>> THE COURT WILL NOW MOVE TO MRI ASSOCIATES OF TAMPA INC. V. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY. YOU MAY PROCEED. >> GOOD MORNING, YOUR HONORS, DAVID CALDEVILLA. I'M HERE TODAY IN TAMPA, FLORIDA, WITH MY CO-COUNSEL, KRISTIN NORRIS AND JOHN ORICK WHO REPRESENT MRI ASSOCIATES OF TAMPA. I'VE RESERVED FIVE MINUTES FOR REBUTTAL THIS MORNING. MY CLIENT WAS SUED BY STATE FARM FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF. THE TRIAL COURT GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR MY CLIENT, STATE FARM APPEAL AND THE SECOND DISTRICT REVERSED. WE'RE NOW BEFORE THIS COURT ON A CERTIFIED QUESTION OF GREAT PUBLIC IMPORTANCE. AMONG OTHER THINGS, WE CONTEND THE SECOND DISTRICT ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT THERE ARE NO LONGER TWO MUTUALLY-EXCLUSIVE METHODS TO CALCULATE PIP REIMBURSEMENTS FOR MEDICAL EXPENSES. BASED ON THAT ERROR, THEY ALSO CONCLUDED THAT A PIP INSURER IS ALLOWED TO USE THE FACT-DEPENDENT METHOD TO CALCULATE CHARGES WHILE AT THE SAME TIME USING A CEILING. I THINK WE ALL KNOW THERE'S BEEN A LOT OF SIGNIFICANT PIP LITIGATION ABOUT THE REASONABLE AMOUNT OF MEDICAL EXPENSES. THIS WAS SUCH A HUGE PROBLEM THAT IN OCTOBER 2007 THE NO-FAULT STATUTES WERE AUTOMATICALLY REPEALED BY A SUNSET PROVISION. AND SO THERE WAS ACTUALLY NO PIP STATUTE IN FLORIDA DURING THE LAST THREE MONTHS OF 2007. BUT IN 2008 THE LEGISLATURE RESURRECTED THE NO-FAULT STATUTE IN A MANNER THAT WAS INTENDED TO REDUCE PIP LEGISLATION.
THE LEGISLATURE DID THIS BY PROVIDING CERTAINTY WITH A FIXED AND PREDETERMINED SCHEDULE OF MAXIMUM CHARGES THAT WILL ALWAYS SATISFY THE REASONABLE MEDICAL

EXPENSES MANDATE.

IF A PIP INSURER LAWFULLY USES THE SCHEDULE OF MAXIMUM CHARGES, THAT PROVIDES CERTAINTY TO THE INSURANCE COMPANIES, THE INSURED PATIENTS, THEIR HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS AND THE COURTS AND ELIMINATES THE NEED TO LITIGATE OVER WHETHER THE AMOUNT PAID BY THE INSURANCE COMPANY WAS REASONABLE.

THE SECOND DISTRICT'S DECISION ELIMINATES THE CERTAINTY PROVIDED BY THE SCHEDULE OF MAXIMUM INJURIES, EXPOSES INSURED TO BALANCED BILLING AND RETURNS PIP TO THE PRE-2008 ERA LITIGATING OVER THE REASONABLE AMOUNT OF MEDICAL EXPENSES. THAT IS NOT WHAT THE LEGISLATURE INTENDED WHEN IT RESURRECTED THE PIP STATUTE AND ADOPTED THE SCHEDULE OF MAXIMUM CHARGES OF 2008.

THAT'S NOT WHAT THE LEGISLATURE INTENDED WHEN IT AMENDED THE STATUTE TO CODIFY THE NOTICE REQUIREMENT IN 2012.

CASE LAW EXPLAINS THAT THE PIP STATUTE HAS A REASONABLE MEDICAL EXPENSE COVERAGE MANDATE WHICH CANNOT BE DISCLAIMED IN AN INSURANCE POLICY.

THERE ARE TWO DIFFERENT METHODS FOR SATISFYING THAT.

THE FIRST METHOD IS THE LONGSTANDING FACT-DEPENDENT METHOD DESCRIBED IN SUBSECTION 5A.

THE SECOND METHOD IS OFTEN
CALLED THE FEE SCHEDULE METHOD,
AND IT'S BASED ON A FIXED AND
PREDETERMINED SCHEDULE OF

MAXIMUM CHARGES ALONG WITH AN EXTENSIVE SET OF TERMS AND CONDITIONS ATTACHED TO IT. THIS SECOND METHOD WAS ADOPTED BY THE LEGISLATURE IN 2008 TO REDUCE LITIGATION, AND IT'S NOW FOUND IN SUBSECTIONS 5A 1-5. IN ALLSTATE VS STAND-UP MRI, THE FACT DEPENDENT METHOD IS THE--WE KNOW THE FEE SCHEDULE METHOD IS A PERMISSIVE ALTERNATIVE. BECAUSE 5A 1-5 REPEATEDLY EXPLAINED THE INSURER MAY USE IT, ALSO WHAT HAPPENS IF THE INSURER USED IT. WE KNOW THE FEE SCHEDULE METHOD IS SEPARATE AND DISTINCT BECAUSE ALL THE DECISIONS CROSS-REFERENCE AND REFER BACK TO THE SCHEDULE OF MAXIMUM CHARGES IN SUBSECTION 5A. THEY'RE ALL TIED TOGETHER. IN FACT, ALL APPELLATE COURTS, THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT AND DCAs, ALL OPINIONS THAT HAVE ADDRESSED THIS ISSUE ALL RECOGNIZE THAT THE TWO METHODS ARE SEPARATE AND DISTINCT-->> I'M SORRY TO INTERRUPT YOU. I'M NOT SURE THAT IT MATTERS. BUT IT'S NOT OBVIOUS THAT VIRTUAL IMAGING WAS RIGHT ON THAT. AND NOW THAT THE STATUTE HAS CHANGED, ISN'T IT CLEAR THAT THERE'S THIS ONE REASONABLENESS

CHANGED, ISN'T IT CLEAR THAT
THERE'S THIS ONE REASONABLENESS
REQUIREMENT AND THAT, CERTAINLY,
THIS LIMITATION ON REIMBURSEMENT
BASED ON THE SCHEDULES IS JUST
SORT OF THE STATUTORY DEFAULT
WAY OF COMPLYING WITH THE
REASONABLE ARGUMENT?
>> THAT'S EXACTLY THE ARGUMENT
THAT GEICO MADE IN VIRTUAL
IMAGING.
THAT WAS REJECTED UNIVERSALLY BY

THAT WAS REJECTED UNIVERSALLY BY THE DISTRICT COURTS OF APPEAL. THE LEGISLATURE COULD HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY AMENDED THE PIP STATUTE IN 2012 TO ADDRESS THAT

IDEA.

