

>> OKAY.

THE NEXT-- LET'S JUST WAIT FOR EVERYBODY TO GET OUT.

WHO WANTS TO LEAVE.

OKAY.

THE NEXT CASE ON THE DOCKET IS BREATHERICK V. STATE.

COUNSEL?

>> MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT, ERIC--

[INAUDIBLE]

ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT, JARED BREATHERICK, I'D LIKE TO RESERVE FIVE MINUTES FOR REBUTTAL.

SEVEN MINUTES.

AFTER DEREK DINING APPROACHED THE BREATHERICK FAMILY TO THREATEN THEM, THEY WAITED SEVEN LONG MINUTES ON 911 FOR HELP TO ARRIVE.

FOR OVER SEVEN MINUTES RONALD BREATHERICK WAS TRAPPED IN HIS VEHICLE AGAINST HIS WILL.

FOR OVER SEVEN MINUTES THE ONLY THING KEEPING DEREK DUNNING AT BAY FROM CONTINUING HIS ATTACK ON THIS FAMILY WAS THE GUN IN JARED BREATHERICK'S HANDS.

FOR OVER SEVEN MINUTES DEREK DUNNING SAT IN HIS CAR IN A SITUATION OF HIS OWN MAKING, TRAPPING A DISABLED VET FROM ESCAPING THE SITUATION THAT DUBBING HAD CREATED-- DUNNING HAD CREATED.

>> LET ME INTERRUPT.

>> YES, SIR.

>> MAKE SURE I UNDERSTAND THE SCENARIO YOU'RE DESCRIBING.

NOW, WASN'T THE VEHICLE IN WHICH THE DEFENDANT WAS LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE LANE OF A, ON ONE SIDE OF A HIGHWAY IN THE MIDDLE OF THREE LANES?

>> YES, YOUR HONOR.

THIS IS A DIVIDED HIGHWAY DIVIDED BY A GRASS MEDIAN WITH THREE LANES PLUS GOING EACH DIRECTION, AND THE BREATHERICKS

WERE-- MR. DUNNING SLAMMED HIS BRAKES ON--

>> SO I'M HAVING, I'M HAVING REAL TROUBLE UNDERSTANDING HOW SOMEBODY IS TRAPPED AND IS UNLAWFULLY DETAINED OR SUBJECT TO AN UNLAWFUL CONFINEMENT IN CIRCUMSTANCES LIKE THAT WHEN THERE ARE THESE OTHER TWO LANES THAT ARE THERE ASK THAT ARE SO FAR AS I CAN TELL FROM THE RECORD ARE NOT CLOSE TO TRAFFIC.

>> YOUR HONOR, THIS OCCURRED ON THE WEDNESDAY BETWEEN CHRISTMAS AND NEW YEAR'S IN 2012.

IN A BUSY SHOPPING AREA ON BRONSON PARKWAY.

THE TESTIMONY WAS CONSISTENT BOTH FROM THE STATE'S WITNESSES AND FROM IF THE BRETHERICKS THAT THE TRAFFIC FLOWING ON EAST SIDE OF THE BRETHERICKS AND THE TRAFFIC BACKING UP BEHIND THEM AROUND DUNNING'S TRUCK, THE DISTANCE OF CALLING FOR LESS BETWEEN THE TWO VEHICLES DID NOT ALLOW SUFFICIENT ROOM TO PULL AROUND ON EITHER SIDE.

AND I THINK THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER IS CONSISTENT WITH THAT. AND I THINK I THE TRIAL COURT ACTUALLY SAYS THAT IT'S NOT AN ISSUE THAT MR. BRETHERICK, RONALD BRETHERICK COULD HAVE DRIVEN AROUND.

THE ISSUE THE TRIAL COURT HAD WAS DID THE FAMILY HAVE A REASONABLE FEAR THAT THEY WERE ABOUT TO BE ATTACKED?

SELF-DEFENSE DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT THE VICTIM, SUCH AS JARED BRETHERICK, BE RIGHT AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A FIREARM OR OTHER WEAPON OR WHETHER DUNNING WAS INTENDING TO USE HIS CAR AS A WEAPON.

IT REQUIRES THAT MR. BRETHERICK HAVE BEEN REASONABLE.

>> SO ISN'T THAT, AND YOU MAKE A VERY GOOD JURY ARGUMENT, AND I

DON'T, YOU KNOW, YOU IN YOUR BRIEF TALKED ABOUT HOW THE DEFENDANT IN THIS CASE HAD NEVER BEEN CHARGED WITH A CRIME, AND THE VICTIM IS SOMEBODY WITH A LONG HISTORY WHICH IS NOT, WHICH I'M NOT SURE HOW THAT WILL COME OUT AT TRIAL.

BUT WHAT WE'RE HERE TO, AS I UNDERSTAND, TO LOOK AT IS WHETHER THE COURT SHOULD GO FARTHER IN EFFECTUATING THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT FOR IMMUNITY. AND MY CONCERN IS THIS, IS THAT AT EVERY STAGE UNDER THE STATUTE PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST, POLICE ARE INSTRUCTED UNDER THE STATUTE THAT IF THEY FIND THAT THE USE OF FORCE WAS JUSTIFIABLE, THEN THEY'RE NOT TO ARREST.

IT IS PART OF THE STATUTE FOR PROBABLE CAUSE.

YOU ARGUE AND THE CON CURRENTS ARGUES THAT KENTUCKY AND KANSAS DID SOMETHING THAT WE SHOULD DO. BUT I READ THOSE TWO DECISIONS AND DECISIONS WHERE WHAT WAS BEING TESTED WAS THE STATE'S PROBABLE CAUSE DETERMINATION WHICH, OF COURSE, THE STATE HAS THE BURDEN TO SHOW PROBABLE CAUSE IF IT'S CHALLENGED.

SO YOU ARE HERE TO ARGUE THAT AT THE PRETRIAL HEARING THAT THE BURDEN SHOULD BE ON THE STATE TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE USE OF FORCE WAS NOT JUSTIFIED WHICH IS WHAT THEIR BURDEN WOULD BE AT TRIAL.

