY NO EVIDENCE THAT ANYBODY AUTHORIZES DEVIATION FROM THE STANDARDS THEY USE, SO THAT IS SIMPLY SPECULATION .

WHAT WE HAVE HERE, THIS IS NOT AN INSURANCE INDUSTRY FORM. THIS IS AN AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS FORM , RIGHT?

IT IS A FORM USED BY THESE SURETIES. WHETHER OR NOT THEY WOULD HAVE NEGOTIATED IN ANY WAYON THAT CONTRACT IS NOT IN THE RECORD AND IS SHEER SPECULATION. SIMPLY BECAUSE I DON'T REPRESENT A LITTLE INSURED DOESN'T MEAN THAT MY CLIENT COULDN'T BE ENTITLED TO GOOD FAITH UNDER THE CONTRACT AS THE MAJORITY OF JURISDICTION RECOGNIZE THE SURETY HAS THE DUTY, SO THEREFORE , THERE IS REALLY, IF THEY HAD PUT ON EVIDENCE OF THAT OR SOMETHING , MAY BE THEY HAVE A STRONGER EQUITABLE CASE , BUT UNDER THE STATUTES THAT WE ARE DEALING WITH, THAT IS NOT A CONSIDERATION. WE HAVE THE DEFINITIONS AND THE PARTY WHO IS MOST ANALOGOUS TO AN INSURED IS THE OBLIGEE , AND WE ARE THE ONE TO BE PROTECTED BY THE CONTRACT.

HOW SHOULD WE INTERPRET THIS STATUTE? SHOULD IT BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AS DER -- SHOULD IT BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AS DEROGATION OF THE CONTRACTOR WHAT IS YOUR POSITION ON THAT?

624.12 5 IS A STATUTE THAT CREATED A CAUSE OF ACTION. CERTAINLY THE CAUSE OF ACTION IS SEPARATE FROM THE COMMON LAW, BUT IT WAS DESIGNED TO CREATE A REMEDY , AND IT, REALLY , DOESN'T REQUIRE AN EXTENSIVE JUMP IN LOGIC , TO SAY THE OBLIGEE IS INSURED AS A MAJORITY OF JURISDICTIONS HAVE HELD , AND THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT THE SURETY INDUSTRIES IN MOST STATES COLLAPSE. I THINK I AM OVER.

CHIEF JUSTICE: YES. YOU ARE. THANK YOU VERY MUCH. THANKS TO BOTH SIDES , FOR AN INFORMATIVE ORAL ARGUMENT AND FOR BEING RESPONSIVE TO OUR QUESTIONS AND VERY WELL PREPARED .