GEICO HAD BEEN REPEATEDLY REBUFFED ON THAT ARGUMENT, BUT DCI, MRI DECISION, VIRTUAL IMAGING I AND II, ALL OF WHICH HAD BEEN DECIDED BEFORE THE 2012 LITIGATION.

>> BUT, COUNSEL, LET'S JUST FOCUS ON THE TEXT OF THIS STATUTE.

AND, YOU KNOW, THERE'S A LONG, COMPLICATED HISTORY HERE, I UNDERSTAND.

BUT WHEN I JUST FOCUS ON THE TEXT OF THIS STATUTE AND I SEE THE LANGUAGE THAT SAYS THE INSURER MAY LIMIT REIMBURSEMENT TO 80 PRESIDENT OF THE FOLLOWING SCHEDULED MAXIMUM CHARGES, I HAVE A HARD TIME UNDERSTANDING WHY THAT DOESN'T MEAN WHAT IT SAYS, THAT IT IS, IT IS GIVING THE INSURER THE OPTION OF LIMITING REIMBURSEMENT IN THAT MANNER.

MAY LIMIT REIMBURSEMENT. IT DOES NOT SAY THAT THE INSURER MAY ELECT TO PROVIDE REIMBURSEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH, OKAY? THAT WOULD BE ONE THING.

IT DOESN'T SAY THAT.

>> WELL, YOU'RE RIGHT. >> AND IT SEEMS, BUT IT SEEM

LIKE YOUR ARGUMENT DEPENDS ON INTERPRETING THAT LANGUAGE AS THOUGH IT SAID THAT INSTEAD OF WHAT IT ACTUALLY SAYS.

NOW, WHAT AM I MISSING ABOUT THE TEXT OF THE STATUTE?

>> YOU'RE NOT MISSING ANYTHING BECAUSE THAT'S WHAT THE STATUTE SAID IN 2008.

IT IS PERMISSIVE, I TOTALLY AGREE WITH PERMISSIVE. BUT WHAT YOU POINTED OUT IN YOUR DISSENT, JUSTICE CANADY, IN THE VIRTUAL IMAGING III CASE WHICH WAS IN 2013 BASED ON THE 2008 VERSION OF THE STATUTE-- THE

STATUTE HAD BEEN AMENDED—— YOU POINTED OUT THAT VERY FACT. WELL, THE STATUTE SAYS MAY, THERE'S NOTHING THAT REQUIRES THIS TO BE IN THE POLICY. >> I THOUGHT I MIGHT HAVE THOUGHT OF THAT BEFORE. >> RIGHT.

BUT IN 2012 THE STATUTE WAS AMENDED TO CODIFY THE NOTICE REQUIREMENT THAT THE DCI MRI CASE WAS TALKING ABOUT AND WITH THE KING'S WAY-- WHAT THE KING'S WAY CASE.

IN 2012 THE LEGISLATURE ENACTED A NOTICE REQUIREMENT, AND IT SAYS AN INSURER MAY LIMIT PAYMENT AS AUTHORIZED BY THIS OF PARAGRAPH ONLY IF THE INSURANCE POLICY INCLUDES A NOTICE AT THE TIME OF ISSUANCE OR RENEWAL THAT THE INSURER MAY LIMIT PAYMENT TO THE CHARGES SPECIFIED ABOVE. IT NOW HAS TO THE IN THE POLICY—

>> THAT'S NOT AT ISSUE HERE. THE FACT THAT NOTICE HAS TO BE GIVEN, THAT WAS THE ISSUE WHETHER SPECIFIC NOTICE HAD TO BE GIVEN OF THE, THE WAY THE INSURER WAS GOING TO PROCEED OR WHETHER THE INSURER WAS GOING TO AVAIL ITSELF OF THAT PROVISION. THAT'S NOT AT ISSUE HERE. THE LEGISLATURE'S CHANGED THAT. THE QUESTION IS WHETHER THEY ARE RESTRICTED TO THAT, TO THOSE SCHEDULES EVEN THOUGH IT STILL SAYS MAY LIMIT, IT REFERS TO THE, ALLOWING THEM TO LIMIT REIMBURSEMENT.

I KNOW THE HISTORY.

>> AND BEFORE YOU ANSWER, I WOULD JUST ADD TO THAT THERE'S NOTHING IN THE TEXT OF THIS NEW STATUTORY EXPLICIT NOTICE REQUIREMENT THAT BUYS INTO THE REQUEST THAT THERE ARE TWO SEPARATE, MUTUALLY-EXCLUSIVE THINGS.

I MEAN, ALL IT SAYS IS IF YOU WANT TO AVAIL YOURSELF OF THE LIMIT, YOU HAVE TO GIVE NOTICE. BUT IT DOESN'T, IT DOESN'T ENDORSE ANY, YOU KNOW, THE VIRTUAL IMAGING VIEW OF WHETHER THEY'RE TWO SEPARATE THINGS OR NOT.

>> NO.

THERE'S NOTHING THAT SUGGESTS THAT THEY'RE NOT MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE.

I DISAGREE WITH YOU.