AND I'M ASKING IS THERE-- I SEE NOTHING IN THE LEGISLATION THAT INDICATES THAT IS THE STANDARD. I SEE NOTHING IN ANY OTHER STATE THAT HAS EVER GONE THAT WAY, AND SO I'M TRYING TO SEE WHERE OTHER THAN SORT OF PULLING IT OUT OF THE STRATOSPHERE WE WOULD COME UP WITH THAT ADDITIONAL BURDEN BEYOND WHAT WE HELD IN DENNIS.

>> YOUR HONOR, I THINK THERE'S A

FEW PLACES THAT COMES FROM.
FIRST, THE LEGISLATURE'S
PRESUMED TO BE AWARE OF THE LAWS
OF THIS STATE.

THE LEGISLATURES WOULD KNOW, IS
PRESUMED TO KNOW THAT IN A
SELF-DEFENSE CASE ONCE THE
DEFENDANT RAISES A PEOPLE
FASCIA-- PRIMA FASCIA, THEN THE
BURDEN IS THEN ON THE STATE TO
PROVE AT LEAST ONE ELEMENT OF
SELF-DEFENSE BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT.

TO VOID THE SELF-DEFENSE CLAIM.
THAT'S THE FIRST PLACE IT COMES
FROM.

THE SECOND PLACE IT COMES FROM
IS THAT THE LEGISLATURE NEVER
DISCUSSED OR AUTHORIZED ANY
SHIFT IN THE BURDEN OF PROOF
EXCEPT FOR ONE PLACE.

IN ONE PLACE THE LEGISLATURE
ADDED AN ELEMENT TO THE PROBABLE
CAUSE DETERMINATION.

THE LEGISLATURE SAID NOT ONLY DO
YOU HAVE TO HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE
THAT A CRIME WAS COMMITTED, BUT
YOU ALSO HAVE TO HAVE PROBABLE
CAUSE THAT THE FORCE YOU USED
WAS NOT USED IN SELF-DEFENSE.

>> SO IT SEEMS TO ME WE MAY HAVE
BEEN WRONG IN DENNIS AND NOT
JUST ENFORCING THE PROBABLE
CAUSE DETERMINATION, INSTEAD AT
THE BEHEST, I MIGHT ADD, OF THE
DEFENDANT WHO IN THAT CASE
ARGUED FOR THE BURDEN TO BE ON
THE, TO HAVE A PRETRIAL HEARING
WHERE THE BURDEN WOULD BE ON THE
DEFENDANT TO PROVE THAT THE
FORCE WAS JUSTIFIED BY ONLY A
PREPONDERANCE, THEY ASKED AND WE
HELD THAT THEY GET THAT EXTRA
LAYER OF PROTECTION.

TO GIVE CREDENCE OR GIVE FORCE
TO THE IMMUNITY.

SO NOT ONLY DO YOU HAVE THE
STATE HAVING TO FIRST HAVE
PROBABLE CAUSE, BUT THEN WE
ADDED SOMETHING NOT IN THE

STATUTE AS AN ADDITIONAL PROTECTION FOR THIS IMMUNITY. SO I'M NOT SURE I UNDERSTAND. SO DO YOU AGREE THAT KENTUCKY DID NOT HOLD WHAT YOU'RE NOW ARGUING FOR, NOR DID KANSAS? >> YOUR HONOR, I WOULD AGREE THAT NEITHER KANSAS NOR KANSAS WENT AS PASS AS WE'RE SUGGESTING THE LEGISLATURE INTENDED. THAT IS ABSOLUTELY CORRECT. HOWEVER, WHEN YOU REVIEW, FOR EXAMPLE, THE AMICUS BRIEF FROM THE NRA WHICH DISCUSSES IN DEPTH SOME LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND SOME LEGISLATIVE FINDINGS OF THE STAFF ANALYSIS AS TO WHAT THIS LAW WAS INTENDED TO DO, IT WAS INTENDED TO PROVIDE A TRUE REAL IMMUNITY. YOUR HONOR REFERENCES THE DENNIS CASE.

I'D LIKE TO QUOTE JUSTICE CANADY'S OPENING IN THAT CASE. WE CONSIDER WHETHER A TRIAL COURT SHOULD CONDUCT A PRETRIAL EVIDENTIARY HEARING AND RESOLVE ISSUES OF FACT WHEN RESOLVING ISSUES OF IMMUNITY. THAT IS ALL BEFORE THE COURT IN DENNIS.

>> LET ME ASK THIS QUESTION. YOU RAISED SOMETHING EARLIER. YOU USED THE SELF-DEFENSE ANALOGY WHERE THE STATE HAS TO DISPROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THE SELF-DEFENSE CLAIM ONCE A PRIMA FACIA CASE IS MADE BY THE DEFENDANT.

ARE YOU SUGGESTING IN THIS PRETRIAL HEARING SETTING WHERE IT IS BASICALLY JUST A JUDGE, THAT THE STATE IS TO HAVE THE BURDEN OF PROOF AND THAT BURDEN OF PROOF IS BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT?

IT WOULD SEEM TO ME, IF THAT IS YOUR CASE OR IF THAT IS YOUR POSITION IT WOULD REQUIRE AN ENTIRE TRIAL BEFORE?

HOW CAN YOU MAKE THAT DETERMINATION BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT UNLESS YOU HEAR ALL THE EVIDENCE?

>> YOUR HONOR, FIRST OF ALL I WOULD SUGGEST ABSOLUTELY I DON'T THINK THERE IS ANY QUESTION GIVEN THE WAY THE LEGISLATURE WROTE THE LAW THAT THE STATE SHOULD HAVE THE BURDEN OF PROOF. I HAVE ARGUED IN MY BRIEF IT SHOULD BE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT AND I, JUSTIFIED THAT REASON THAT IF THEY CAN'T PROVE THAT CASE INITIALLY TO A JUDGE, THE JUDGE IS ALREADY HAD THE RIGHT, EVEN BEFORE THE LAW WAS PASSED, TO GRANT A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL AT THAT POINT. MY ARGUMENT IN MY BRIEF AT MINIMUM IT SHOULD BE SOME HEIGHTENED STANDARD.

YOUR HONOR, I EQUATE IT TO THE 1983, SECTION 42 USC 1983 ISSUE.