BUT LET ME-- BEFORE I ANSWER YOUR APPENDAGE TO THE QUESTION THAT JUSTICE CANADY ASKED, LET ME ADDRESS JUSTICE CANADY OUICKLY.

WE AGREE THAT IT'S PERMISSIVE, BUT IT'S ONLY PERMISSIVE ONCE YOU'VE GOT A NOTICE-->> WHERE DOES IT, WHERE DOES--

>> WHERE DOES IT, WHERE DOES--OKAY.

SO DIDN'T THE INSURANCE COMPANY IN THIS CASE INCLUDE THE NOTICE THAT THEY RESERVE THE RIGHT TO LIMIT REIMBURSEMENT TO 80% OF THE SCHEDULE?

>> THAT'S A DISPUTED ISSUE IN THIS CASE.

THIS WAS A SUMMARY JUDGMENT CASE BASED ON A STIPULATION OF FACTS. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE THAT STATE FARM EVER COMPLIED BY PROVIDING A NOTICE AT THE TIME OF ISSUANCE OR RENEWAL OF HIS POLICY, THERE'S NO EVIDENCE THAT THEY SUBMITTED A REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF ANY NOTICE UNDER 5A-5 OF THE STATUTE.

THERE'S NO EVIDENCE THAT THE OFFICE OF INSURANCE REGULATION APPROVED ANY NOTICE FOR PURPOSES OF 5A-5.

BUT THERE IS A NOTICE REQUIREMENT, AND I THINK WE CAN ALL AGREE BEFORE YOU CAN USE THE FEE SCHEDULES, YOU HAVE TO HAVE ISSUED A NOTICE AT THE TIME OF

## RENEWAL.

>> THE POLICY'S QUOTED IN THE SECOND DISTRICT OPINION, AND THE POLICY ITSELF SAYS THAT THEY ARE GOING TO LIMIT PAYMENT TO 80% OF THE FEE SCHEDULE.

>> IT SAYS TWO THINGS, JUSTICE LAWSON.

FIRST OF ALL, LET ME JUST SAY BECAUSE WHAT THE-- JUST BECAUSE THE POLICY SAYS IT DOESN'T MEAN IT IS A NOTICE THAT WAS ISSUED AT THE TIME OF ISSUANCE OR RENEWAL.

IT DOESN'T MEAN THAT IT WAS OFFERED FOR APPROVAL TO THE OFFICE OF INSURANCE REGULATION. IT DOESN'T MEAN THAT THE OFFICE OF INSURANCE REGULATION DID APPROVE.

BUT WITH THAT SAID, LET'S READ THE LANGUAGE OF THE POLICY BECAUSE IT SAYS TWO THINGS. IT SAYS—— THIS IS AT PAGE 16 OF THE POLICY AND PAGE 232 OF THE RECORD.

IT SAYS WE WILL LIMIT PAYMENT OF MEDICAL EXPENSES TO 80% OF A PROPERLY-BILLED AND DOCUMENTED REASONABLE CHARGE, BUT IN NO EVENT WILL WE PAY MORE THAN 80% OF THE FOLLOWING NO-FAULT SCHEDULE OF MAXIMUM CHARGES. SO IT SAYS TWO THINGS; WE WILL LIMIT PAYMENT TO A REASONABLE CHARGE, AND WE WILL LIMIT PAYMENT TO THE SCHEDULE OF MAXIMUM CHARGES.

THAT PROBABLY WOULD BE OKAY EXCEPT STATE FARM THEN DEFINED THE TERM REASONABLE CHARGE IN ITS POLICY TO INCLUDE THE FEE SCHEDULES AS MERELY ONE OF SEVEN FACTORS THAT IT WAS GOING TO RELY UPON IN DETERMINING WHETHER IT'S GOING TO LIMIT PAYMENT TO THE REASONABLE CHARGE WHICH WAS—

>> AM I--

>> [INAUDIBLE]

>> JUST, AM I CORRECT THAT THAT, THEY ESSENTIALLY TRACKED THE STATUTORY TESTIFY IN ADDITION OF REASONABLE CHARGE?

>> NO.

THEY DID NOT, YOUR HONOR.
THEY ADDED, THEY ADDED TO THE
DEFINITION FOUND IN 5A THE
SCHEDULE OF MAXIMUM CHARGES
WHICH IS A SEPARATE METHOD.
AND TO ANSWER JUSTICE MUNIZ'S
QUESTION IF I COULD FINALLY GET
TO THAT.

ALL THE LANGUAGE, JUSTICE MUNIZ, IN 5A 1, 2, 3, 4 AND 5, EVERY ONE RELATES BACK TO 5A 1. AND THAT'S IMPORTANT BECAUSE THERE ARE RAMIFICATIONS, THERE ARE CONSEQUENCES ASSOCIATED WITH SELECTING ONE METHOD FOR THE OTHER.

THAT'S WHAT MAKES THEM DIFFERENT.

WE KNOW THAT THE TWO METHODS ARE SEPARATE AND DISTINCT BECAUSE THEY HAVE VERY SEPARATE CONSEQUENCES.

THE MOST IMPORTANT CONSEQUENCE WAS THE BALANCED BILLING.
UNDER 5A-4 THE PIP INSURER USES,
THE PIP INSURER USES THE FEE
SCHEDULE METHOD THE HEALTH CARE
PROVIDERS PROHIBITED FROM
BALANCED BILLING, BUT UNDER THE
FACT PAYMENT METHOD BALANCED
BILLING IS NOT PROHIBITED.
AND ONE STEP FURTHER, ANOTHER
STATUTE— SECTION 817.234—
ACTUALLY REQUIRES THE HEALTH
CARE PROVIDER TO BALANCE BILL
THE PATIENT.