>> IN ESSENCE SEEMS TO ME YOU'RE ARGUING AT THIS MOTION TO DISMISS HEARING THE STATE WILL REALLY HAVE TO PROVE ITS CASE?

>> YES, YOUR HONOR, I AM. I WOULD TELL YOU THAT JUST LOOKING AT THE CASES THAT HAVE COME UP THROUGH THE APPELLATE COURTS SO FAR SINCE 2011 WHEN THIS COURT ISSUED ITS OPINION IN DENNIS IT IS REQUIRING MULTI-DAY HEARINGS ALREADY WHERE THE DEFENDANT IS BEARING THE BURDEN OF PROOF AND TRYING TO PRESENT THEIR CASE.

>> SO IF THE STATE PROVES THEIR CASE, AT ITS MOTION TO DISMISS HEARING, THEN WE HAVE TO GO THROUGH ANOTHER TRIAL WERE THE STATE PRESENTS ANOTHER HEARING WHERE THE STATE PRESENTS THE SAME ARGUMENT?

THE SAME EVIDENCE AND THEN WE CAN CONVICT?

>> YOUR HONOR, I WOULD SUGGEST TO YOU THAT WE'RE DOING, ALMOST

DOING THAT ANYWAY ALREADY
BECAUSE OF THE STATE'S, BECAUSE
THE STATE IS TRYING TO REBUT THE
PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE
STANDARD THAT THE DEFENDANTS
HAVE, I WOULD ARGUE TO YOU IT IS
RESULTING IN MINI TRIALS ALREADY
IF NOT FULL TRIALS, THE CASE
BEING TRIED TWICE.

THE QUESTION--

>> WE WERE WRONG IN REQUIRING
THAT PROCEDURE?

MAYBE THAT'S THE PROBLEM.
MAYBE WE SHOULD GO BACK TO WHAT
KENTUCKY HAS AND REQUIRE THAT IF
IT IS CHALLENGED, THAT THE STATE
PRESENTS ITS CASE OF PROBABLE
CAUSE TO THE JUDGE WHO DECIDES
WHETHER THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE
AND IN THAT TO BELIEVE THAT THE
USE OF FORCE WAS NOT JUSTIFIED.

>> YOUR HONOR, I DON'T THINK
THAT WOULD ACCOMPLISH THE
LEGISLATIVE INTENT.

>> BUT THERE IS AN EASY WAY TO
FIND THAT OUT WHICH IS, GO TO
THE LEGISLATURE AND HAVE THEM
SPECIFY THAT'S WHAT THEY WANT OF
THE JUDICIARY IN A PRETRIAL
EVIDENTIARY HEARING.

WE DON'T, YOU KNOW, THIS IDEA
THAT WE'RE EFFECTUATING
LEGISLATIVE INTENT WHEN THE
LEGISLATURE WAS SILENT ON BOTH
THE PROCEDURE AND THE ANY
PRETRIAL EVIDENTIARY BURDEN IS
SOMETHING THAT, THAT IS, AGAIN,
IN MY VIEW WE WOULD BE LOOKING
AT IT AND TRYING TO GUESS WHAT
THE LEGISLATURE ACTUALLY WANTED.

>> YOUR HONOR, I THINK THE
LEGISLATURE ALREADY HAD, WHILE
THE LEGISLATURE DIDN'T DISCUSS
IT BECAUSE AGAIN THE
LEGISLATURE'S PRESUMED TO KNOW
THE LAW, THERE IS ONLY ONE OTHER
CIRCUMSTANCE THAT EXISTED PRIOR
TO THE STAND YOUR GROUND
IMMUNITY STATUTE PACKED THERE IS
ONLY ONE OTHER CIRCUMSTANCE IN

THE LAW WHERE A PERSON WHO HAS HAD FORCE USED AGAINST THEM OR PERSON, EXCUSE ME, WHERE A PERSON WHO HAD TO ACT IN SELF-DEFENSE, IN THIS CASE A POLICE OFFICER, HAS A RIGHT TO AN IMMUNITY OF SOME TYPE PRIOR TO BEING PUT BEFORE A JURY. AND THAT IS IN QUALIFIED IMMUNITY CASES 42 USC 1983. IN THAT CASE, QUALIFIED IMMUNITY IS JUST THAT QUALIFIED. IT IS JUDICIARY CREATED. WHAT WE HAVE IS A SITUATION WHERE JUDICIARY CREATED JUDICIALLY CREATED QUALIFIED IMMUNITY THAT A POLICE OFFICER USED EXCESSIVE FORCE. IF THE POLICE OFFICER CAN SHOW PRIMA FACIA CASE THEY WERE ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE AND COURSE OF THEIR AUTHORITY AND THAT THEY ARGUABLE PROBABLE CAUSE, A VERY LOW STANDARD, ONCE THAT POLICE OFFICER SHOWS THAT BY PRIMA FACIA CASE WE NOW REQUIRE THE PARTY WHO WANTS TO BREACH THAT IMMUNITY, THE CITIZEN, TO CHALLENGE THAT IMMUNITY AND PROVE BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE TO A FEDERAL JUDGE OR STATE JUDGE IF IT IS NOT REMOVED, THAT THE FORCE USED, THAT OFFICER DID NOT HAVE ARGUABLE PROBABLE CAUSE. YOUR HONORS, WE DON'T HAVE A SEPARATE SET OF RULES FOR POLICE OFFICERS VERSUS CITIZENS IN THIS STATE WHEN IT COMES TO THE USE OF FORCE. THE RULES ARE THE SAME FOR JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE, FOR USE OF DEFENSIVE FORCE, THE RULES ARE THE SAME FOR POLICE OFFICERS AND CITIZENS. SO WHY THEN HAS THIS COURT CREATED A BURDEN THAT THE LEGISLATURE NEVER AUTHORIZED AND PUT THE BURDEN ON THE CITIZEN? THE BURDEN THAT THIS COURT USED,

THIS STATUTE, REALLY, YOUR HONORS CALLS FOR A NEW RULE OF PROCEDURE.

WE'RE USING THIS DENNIS AND PETERSON FORMULATION THAT IS TAKEN FROM THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND WE'RE APPLYING IT IN CIVIL CASES EVEN.

SO WE'RE NOW BECAUSE OF THIS PROCEDURE WE'RE USING RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN CIVIL PROCEEDINGS.