AND IF NOT, THE HEALTH CARE PROVIDER'S EXPOSED TO CRIMINAL INSURANCE FRAUD CHARGES WHICH IS A FELONY-LEVEL CRIME.
>> COUNSEL, LET ME ASK A QUESTION ABOUT THAT.
IF I UNDERSTOOD YOUR ARGUMENT ABOUT THE BALANCED BILLING AND THE WAY THE REMEDY SHOULD WORK

HERE, I MEAN, IF I UNDERSTAND WHAT YOU'RE SAYING, WE SHOULD REQUIRE THAT THE FACT-DEPENDENT METHOD BE USED WHICH WILL-BECAUSE OF THE PROBLEMS YOU HAVE IDENTIFIED, YOUR INTERPRETATION OF THE WAY THE STATUTE SHOULD BE APPLIED.

SO YOU'RE SAYING THE FACT-DEPENDENT-- THE REMEDY IS THAT THE FACT-DEPENDENT METHOD BE USED.

AND SO THAT, THAT ENTAILS THE BALANCED BILLING.

BUT THEN ELSEWHERE IN YOUR ARGUMENT THAT'S THE GREAT EVIL IN THIS WHOLE THING.

SO WHY, IF YOU WERE—— WHY WOULD THAT BE THE REMEDY AS OPPOSED TO REQUIRING THAT, IF WE AGREED WITH YOUR BASIC ARGUMENT, WHY WOULDN'T THE REMEDY BE TO REQUIRE THAT THE SCHEDULE, THE NON-FACT-DEPENDENT METHOD BE USED?

I WAS CONFUSED BY WHY YOU, HOW YOU IDENTIFY THE BALANCED BILLING AS SUCH A TERRIBLE THING, WHICH I UNDERSTAND THE CONCERNS ABOUT THAT, BUT THEN THE REMEDY YOU PROPOSE IS A REMEDY THAT WOULD REQUIRE THAT. >> BECAUSE YOU CAN'T-- ABSOLUTELY, JUSTICE CANADY. IT'S BECAUSE STATE FARM IS TRYING TO GIVE ITSELF THAT OPTION.

IT'S PURPORTING TO GIVE ITSELF THAT OPTION TO USE EITHER OR BOTH OF THOSE METHODS AT THE SAME TIME.

IT LEADS TO TOTAL UNPREDICTABILITY OF HOW MUCH STATE FARM IS GOING TO PAY FOR A MEDICAL BILL.

YES, WE WANT YOU TO DIRECT STATE FARM, LOOK, YOU HAVE TO ELECT ONE METHOD THE OTHER JUST LIKE ALL THE CASE LAW HAS SAID—>>> COUNSEL, THAT'S NOT WHAT I'M

TALKING ABOUT. I'M TALKING ABOUT THE REMEDY IN THIS CASE GIVEN THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT HAVE DEVELOPED IN YOUR ARGUMENT. IF WE AGREE WITH YOUR BASIC ARGUMENT, YOU'RE SAYING MAKE THIS AS BAD AS IT COULD BE. THAT WOULD BE THE REMEDY, RIGHT? >> THAT DOESN'T MAKE IT AS BAD AS IT COULD BE. IT PROVIDES THE METHOD THAT'S BEEN IN PLACE SINCE 1971 THAT THE LEGISLATURE HAS CHOSEN NOT TO DELETE FROM THE STATUTE. IF THE LEGISLATURE WANTED ONLY THE SCHEDULED MAXIMUM CHARGES METHOD TO BE USED, IT COULD HAVE DONE THAT, BUT THEY DIDN'T. IN FACT, THERE ARE SEVERAL INSURANCE COMPANIES THAT DON'T USE THE SCHEDULE OF MAXIMUM CHARGES METHOD AT ALL. THEY'RE STILL USING THE FACT-DEPENDENT METHOD WHEN THEY PAY CLAIMS, AND THEY DON'T LITIGATE LIKE STATE FARM DOES. INSTEAD, STATE FARM HAS ITSELF, HAS GIVEN ITSELF THE UNMITIGATED DISCRETION, UNFETTERED DISCRETION TO PAY ANY AMOUNT THAT IT WANTS ANYTIME IT WANTS. SO AS A HEALTH CARE PROVIDER. WE DON'T KNOW HOW MUCH WE CAN CHARGE. >> COUNSEL, YOU ARE NOW, COUNSEL, YOU'RE NOW IN YOUR REBUTTAL TIME. YOU MAY CONTINUE, BUT YOU ARE CONSUMING YOUR REBUTTAL TIME. >> WELL, YOUR HONOR, ONE THING I WANT TO POINT OUT INTO MY REBUTTAL TIME IS THE SECOND DISTRICT MADE SEVERAL MISTAKES. ONE OF PROBABLY THE MOST IMPORTANT ONES IS THEY SAID THAT A INSURER MAY NOT DISCLAIM THE FACT-DEPENDENT INFORMATION. THAT'S DIRECTLY CONTRARY TO THE LAW.

YOU CANNOT DISCLAIM THE MANDATE. THE LAW IS THAT YOU CANNOT DISCLAIM THE FACT-DEPENDENT METHOD, THEN THAT MEANS A LOT OF INSURANCE POLICIES RIGHT NOW ARE

INVALID. GEICO'S POLICIES, THOSE POLICIES WOULD BE INVALID.

I'LL RETAIN THE REST OF MY TIME, WHATEVER I HAVE LEFT. THANK YOU.

>> THANK YOU, COUNSEL.

WE'LL NOW GO TO COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT.

>> MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT, GOOD MORNING.

MY NAME IS MARCY ALDRIDGE, AND I'M HERE ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT, STATE FARM. THIS CASE POSES A VERY SIMPLE QUESTION THAT THIS COURT HAS ADDRESSED TWICE BEFORE IN ORTHOPEDIC SPECIALISTS AND IN VIRTUAL IMAGING WHICH IS WHETHER

AN AUTO INSURER'S POLICY SATISFIES WHAT THE COURTS HAVE CALLED A SIMPLE NOTICE REQUIREMENT ALLOWING STATE FARM TO LIMIT REIMBURSEMENT FOR MEDICAL EXPENSE BASED ON THE SCHEDULE OF MAXIMUM CHARGES IN

THE SECOND DISTRICT FOUND THAT IT DID.