YOUR HONOR, THIS STATUTE CALLED FOR A NEW RULE OF PROCEDURE. CALLED FOR A NEW RULE FOR THE COURTS TO SAY, A WAY, IF YOU GIVE AWAY TO HANDLE THESE CASES IN A WAY THAT COMPORTS WITH THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT WHICH WAS TO GRANT ADDITIONAL PROTECTIONS TO CITIZENS WHO WERE ATTACKED WHERE THEY HAVE A RIGHT TO BE.

>> WHY COULDN'T THE STATUTE JUST SIMPLY SAY, YOU KNOW, IT IS THE BURDEN, THE BURDEN IS ON THE STATE TO PROVE THAT SELF-DEFENSE WAS NOT A QUESTION HERE?

WE WOULD NOT BE HERE TODAY.

>> YOUR HONOR, IF LAWS WERE WRITTEN PERFECTLY I THINK THIS COURT WOULD HAVE A LOT LESS TO DO.

>> I DON'T WANT IT TO BE PERFECT.

SEEMS LIKE MY QUESTION IS A NO-BRAINER.

>> IT WOULD BE WONDERFUL HAD THE LEGISLATURE SPOKEN TO A BURDEN BUT I THINK THE REASON THEY DIDN'T THE LEGISLATURE ALREADY SAW THERE WERE PROCEDURES AND METHODS IN PLACE FOR HANDLING THESE SITUATIONS.

>> BUT AGAIN, AND I APPRECIATE YOUR ADVOCACY IS, FOR YOUR CLIENT IS CERTAINLY COMMENDABLE. THE, IDENTICAL DEFENDANT, NOT IDENTICAL, THE DEFENDANT IN THE SAME SITUATION IN DENNIS SPECIFICALLY GOT UP HERE AND

ARGUED FOR A PRETRIAL EVIDENTIARY HEARING WHERE THE BURDEN, THE DEFENDANT WOULD HAVE THE BURDEN TO PROVE BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE IF THEY FELT THAT WAS AN ADDITIONAL PROTECTION TO THE PROBABLE CAUSE DETERMINATION.

AND ALTHOUGH I AGREE THAT THE HOLDING CAN BE DEBATABLE IN DENNIS, CLEARLY THE DEFENDANT IN THAT CASE WAS ARGUING FOR THAT JUST LIKE THE DEFENDANT WAS IN THE KENTUCKY CASE.

SO NOW YOU'RE SAYING, GOD, WE PUT THIS BURDEN ON THE DEFENDANT AND THAT'S NOT FAIR.

WELL, THAT'S WHAT WAS ASKED FOR.

>> YOUR HONOR, ACTUALLY THE DENNIS BRIEF PRESUMED WITHOUT ARGUING THAT THE PETERSON COURT WAS RIGHT.

IT NEVER ACTUALLY ADDRESSED OR ARGUED FOR ANY PARTICULAR BURDEN OTHER THAN WE BELIEVE THAT PETERSON WAS RIGHT.

YOUR HONORS, I WANT TO LEAVE YOU WITH THE WORDS OF THE LEGISLATURE THEMSELVES AND THEIR INTENT IN PASSES THIS LAW.

THAT WAS WHERE AS THE LEGISLATURE FINDS IT IS PROPER FOR LAW-ABIDING PEOPLE TO PROTECT THEMSELVES, THEIR FAMILIES AND OTHERS FROM INTRUDERS AND ATTACKERS WITHOUT FEAR OF PROSECUTION OR CIVIL ACTION AND WHEREAS THE PERSONS RESIDING IN OR VISITING THIS STATE HAVE A RIGHT TO EXPECT TO REMAIN UNMOLESTED WITHIN THEIR HOMES OR VEHICLES.

AND YOUR HONOR, HAD DEREK DUNNING PUT HIS HAND, TRIAL JUDGE FOUND, DEREK DUNNING APPROACHED FAMILY FIRST AFTER STOPPING IN MIDDLE OF THREE LANES OF TRAFFIC.

UNDER PRESUMPTIONS OF 776.013, HAD DEREK DUNNING PUT HIS HAND

ON CAR DOOR ATTEMPTED AN ENTRY,
THIS CASE WOULDN'T BE HERE.
BECAUSE THE PRESUMPTION IS
THERE.

>> THAT'S FAIR.

NOT AT ISSUE WHAT THE DRIVER OF
THE CAR DID, UPON HIS APPROACH.
WHICH WAS TO DISPLAY THE WEAPON.

>> YES, SIR.

>> THAT IS NOT AT ISSUE HERE.
THAT IS A VERY DIFFERENT FACTUAL
QUESTION THAN THIS QUESTION THAT
WE'VE GOT.

BUT AGAIN THESE FACTUAL
QUESTIONS REALLY ARE KIND OF
JUST SEPARATE FROM THE LEGAL
ISSUE THAT IS REALLY THE HEART
OF YOUR ARGUMENT.

RIGHT?

>> WE MADE TWO ARGUMENTS, YOUR
HONOR.

THE NUMBER ONE THAT THE BURDEN
IS WRONG.

EVEN WITH THE BURDEN IN PLACE,
THE LEGAL CONCLUSION OF THE
COURTS BELOW, THE LEGAL
CONCLUSION BASED ON FACTS THEY
FOUND THAT JARED BREThERICK WAS
NOT ENTITLED TO DEFENSIVELY
DISPLAY A FIREARM.

LEGISLATURE SINCE AMENDED
STATUTE IN PART BASED ON THIS
CASE BEING ARGUED BEFORE THE
LEGISLATURE.

THE LEGISLATURE HAS AMENDED 776
TO SPECIFICALLY PROVIDE FOR
DEFENSIVE DISPLAY OF A FIREARM
IN PART BASED ON THIS CASE AND
SEVERAL OTHERS.

YOUR HONORS, JARED BREThERICK
WAS IN THE RIGHT PASSENGER SEAT,
EXCUSE ME, RIGHT BACK SEAT OF
THIS VEHICLE.

HE COULDN'T SEE MR. DUNNING'S
DOOR.

HE HAD TWO DISABLED ADULTS UP
FRONT AND A 14-YEAR-OLD CHILD IN
THAT CAR.

THE ONLY WAY FOR HIM TO BE ABLE
TO TAKE A BETTER POSITION TO BE

ABLE TO CONTROL WHATEVER CAME NEXT FROM THE PERSON WHO ALREADY THREATENED HIS FAMILY ONCE WAS TO GET OUT OF THAT VEHICLE AND MOVE TO THE OTHER SIDE WHERE HE COULD SEE.

THANK YOU.

>> MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT. MY NAME IS KRIS DAVENPORT AND I REPRESENT THE STATE OF FLORIDA. I AGREE WITH THE COURT THAT THIS IS A VERY PERSUASIVE JURY ARGUMENT.

THE DEFENDANT IS CERTAINLY ENTITLED TO MAKE THIS ARGUMENT TO THE JURY.

HE LOST AT HIS PRETRIAL IMMUNITY HEARING.

THAT DOESN'T MEAN HE GOES TO JAIL.

THIS COURT DIDN'T CHANGE THE BURDEN OF PROOF.

THE STATE IS GOING TO HAVE TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT AT TRIAL THAT HE DIDN'T ACT IN SELF-DEFENSE, ASSUMING HE RAISES THIS DEFENSE WHICH I'M SURE HE WILL.

HE CAN MAKE THAT ARGUMENT AND THE JURY WILL EVALUATE IT AND MAYBE THEY WILL BELIEVE HIS VERSION OF THE EVENTS.

THE TRIAL JUDGE DIDN'T.

THIS COURT HAS ALREADY SAID HOW YOU DO THESE PRETRIAL HEARINGS. IT WAS DIRECTLY PRESENTED IN THE DENNIS CASE.

THERE WERE QUESTIONS, IF YOU GO BACK AND WATCH THE ORAL ARGUMENT THERE WERE A LOT OF QUESTIONS WHAT THE BURDEN OF PROOF SHOULD BE AND THIS COURT SAID HERE'S THE PROCEDURE.

>> WHAT WE ACTUALLY SAID IN OUR OPINION.

IN OUR ANALYSIS IN THE DENNIS OPINION IS THERE ANY REFERENCE TO THE PHRASE, BURDEN OF PROOF?

>> THE COURT IN DENNIS APPROVED THE PROCEDURE WITH PETERSON AND

THAT WAS PART OF THE HOLDING IN PETERSON.

>> COULD YOU ANSWER MY QUESTION?

>> I WOULD SAY THE FOCUS OF THE ANALYSIS WAS THE CONTESTED ISSUE OF C-4 VERSUS EVIDENTIARY HEARING.

THAT WAS THE FOCUS OF THE ANALYSIS.

>> DO YOU KNOW WHETHER IN THE ANALYSIS IN THE CASE WHETHER THERE WAS ANY REFERENCE TO THE PHRASE BURDEN OF PROOF?

I KNOW THE ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION.

>> I WILL DEFER TO YOUR ANSWER.

>> WELL, I WOULD SAY--

>> I WOULD IMAGINE YOUR ANSWER IS NO.

>> NO.

SO, I'M HAVING A LITTLE TROUBLE UNDERSTANDING THE STATE'S POSITION THAT IT IS A HOLDING OF THIS CASE THAT THE BURDEN OF PROOF IS WHAT YOU SAY IT IS.

WHEN WE DON'T, WHEN THE WAY WE DESCRIBED THE ISSUE WE'RE CONSIDERING DOES NOT REFER TO THE BURDEN OF PROOF.

OUR ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES WE DON'T TALK ABOUT ANY ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE BURDEN OF PROOF.

AND WE DON'T ACTUALLY USE THE PHRASE, BURDEN OF PROOF.

IN OUR ANALYSIS.

>> THE REASON I SAY IT WAS PART OF THE HOLDING BECAUSE YOU ADOPTED THE HOLDING OF THE COURT IN PETERSON.

>> WELL--

>> THE COURT IN PETERSON SAID WE HOLD THIS IS THE-- IT WASN'T LIKE, THE COURT COULD HAVE SAID WAS, WE'RE GOING TO RESOLVE THIS AND YOU GET A PRETRIAL HEARING. HOW YOU DO ABOUT DOING THAT IS UP TO THE LOWER COURTS BECAUSE THAT IS NOT DIRECTLY AT ISSUE HERE AND HE DIDN'T SAY THAT.

>> ISN'T IT THE CASE WHAT WE

ACTUALLY SAID WITH RESPECT TO PETERSON WE APPROVED THE REASONING OF PETERSON ON THE CONFLICT ISSUE?

THERE IS REFERENCE TO PROCEDURE IN APPROVING THE PETERSON PROCEDURE.

>> RIGHT.

>> BUT THE PROCEDURE AT ISSUE HERE WAS WHETHER YOU'RE GOING TO HAVE A PRETRIAL EVIDENTIARY DETERMINATION AS OPPOSED TO THIS OTHER, C-4 OR C-3, I CAN'T REMEMBER.

>> C-4.

>> C-4 PROCEDURE WHERE IF THERE ARE DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT THEN THE STATE GETS TO GO FORWARD.

>> RIGHT.

>> THAT WAS WHAT WAS AT ISSUE, NOT WHAT THE BURDEN OF PROOF IS. NOW THE CASE COULD HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED IN A WAY WHERE THE BURDEN OF PROOF WOULD HAVE, WOULD HAVE BEEN AT ISSUE BUT THAT'S NOT THE WAY THE CASE WAS ACTUALLY DECIDED, IS IT?

>> WELL I WOULD SUBMIT THAT IT WAS ALL PART OF A WHOLE BECAUSE YOU'RE DECIDING HOW YOU'RE GOING TO DO THIS.

THE DEFENSE COUNSEL IN AN ATTEMPT TO LOOK REASONABLE I WOULD SUBMIT, LOOK, WE'RE ADDING IN THIS PRETRIAL HEARING AND THIS IS KIND OF A BIG DEAL BECAUSE NOW THERE ARE ESSENTIALLY TWO TRIALS.

THEY MADE THAT POSITION MORE REASONABLE SAYING BUT LOOK, WE UNDERSTAND, WE'RE THE MOVING PARTY.

WE'LL CARRY THE BURDEN.