SUBSECTION 5A-1.

THE POLICY USES UNEQUIVOCAL LANGUAGE THAT SAYS IF A PROVIDER SUBMITS BILLS IN EXCESS OF THE SCHEDULE AMOUNTS BUT IN NO EVENT WILL THEY BE PAID MORE THAN THE SCHEDULE WOULD PROVIDE.

IT IMPORTS THE ACTUAL SUBSTANCE OF THE SCHEDULE ITSELF, UNLIKE EVEN THE POLICY THIS COURT CONSIDERED IN ALLSTATE V. ORTHOPEDIC SPECIALISTS.

IT COMPLIES WITH THE NEW NOTICE PROVISION THAT CAME INTO THE STATUTE IN 2012 IN SUBSECTION 5A-5 WHICH SAYS THAT AN INSURER MAY ELECT TO LIMIT BASED ON THE

SCHEDULE IF THE INSURANCE
POLICY, AS THIS POLICY HERE,
INCLUDES A NOTICE AT TIME OF
ISSUANCE OR RENEWAL THAT THE
INSURER MAY LIMIT PAYMENT BASED
ON THE SCHEDULE.
>> COUNSEL, I'M SORRY TO
INTERRUPT YOU.

CAN I JUST ASK YOU A QUESTION?
AND IT'S KIND OF— I'M TRYING
TO FIGURE OUT WHAT OUR SORT OF
POTENTIAL VALUE—ADD HERE IS.
AND I UNDERSTAND THAT THE DCA
HERE WAS STUCK WITH VIRTUAL
IMAGING, AND SO THEY HAVE THIS,
THEY— PART OF THEIR ANALYSIS
IS THAT SOMEHOW THE RENUMBERING
OF THE STATUTE CHANGED THIS
ISSUE AS TO WHETHER THEY'RE
MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE.

BUT IF YOU KIND OF PUT THAT TO THE SIDE, FROM YOUR PERSPECTIVE WHAT'S WRONG WITH— IS THERE ANYTHING WRONG WITH THE ANALYSIS THAT THE DISTRICT COURT ENGAGED IN HERE?

I MEAN, I'M TRYING TO UNDERSTAND WHY THIS ISN'T JUST A VERY STRAIGHTFORWARD ISSUE THAT THEY, IN MY OPINION, NOTWITHSTANDING, YOU KNOW, WHETHER I WOULD HAVE WRITTEN IT THIS EXACT WAY ABOUT THE, YOU KNOW, THE RENUMBERING THING.

BUT WHAT IS THERE TO ADD, WHAT CAN WE DO TO ADD TO THIS? OR WHAT SHOULD WE DO? >> YOUR HONOR, I AGREE 100%. WHAT THE SECOND DISTRICT FOUND IS WHETHER WE LOOK AT IT UNDER THE PRISM OF THE NEW STATUTE OR WE LOOK THIS UNDER THE PRISM OF THIS COURT'S JURISPRUDENCE UNDER VIRTUAL AND ORTHOPEDIC SPECIALISTS, STATE FARM'S POLICY FORM CLEARLY ELECTS TO LIMIT REIMBURSEMENT BASED ON A SCHEDULE.

AND IT DOES IT IN A METHOD THAT TRACKS THE TEXT OF THE STATUTE.

AS FAR AS WHAT THIS COURT CAN ADD, OBVIOUSLY, OUR POSITION WAS THAT THIS COURT DIDN'T NECESSARILY NEED TO HEAR THIS CASE BECAUSE STATE FARM'S POLICY AS THE SECOND DISTRICT FOUND, THIS POLICY LANGUAGE IS EVEN MORE PRECISE THAN THE LANGUAGE THIS COURT-- AND, THEREFORE, WE THINK IT IS SUBJECT TO AFFIRMANCE JUST BASED ON THE DECISION IN ORTHOPEDIC SPECIALISTS. BUT I GUESS TO THE EXTENT THIS COURT WANTS TO GIVE VALUE-ADD, WHAT THEY CAN DO IS PROVIDE CLARITY IN THIS AREA. AS MY OPPONENT IDENTIFIED, WHETHER PARTICULAR INSURERS' POLICIES SATISFY THIS NOTICE. AND IN PARTICULAR, THE PROVIDERS CONTINUE TO LIT GATE OVER THEIR VIEW WHICH I DON'T BELIEVE IS ACTUALLY THE VIEW IN EITHER VIRTUAL OR ORTHOPEDIC SPECIALISTS THAT THESE ARE TWO ALL-OR-NOTHING, MUTUALLY-EXCLUSIVE APPROACHES. THE STATUTORY TEXT IS VERY CLEAR, AND IT HAS BEEN CLEAR SINCE 2008 THAT EVERY INSURER IN THE STATE OF FLORIDA MUST, IT'S A MANDATE. MUST IN 1A OF THE STATUTE, MUST ELECT TO LIMIT--SORRY, TO LIMIT, TO PAY 80% OF REASONABLE AND MEDICALLY-NECESSARY CHARGES. EVERY INSURER MUST ELECT REASONABLE. WHAT THE INSURER MAY DO IN SUBSECTION 5.A OF THE CURRENT INSTITUTE IS ELECT A LIMIT ON THAT, A CAP ON THAT BASED ON THE SCHEDULE OF MAXIMUM CHARGES. SO TO THE EXTENT THAT THERE CONTINUES TO BE SOME UNCERTAINTY IN THIS AREA WHICH HAS LED TO THIS CASE AND TO THE EXTENT THAT THIS COURT MAY WANT TO GET OUT OF THE BUSINESS OF HAVING TO BE