WE'LL NOT MAKE THE STATE PROVE IT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT AND ACTUALLY HAVE TWO COMPLETE TRIALS HERE.

WE'RE TAKING A REASONABLE POSITION AND THIS COURT AGREED.

THIS COURT SAID COLORADO MAKES SENSE, PETERSON MAKES SENSE. WE'LL GOING TO ADOPT THE PROCEDURE AND THAT THE PROCEDURE IS COURTS HAVE BEEN USING WHAT THE COURT SAID IN PETERSON.

>> ALTHOUGH I THINK, THE REASON, BECAUSE I WAS LOOKING BACK AT THIS, IN THAT CASE THE TRIAL HAD ALREADY TAKEN, IN DENNIS THE TRIAL HAD ALREADY TAKEN PLACE. SO THE ISSUE WHAT EXACTLY WOULD BE THE PROCEDURE PRETRIAL IT WAS, I NOT THAT, IT WAS AN ISSUE.

>> RIGHT.

>> BUT WE WERE LOOKING AT, WELL NOW THE TRIAL HAS TAKEN PLACE, NOW WHAT?

SO IT WAS, THE QUESTION OF WHAT WE WERE FOCUSING ON.

BUT HERE'S MY QUESTION TO YOU IS IN TERMS OF THE PROCEDURE, IF WHAT WE WERE INTENDING WOULD BE A MOTION TO DISMISS, UNDER, IS IT RULE 3.-- WHAT IS THE OTHER ONE THAT JUDGE GROSS REFERS TO IN CHIVANI.

>> B-3.

>> B-3 WHERE THE DEFENDANT RAISES OTHER TYPES OF MOTIONS TO DISMISS.

>> RIGHT.

>> UNIFORMLY THOSE HAVE ALL BEEN ISSUES WHERE THE DEFENDANT WHO IS RAISING IS TRYING TO GET THE BENEFIT OF THE DISMISSAL.

>> RIGHT.

>> THEIRS IS THE BURDEN BECAUSE THEY'RE BRINGING THE MOTION.

>> RIGHT.

>> NOT LIKE IT WOULD BE OUT OF THIN AIR, LET'S GO BACK TO, LET'S ASSUME WE DIDN'T DECIDE IT.

>> LET'S ASSUME WE'RE WORKING ON A CLEAN SLATE HERE.

>> LET'S GO TO THE REASON WHY IF WE'RE GOING TO REQUIRE PRETRIAL EVIDENTIARY HEARING NOT REQUIRED

UNDER THE STATUTE--
>> IF WE'RE GOING BACK TO SQUARE ONE I THINK THE COURT SHOULD FOLLOW KENTUCKY.
IT MAKES THE MOST SENSE.
>> BUT WE'RE PROBABLY NOT GOING THERE.
LET'S--
>> THAT IS THE POINT YOU HAVE TO CONSIDER ISSUES AS A WELL.
IF YOU GO BACK TO SQUARE ONE I WE SAY YOU DO IT WITH A C-4 MOTION.
THAT IS WHAT KENTUCKY DID.
THEY DIDN'T WANT TO DO TWO TRIALS.
IT IS WITHIN THE DEFENDANT'S KNOWLEDGE.
IN THIS CASE THE VICTIM IS ALIVE.
HE CAN TESTIFY.
A LOT OF THESE THE SHOT IS FIRED, VICTIM IS NOT THERE TO TESTIFY.
WHO HAS THE BEST ABILITY TO ESTABLISH THIS DEFENSE.
IT IS THE DEFENDANT.
IF HE WANTS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE AND GET RID OF THIS THING EARLY, WHICH IS SOMETHING NOBODY ELSE CAN DO, IT IS AN ADVANTAGE UNDER THE STATUTE.
IT IS NOT LIKE THIS COURT DECIDED DENNIS AND SAID, NO, WE'LL JUST LEAVE IT THE WAY IT IS AND WE'LL NOT GIVE EFFECT TO THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT.
OBVIOUSLY THESE CASES GIVE MORE PROTECTION TO THE DEFENDANT BECAUSE HE CAN CLAIM IMMUNITY.
IN MOST CRIMES YOU HAVE TO GO TO TRIAL.
THAT IS WHERE IT ALL COMES OUT.
IN THIS CASE HE GETS BENEFIT OF PRETRIAL--
>> THE IMMUNITY IS WHAT MAKES THIS DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE POWER OF THE STATE TO CHARGE AND ESSENTIALLY GET TO GO TO TRIAL ONCE IT DETERMINES THERE IS

PROBABLE CAUSE.

>> YES.

>> SO THERE HAS TO BE THE PROTECTION.

>> THERE IS AN ADDITIONAL PROTECTION.

>> IS THERE A REASON WHY IT IS NOT TO GIVE TRUE EFFECT TO THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT, WHY THE STATE SHOULDN'T HAVE TO ESTABLISH PRETRIAL BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE USE OF FORCE WAS NOT JUSTIFIABLE?

>> WELL, FIRST OF ALL THERE IS NOTHING IN THE STATUTE THAT SAYS THAT.

THE STATUTE HAS NO PROCEDURE AT ALL.

THIS COURT SET UP A PROCEDURE AND IN 2010.

IT HAS BEEN FOLLOWED IN THE LOWER COURTS.

NOBODY'S QUESTIONED IT.

THE DEFENDANTS ARE NOT

COMPLAINING ABOUT IT.

THE TRIAL JUDGES ARE NOT

COMPLAINING ABOUT IT.

THE DISTRICT COURTS UNIFORMLY FOLLOWED IT AND UNTIL THIS PARTICULAR CONCURRENCE, NOBODY BROUGHT THIS UP AS A PROBLEM.

NOT LIKE CLASSIC CASE OF SAME EVILS TEST IN DOUBLE JEOPARDY, CONSTANTLY WE CAN'T DO THIS, IT IS TOO CONFUSING IT IS NOT MAKING ANY SENSE.

THIS PROCEDURE HAS BEEN IN PLACE FOR FOUR YEARS AND GOING AS SMOOTHLY AS CAN BE EXPECTED, NUMBER ONE.

NUMBER TWO, THE LEGISLATURE IS PRESUMED TO UNDERSTAND AND KNOW WHAT THIS COURT DID.

THE COURT SET THE PROCEDURE IN DENNIS WHETHER SET IN DICTA AS PART OF IT OR FULLY IN THE HOLDING, THE LEGISLATURE KNOWS WHAT THIS COURT DOES.

THEY HAVE HAD FOUR SHOTS AT AMENDING THE STATUTE.

THEY HAVE NEVER DONE ANYTHING.
IF THEY DON'T LIKE THE PROCEDURE
COURT CAME UP WITH, THEY ARE
CERTAINLY FREE TO CHANGE THAT.

>> THE PROCEDURE, I'VE ALWAYS
WONDERED, THE ISSUE OF BURDEN OF
PROOF AND WHO, WHO BEARS THE
BURDEN MAY BE PROCEDURAL, WHAT
THE BURDEN IS, IS PROBABLY
SUBSTANTIVE.

WE'VE STRUGGLED WITH THAT IN
OTHER CASES.

>> RIGHT.

BUT THE LEGISLATURE HAS SET OUT
IN STATUTE BURDENS OF PROOF AND
MADE THE DEFENDANT, YOU KNOW,
PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE
WAS NOT PULL OUT OF AIR.

THAT WAS COMMON LAW.

HISTORICALLY THE DEFENDANT AT
TRIAL HAD TO PROVE AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSES BY PREPONDERANCE OF THE
EVIDENCE.

NOT LIKE COLORADO AND THIS COURT
CAME UP WITH IT FROM NOWHERE.

THIS IS HISTORICAL PRECEDENT.

>> THAT IS NOT THE LAW NOW, IS
IT?

>> IT IS NOT THE LAW NOW BECAUSE
STATUTORILY HAS CHANGED WHERE
THIS COURT DECIDED UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION THE STATE IS NOT
REQUIRED TO DISPROVE AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSES.

WE MAKE THE DEFENDANT PROVE
HIS AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE UNLESS
IT CONFLICTS WITH AN ELEMENT.
THE STATE ALWAYS HAS TO PROVE
ALL THE ELEMENTS.

SO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT HAS
SAID THAT WE CAN, IT IS
PERFECTLY CONSTITUTIONAL TO--

>> I'M ASKING WHAT THE LAW OF
FLORIDA IS WITH RESPECT TO A
CLAIM OF SELF-DEFENSE AND THE
STATE'S BURDEN WITH RESPECT TO
THAT?

>> THE LAW OF FLORIDA IS, THE
STATE BEARS THE BURDEN ONCE
THERE IS PRIMA FACIE CASE BY THE

DEFENSE TO DISPROVE IT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.

IT IS THE STATE'S BURDEN AT TRIAL.

AND STILL THE STATE'S BURDEN AT TRIAL AFTER DENNIS.

AGAIN MR. BREATHERICK IS FREE TO RAISE HIS ARGUMENTS IN FRONT OF A YOU ARE ASK I ARE.

JUST BECAUSE HE LOST WHEN HE HAD THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN FRONT OF A JUDGE, DOESN'T MEAN HE WILL LOSE IN FRONT OF A JURY.

HE STILL HAS THAT RIGHT.

IT DIDN'T CHANGE ANYTHING.

>> ANY STATE THAT HAS A "STAND YOUR GROUND" LAW THAT HAS PUT INTO PLACE A PRETRIAL EVIDENTIARY HEARING WHERE THE STATE WOULD HAVE TO PROVE BEFORE A JUDGE THE, THAT THE FORCE WAS NOT JUSTIFIABLE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.

>> THERE IS NONE.

IT IS UNPRECEDENTED IT IMPOSE THAT KIND OF A BURDEN.

BUT LET ME GET BACK TO, IT IS UP TO THE LEGISLATURE TO HOW TO IMPLEMENT ITS STATUTE.

THE LEGISLATURE IS PRESUMED TO UNDERSTAND WHAT THIS COURT DID IN DENNIS AND IT HAS REVISITED THE STATUTE.

IT HASN'T CHOSE TO SET OUT A DIFFERENT PROCEDURE.

UNDER THIS COURT'S CASE LAW THAT MEANS THE LEGISLATURE IS AGREEING WITH THAT.

IT IS ACQUIESCING IN THIS COURT'S DECISION.

IF IT HAS A PROBLEM WITH IT CAN CHANGE IT.

WHEN THE BURGLARY STATUTE WAS INTERPRETED A WAY THEY DIDN'T LIKE, THEY CAME BACK IMMEDIATELY AND CHANGED IT.

THEY HAVE THE POWER TO DO THAT. THEY HAVE CHOSEN NOT TO DO.

THAT UNDER THIS COURT'S CASE LAW THAT SAYS THAT MAKES IT PART OF

THE STATUTE AND WE HAVE TO KEEP GOING.

THEY HAVE SHOWN ABSOLUTELY NO REASON FOR THIS COURT TO CHANGE ITS OPINION IN DENNIS.

IT IS NOT ESPECIALLY BURDENSOME. IT IS NOT PULLED OUT OF THE AIR. SOMETHING THAT THE DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DENNIS ASKED FOR WHEN THEY WERE TRYING TO BE REASONABLE.

THEY HAVE HAVEN'T HAD ANY PROBLEM WITH IT.

NOTHING HAS CHANGED.

NO STATUTE HAS CHANGED.

IT IS NOT LIKE THERE HAVE BEEN 40 OTHER CASES FROM OTHER STATES SAYING, OH, WE'LL IMPOSE THIS BURDEN ON THE STATE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.

NOTHING HAS CHANGED THAT REQUIRES THIS COURT TO REVISIT WHAT IT SAID IN DENNIS.

THE LEGISLATION HASN'T CHANGED. NONE OF THE CASE LAW AROUND THE COUNTRY.

AS A MATTER OF FACT THEY'RE POLLING FLORIDA.

-- FOLLOWING FLORIDA.

SOUTH CAROLINA AND GEORGIA SAID, THAT MAKES SENSE TO US.

PROPONENT OF IMMUNITY SHOULD BEAR BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING IT. PREPONDERANCE IS MINIMAL BURDEN. NOT LIKE THIS COURT IMPOSED SOMETHING REAL DRACONIAN.