THE LAST WORD ON EVERY POLICY ELECTION OF THE SCHEDULE IN THE STATE OF FLORIDA FOR EVERY INSURER AND ALL OF THEIR POLICIES, WHAT THIS COURT COULD BRING TO THE TABLE IS SOME CLARITY ON THIS QUESTION. AS FAR AS, AS I SAID, STATE FARM'S POLICY IS NOT ONLY CLEAR IN ITS LANGUAGE, IN ITS ADOPTION OF THE SCHEDULE ITSELF, BUT IT ALSO TRACKS THE STATUTORY TEXT BECAUSE, AGAIN, SUBSECTION 1A PROVIDES THAT EVERY INSURER, EVERY INSURER WHO ISSUES A POLICY IN THIS STATE MUST PROVIDE REIMBURSEMENT FOR REASONABLE AND MEDICALLY-NECESSARY MEDICAL CHARGES. BUT IT THEN GOES ON TO, IN 1A, CHOOSE TO FOLLOW THE TEXT AND INCLUDE A LIMITATION WITHIN THE LIMITS PROVISIONS OF THE ITS PIP POLICY TO LIMIT REIMBURSEMENT BASED ON THE SCHEDULE. NOW, MY OPPONENT WOULD HAVE YOU BELIEVE THAT SOMEHOW THE FACT THAT STATE FARM HAS CONTAINED A GENERALIZED DEFINITION OF REASONABLE CHARGES IN ITS GENERAL DEFINITIONS SECTIONS WHICH INCLUDES THE 5A FACTORS AND ALSO REFERS TO THE FEE SCHEDULE ITSELF SOMEHOW CREATES AN AMBIGUITY OR RENDERS ITS ELECTION INVALID, NOTHING COULD BE FURTHER FROM THE TRUTH. 5A WHICH-- 5A CONTAINS FACTORS WHICH EVEN AN INSURER ELECTS TO LIMIT BASED ON THE SCHEDULE MUST, MUST CONSIDER. FIRST OF ALL, THE FIRST SENTENCE OF 5A INCLUDES AN OBLIGATION ON THE PART OF THE PROVIDER, AND THAT IS THAT A PROVIDER MAY ONLY CHARGE A REASONABLE CHARGE. THAT ISN'T STATE FARM'S OBLIGATION, THAT IS A PROVIDER'S OBLIGATION, TO PROVIDE A

REASONABLE CHARGE.
AND THEN IT LAYS FOUR FACTORS
THAT IT INSURER MAY, MAY
CONSIDER IN ASSESSING THE
REASONABLENESS OF THIS CHARGE.
SOME OF THOSE THINGS THAT EVEN
AN INSURER WHO ELECTS A SCHEDULE

MUST CONSIDER.
SO, FOR EXAMPLE, THE FIRST
FACTOR IN STATE FARM'S
DEFINITION OF REASONABLE CHARGES
AND THE FIRST FACTOR OF THE 5A
FACTORS THAT AN INSURER MUST
CONSIDER IS USUAL AND CUSTOMARY

CHARGES.

AND AN INSURER WHO ELECTS THE SCHEDULE AND GETS A HOSPITAL BILL, THE HOSPITAL BILLS ARE PAYABLE UNDER—— THE LIMIT FOR HOSPITAL BILLS IS PROVIDED UNDER 5A-1A.

AND IT SAYS THE MONTH BILLS ARE PAID AT 75% OF USUAL AND CUSTOMARY PRICING.

SO AN INSURER WHO ELECTS TO LIMIT BASED ON THE SCHEDULE LIKE STATE FARM MUST, AT THE SAME TIME, CONSULT THE USUAL AND CUSTOMARY PRICING BECAUSE THAT'S EXACTLY HOW YOU WOULD PAY FOR THOSE SERVICES.

AND SO IT GOES ON WITH
OTHER SECTIONS OF THE SCHEDULE.
MOREOVER, YOU CAN'T DIVORCE
GENERAL CLAIMS HANDLING FROM THE
ASSESSMENT OF THE CHARGE EVEN
FOR A CARRIER WHO LIMITS
REIMBURSEMENT UNDER THE
SCHEDULE.

BECAUSE, FOR EXAMPLE, ONE OF THE OTHER FACTORS IN 5A IS A CATCH-ALL, IT'S ALL INFORMATION RELEVANT TO THE REASONABLENESS OF THE CHARGE.

SO, FOR EXAMPLE, PUTTING ASIDE WHAT SOURCE THEY MIGHT GO TO TO FIND A CHARGE, AN INSURED HAS TO LOOK AT THE CHARGES AND ASSESS THE REASONABLENESS OF TO MEDICAL SERVICES THAT WERE PROVIDED, THE

DESCRIPTION IN THE MEDICAL NOTES MATCH UP WITH THE PRICE THAT HAS BEEN CHARGED OR THE CODE THAT HAS BEEN ASSIGNED, IS THERE DUPLICATION. DOES THERE APPEAR TO BE UNFAIR BUNDLING OF SERVICES. SO, ESSENTIALLY, THE PETITIONER'S VIEW IS WE SHOULD DIVORCE ALL FACTUAL CLAIMS HANDLING FROM PRICING. THAT BILL SHOULD COME IN THE DOOR, AND WE SHOULD SIMPLY LIMIT THEM BASED ON THIS SCHEDULE. AND TO YOUR POINT, THAT SYSTEM DOES-- TO THE EXTENT THAT THIS COURT WANTED TO FIND AN AMBIGUITY IN STATE FARM'S POLICY, IT'S NOT AMBIGUOUS, IT FOLLOW THE TEXT OF THE STATUTE. BUT ALSO AN ELECTION-- AS, ESSENTIALLY, MY OPPONENT HAS ARGUED-- BENEFITS THE INSUREDS OF FLORIDA IN THREE SIGNIFICANT WAYS. WHEN A INSURER CAN LIMIT BASED ON THE SCHEDULE, THAT DECREASES THE INSURED'S CO-PAY. WE HAVE MRIS WHERE THIS MRI PROVIDER ESSENTIALLY SENT BILLS FOR 400% OF MEDICARE. STATE FARM LIMITED THOSE TO 200% OF MEDICARE WHICH ON ITS FACE IS NOT AN UNGENEROUS AMOUNT. AND, YES, THE LIMITATION ON THE SCHEDULE ALLOWED STATE FARM TO PAY LESS, BUT IT ALSO MEANT THAT STATE FARM'S INSURED-- BECAUSE PIP IS A CO-PAYMENT COVERAGE--THE INSURED'S 20% WAS ALSO LESS. IN ADDITION, TO THE EXTENT THAT EACH INCREMENTAL PAYMENT IS GOING TO BE LESS BASED ON THE SCHEDULE LIMIT, THAT MEANS THAT THE INSURED'S BENEFITS ARE DEPLETED MUCH LESS QUICKLY. PIP A FINITE COVERAGE THAT EXHAUSTED EITHER \$10,000 OR \$2500 IF THE INSURED DOES NOT HAVE AN EMERGENCY MEDICAL

CONDITION, SO A LOWER PRICE FOR EACH INCREMENTAL VISIT MEANS THAT THE BENEFITS LAST LONGER. AND FINALLY, IT BENEFITS THE INSURANCE BECAUSE PURSUANT TO SUBSECTION 5A-4 THE INSURED CANNOT BE BALANCE BILLED FOR ANY OVERAGE BEYOND THE SCHEDULE IF THE INSURER HAS MADE THE ELECTION.

IT IS STATE FARM'S POSITION THAT ITS POLICY LANGUAGE IS QUITE CLEAR.

IT FOLLOWS THE TEXT OF THE STATUTE.

EVERY INSURER MUST ELECT
REASONABLE, BUT IT THEN ELECT
ARES TO LIMIT REIMBURSEMENT
BASED ON THE SCHEDULE, AN OPTION
THAT IS AVAILABLE TO IT IN 5A-1.
BY REFERENCE TO FACTORS IN
DEFINITION, THAT CANNOT BE
WRITTEN OUT OF ITS POLICY OR ITS
ADJUSTMENT PROCESS.

VIRTUAL AND ORTHOPEDICS, UNDER THOSE DECISIONS STATE FARM'S POLICY WE WOULD NOT REACH ANY DIFFERENT RESULT.

I DO NOT BELIEVE, ACTUALLY, THAT EITHER OF THOSE CASES MAKE THESE MUTUALLY-EXCLUSIVE METHODS. THERE'S LANGUAGE IN VIRTUAL THAT PROVIDERS IS HAVE USED TO EXPLOIT OVER THE YEARS, BUT THERE IS ALSO LANGUAGE THAT MAKES IT VERY CLEAR THAT CASE WAS A NOTICE CASE.

IN FACT, THE COURT REDESIGNED THE CERTIFIED QUESTION IN THAT CASE TO ADDRESS THE FACT— THEY CHANGED IT FROM CAN THE INSURER DO THIS RATHER THAN THAT TO A CAN AN INSURER USE THE SCHEDULE AS A LIMIT WITHOUT SAYING SO AND PROVIDING NOTICE IN ITS POLICY. SO, FIRST OF ALL, VIRTUAL WAS A NOTICE CASE.

SECONDLY, THERE IS LANGUAGE IN THAT POLICY THAT THEY DON'T USE THE WORDS MUTUALLY-EXCLUSIVE,

ALL OR NOTHING.

THAT IS WHAT HAS BEEN WRITTEN INTO IT THROUGH LITIGATION. AND IN ORTHOPEDIC SPECIALISTS, THIS COURT WAS VERY CHEER THAT REASONABLENESS, THE MANDATE OF 1A, CANNOT BE DISCLAIMED, THAT AN INSURER MUST PAY REASONABLE, BUT THAT THEY CAN CHOOSE TO LIMIT THAT REIMBURSEMENT BASED ON THE SCHEDULE OF MAXIMUM CHARGES.

AND, INDEED, THIS COURT REJECTED THE ARGUMENT THAT SOMEHOW THE INSURER'S INCLUSION OF THE 5A FACTORS TO ASSESS REASONABLENESS I SOMEHOW DEFEATED THAT ELECTION, REALIZING THAT THOSE WERE THINGS THAT NEEDED TO BE CONSIDERED AS PART OF THE BASIC ADJUSTMENT PROCESS.

IT'S STATE FARM'S POSITION THAT ITS POLICY LANGUAGE CLEARLY AND UP EQUIVOCALLY ELECTS TO LIMIT REIMBURSEMENT BASED ON THE SCHEDULE.

THERE IS NO WAY THAT A PROVIDER WHO READS ITS POLICY LANGUAGE AND SUBMITS A BILL IN EXCESS OF THE AMOUNT PROVIDED IN THE SCHEDULE OF MAXIMUM CHARGES COULD POSSIBLY BELIEVE THAT THEY'RE GOING TO GET A PENNY MORE THAN THE SCHEDULE. THE POLICY SAYS BUT IN NO EVENT WILL WE PAY MORE THAN 80% OF THE FOLLOWING NO-FAULT ACTS SCHEDULE OF MAXIMUM CHARGES. IF THERE ARE NO OTHER OUESTIONS--

>> I GUESS THERE ARE NO

QUESTIONS. WE WILL GO TO REBUTTAL. >> THANK YOU, YOUR HONORS. LET ME ADDRESS SOME OF THE COMMENTS MY OPPONENT MADE. SHE SAID THAT THE FEE SCHEDULE SHOULD BE USED AS A CAP. THEY'RE NOT A CAP. IN FACT, 5A-2 MAKES IT EXTREMELY CLEAR THAT IT IS THE AMOUNT MUST BE PAID.

THE FEE SCHEDULE AMOUNT MUST BE PAID OR THE 2007 AMOUNT OF THE FEE SCHEDULE, WHICHEVER'S GREATER.

IT'S NOT A CAP.

IT'S THE MINIMUM, AS THE SECOND DISTRICT HELD IN NATIONWIDE V. AFO.