IT IS SOMETHING HISTORICAL.

IT IS WORKING IN THE LOWER COURTS.

THERE IS NO REASON TO VISIT NOW. GIVEN ALL THAT WE WOULD ASK YOU TO ANSWER THE CERTIFIED QUESTION IN THE NEGATIVE AND KEEP THE PROCEDURE THE SAME AS THIS COURT ALREADY ESTABLISHED IN DENNIS.

THANK YOU.

>> COUNSEL IF YOU WOULD JUST ANSWER THE QUESTION THAT THE ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL RAISED.

THE LEGISLATURE HAS NOW HAD FOUR SESSIONS WITH THIS LAW IN PLACE.

>> I WOULD ACTUALLY ARGUE--

>> I'M SORRY.

>> I'M SORRY YOUR HONOR, I THOUGHT YOU WERE THROUGH WITH YOUR QUESTION.

>> I'M NOT DONE.

THEY HAVE HAD FOUR SESSIONS WITH THE "STAND YOUR GROUND" LAW IN PLACE.

THE PROCEDURE HAS BEEN FOLLOWED FOR THE LAST FOUR YEARS.

HAS BEEN THAT THE DEFENDANT CARRIES THE BURDEN AT BEGINNING DURING THIS TRIAL, THIS HEARING. WHY HASN'T THE LEGISLATURE CHANGED IT?

>> YOUR HONOR--

>> YOU ARGUE THAT THEY'RE PRESUMING TO KNOW THE LAW. WHY HAVEN'T THEY CHANGED IT?

>> YOUR HONOR, FROM THE DECISION IN DENNIS IN DECEMBER 2010, IN 2011, 2012, AND 2013

LEGISLATURES WERE, I BELIEVE WERE STILL WATCHING WHAT THE COURTS WERE DOING AND JUST TRYING TO DETERMINE WHETHER ANYTHING ELSE NEEDED TO BE DONE.

IN 2014, THIS MOST RECENT SESSION THEY ACTUALLY DID MAKE ONE MODIFICATION TO THE "STAND YOUR GROUND" LAW.

THEY MODIFIED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE DEFENSIVE DISPLAY OF A FIREARM IS A LEGITIMATE USE OF A FIREARM TO DEFEND ONE'S SELF.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ACTUALLY ARGUES IN THEIR BRIEF THIS ISSUE, THIS SHIFTING OF THE BURDEN OR MAKING CLEAR WHERE THE BURDEN IS DIED IN COMMITTEE AND THIS COURT SHOULD TAKE THE FACT THAT THAT ISSUE DIED IN COMMITTEE AS EVIDENCE THAT THE LEGISLATURE HAS NO INTENTION OF CHANGING IT.

BUT AS WE POINTED OUT IN OUR REPLY THERE WERE A LOT OF OTHER

ISSUES IN THAT PARTICULAR BILL.
IT WAS ACTUALLY ONE OF TWO
COMPETING BILLS.
THE OTHER BILL PASSED.
THIS BILL THAT THE AG'S OFFICE
POINTED OUT, IT DIED.
IT DIDN'T DIE AND WASN'T OPPOSED
BECAUSE OF THE SHIFT OF THE
BURDEN.
IT WAS OPPOSED BY THE SAME
GROUPS THAT PUSHED FOR STAND
YOUR GROUND IN THE FIRST PLACE.
THEY OPPOSED THAT PARTICULAR
BILL BECAUSE IT IMPOSED NEW
RESTRICTIONS ON WHO COULD USE
DEFENSIVE FORCE AND WIN.
SO, YOUR HONOR, WHEN THERE HAS
BEEN LONG LEGISLATIVE INACTION I
WOULD SAY ABSOLUTELY.
BUT WE'VE HAD REDISTRICTING
ISSUES.
WE HAVE HAD SIGNIFICANT
BUDGETARY ISSUES.
WE HAVE HAD OTHER ISSUES THAT
OCCUPIED THE LEGISLATURE'S TIME.
I DON'T THINK FOUR YEARS WITH
OTHER ISSUES GOING ON AND
ONGOING DISCUSSION ABOUT ROLE OF
STAND YOUR GRAND IN THIS STATE
THAT WE CAN SAY THE LEGISLATURE
ACQUIESCED IN THIS COURT'S
DECISION.
THE STATE ARGUES ESSENTIALLY THE
BURDEN SHOULD BE ON THE
DEFENDANT BECAUSE THEY'RE THE
MOVING PARTY.
THEY'RE ONLY THE MOVING PARTY
BECAUSE THIS COURT MADE THEM THE
MOVING PARTY.
THE LEGISLATURE DIDN'T.
THE LEGISLATURE SAID PERSON USES
FORCE IS PERMITTED IN ONE OF
THREE SELF-DEFENSE STATUTES IS
JUSTIFIED IN USING SUCH FORCE
AND IMMUNE FROM CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION AND CIVIL ACTION.
DIDN'T SAY CAN APPLY FOR
IMMUNITY.
THEY DIDN'T SAY SEEK IMMUNITY.
THEY SAID THIS PERSON IS IMMUNE.

YOUR HONORS I BELIEVE THAT IS
ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY THAT THE
LEGISLATURE GRANTED.
IF THE STATE WANTS TO PIERCE
THAT IMMUNITY GRANTED BY THE
LEGISLATURE TO A PERSON WHO
CLAIMS SELF-DEFENSE I THINK THE
BURDEN SHOULD BE ON THE STATE.
I THINK THAT'S WHY THE
LEGISLATURE DIDN'T FEEL THE NEED
TO PUT A BURDEN BECAUSE THEY
SAID THIS PERSON HAS IMMUNITY.
WE WOULD ASK THIS COURT TO
ANSWER THE CERTIFIED QUESTION
THAT THE BURDEN SHOULD BE PLACED
ON THE STATE AT ALL STAGES TO A
HEIGHTENED STANDARD.
WE ASK THAT THIS COURT FIND EVEN
UNDER THE EXISTING STANDARD,
MR. BREThERICK ACTED REASONABLY
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCE.
>> THANK YOU, COUNSEL.
THANK YOU FOR YOUR ARGUMENTS.
THE COURT IS IN RECESS FOR TEN
MINUTES.