CO-PAYMENT, COUNSEL CLAIMED THAT, OH, THIS IS BENEFITING INSURED BECAUSE WHEN WE USE THE FEE SCHEDULE METHOD, IT ALSO REDUCES THE CO-PAYMENT.
5A-4 IN THE PIP STATUTE SPECIFICALLY SAYS THAT THE FEE SCHEDULING DOES NOT APPLY TO THE TO CO-PAYMENT.

AND, JUSTICE CANADY, YOU JUST HELD IN UNANIMOUS COURT THAT NO PORTION OF A MEDICAL BILL THAT THE INSURED HIMSELF SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR IS COVERED BY THE SCHEDULE OF MAXIMUM CHARGES. IN THAT CASE IT WAS THE DEDUCTIBLE.

THE FEE SCHEDULES ALSO DO NOT PROVIDE A CO-PAYMENT OR CO-INSURANCE, WHICH IS EXACTLY WHAT THE STATUTE SAYS. WE AGREE THAT STATE FARM'S POLICY IS NOT AMBIGUOUS. IT'S CRYSTAL CLEAR THAT THEY WANT TO ADOPT BOTH METHODS AT THE SAME TIME.

IN FACT, THE SECOND DCA
SPECIFICALLY HELD THAT THEY
TRACK BOTH METHODS.
STATE FARM NEVER ONCE TOOK THAT
POSITION IN THIS LITIGATION.
STATE FARM ALWAYS TOOK THE
POSITION THAT THEY ELECTED ONLY
THE FEE SCHEDULE METHOD, THE
SCHEDULE OF MAXIMUM CHARGES.
BUT AGAIN, THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF
THEIR, OF THEIR POLICY SAYS THAT
THEY WILL LIMIT THEIR
REIMBURSEMENTS TO REASONABLE

CHARGES, AND THEY'LL ALSO LIMIT

REIMBURSEMENT TO THE SCHEDULE OF MAXIMUM CHARGES.

WHEN YOU LOOK AT THAT STATEMENT, THE TERM REASONABLE CHARGES IS A DEFINED TERM.

AND IF YOU LOOK AT THEIR
EXPLANATION OF BENEFITS, EVERY
ONE OF THE 19 CLAIMS IN THIS
CASE, EVERY ONE OF THEM HAS AN
EXPLANATION OF BENEFITS FORM
WHICH IS ATTACHED TO OUR
STIPULATION, AND THEY'RE AT
272-330 OF THE RECORD.
AND THEY ALL EXPLAIN THAT STATE
FARM USED THE FACT-DEPENDENT
METHOD TO PAY FOR THESE BILLS.
THEY DIDN'T EVEN RELY ON THE
SCHEDULE OF MAXIMUM CHARGES FOR

THIS BILL.

>> COUNSEL, IT JUST SEEMS LIKE A STRANGE ARGUMENT FOR YOU TO SAY THAT A COMPANY BASICALLY PARROTS THE STATUTE WHICH THE STATUTE ITSELF SAYS HERE'S WHAT YOU HAVE TO DO, HERE'S WHAT YOU MAY DO. AND THEN IF THE POLICY SAYS HERE'S WHAT WE HAVE TO DO AND HERE'S WHAT WE MAY DO, FOR US TO TURN AROUND AND SAY THAT THAT'S ILLEGAL, THAT JUST DOESN'T SEEM TO MAKE ANY SENSE.

>> EXCEPT THAT THAT'S NOT WHAT THE STATUTE SAYS, YOUR HONOR. THEY DON'T PARROT THE STATUTE, THAT'S THE PROBLEM.

THEY'RE SAYING THAT THEY WILL PAY NO MORE THAN THE SCHEDULE OF MAXIMUM CHARGES.

IF I OFFER TO CUT YOUR GRASS FOR \$25 AND YOU SAY, DAVID, GO AHEAD AND CUT MY GRASS FOR \$25 AND I'LL PAY YOU NO MORE THAN REASONABLE CHARGE, BUT IN NO EVENT WILL I PAY YOU MORE THAN \$25, WE'RE NOT SAYING THE SAME THING.

YOU'RE TELLING ME THAT YOU'RE GOING TO PAY LESS.

STATE FARM'S NOT ALLOWED TO PAY LESS.

IF THEY ELECT THE FEE SCHEDULE METHOD, THEY SHOULD BE PAYING THE FEE SCHEDULE AMOUNT.

THEY ARE NOT.

THEY'RE PAYING WHATEVER THEY WANT TO A PAY.

THAT LEADS TO UNPREDICTABILITY AND AN INSURED PATIENT AND THEIR DOCTOR NEED TO KNOW HOW MUCH EACH ONE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE BILL.

THE INSURED NEEDS TO KNOW HOW MUCH ARE THEY GOING TO HAVE TO PAY.

AM I GOING TO BE BALANCE BILLED. HOW MUCH MORE COVERAGE DO I HAVE HAVE LEFT.

>> COUNSEL?

YOU'RE NOW IN OVERTIME, BUT IF YOU-- I'LL GIVE YOU ANOTHER 30 SECONDS TO SUM UP.

>> I APPRECIATE THAT, JUSTICE CANADY.

I THINK THE ISSUES ARE VERY WELL BRIEFED HERE, SO I'M GOING TO HAVE TO FALL BACK ON MY BRIEFS. FOR THE REASONS EXPRESSED IN THE BRIEFS AND TODAY, WE REQUEST THAT YOU ANSWER THE CERTIFIED OUESTION IN THE NEGATIVE AND REVERSE THE SECOND COURT OF APPEAL ESPECIALLY ON THE ISSUE THAT THEY CAN'T DISCLAIM THE FACT-DEPENDENT METHOD. OF COURSE THEY CAN. AND REINSTATE THE TRIAL COURT'S

JUDGMENT.

THANK YOU SO MUCH FOR YOUR TIME, I APPRECIATE IT.

>> WELL, WE THANK YOU BOTH FOR YOUR ARGUMENTS.

THE COURT WILL NOW TAKE A RECESS OF ABOUT TEN MINUTES.