

>> NOW TO THE FOURTH CASE ON THE DOCKET WHICH IS CALHOUN V. THE STATE OF FLORIDA. PLEASE PROCEED.

>> MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT, I'M STACY BIGGART WITH CCRC NORTH, AND WE REPRESENT JOHNNY CALHOUN IN HIS POST-CONVICTION CASE. I WOULD LIKE TO RESERVE FIVE MINUTES FOR REBUTTAL, PLEASE, AND IN THE REMAINING AMOUNT OF TIME I HAVE TO TALK TO YOU, I WANT TO TALK ABOUT MR. CALHOUN'S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIM, CLAIM FOUR IN HIS INITIAL BRIEF.

YOUR HONORS, THIS IS A CASE OF AN OVERWHELMED CAPITAL DEFENSE ATTORNEY WHO WAS TRYING A DIFFICULT CAPITAL MURDER TRIAL ESSENTIALLY BY HERSELF. SHE HAS A SECOND CHAIR, BUT HER SECOND CHAIR IS NOT QUALIFIED TO HANDLE CAPITAL CASES, IS A MISDEMEANOR ATTORNEY AND DESCRIBES HIMSELF, NOT ME, AS A BAG HOLDER.

THIS IS ALSO A CASE WHERE THE DEFENSE COUNSEL HAD AN INVESTIGATOR, AN INVESTIGATOR WHO SEEMED DISINTERESTED OR UNMOTIVATED IN INVESTIGATING THIS CASE AND MADE SUCH STATEMENTS AT THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING AS I DON'T HAVE THE TIME OR THE ENERGY TO CHASE DOWN THOSE LEADS.

SO AS A RESULT OF THIS DEFENSE ATTORNEY ESSENTIALLY TRYING THIS CASE BY HERSELF, SHE FAILED TO CONDUCT AN ADEQUATE PRETRIAL INVESTIGATION OF THIS CASE INCLUDING INVESTIGATING HER ALTERNATE SUSPECT, SHE FAILED TO CHALLENGE THE STATE'S FORENSIC EVIDENCE, SHE FAILED TO CHALLENGE THE STATE'S IDENTIFICATION WITNESSES, SHE FAILED TO OBJECT TO HARMFUL HEARSAY THAT ALLOWED THE STATE

TO ARGUE CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT
IN THEIR CLOSING ARGUMENT, AND
SHE ALSO ELICITED HARMFUL
EVIDENCE IN HER CASE IN CHIEF
THROUGH NOT ONE, BUT TWO
WITNESSES.

AND THEN SHE ALLOWED THE STATE
TO MISSTATE THE EVIDENCE IN
CLOSING ARGUMENT WHICH AMOUNTED
TO AN ARGUMENT THAT MR. CALHOUN'S
GAVE A CONFESSION THAT HE DID
NOT GIVE.

THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF ALL HER
ERRORS PREJUDICES MR. CALHOUN'S,
BECAUSE BUT FOR THOSE ERRORS,
THE RESULT OF THE TRIAL PROBABLY
WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT.

TRIAL COUNSEL HAD A DUTY TO
CONDUCT A REASONABLE
INVESTIGATION, AND THIS COURT
HAS SAID IN FITZPATRICK V. STATE
THAT PRETRIAL PREPARATION,
BECAUSE IT PROVIDES A BASIS UPON
WHICH MOST OF THE DEFENSE MUST
REST, IS PERHAPS THE MOST
CRITICAL STAGE OF THE LAWYER'S
PREPARATION.

>> LET ME JUST ASK A QUICK
POINT.

WHERE IN YOUR BRIEF DID YOU
RAISE THE CUMULATIVE ERROR POINT
AND MAKE THAT ANALYSIS?

>> THE INITIAL BRIEF WAS NOT
DRAFTED BY MYSELF.

I THINK, THOUGH, THAT UNDER
STRICKLAND YOU HAVE TO LOOK AT
ALL OF THE ERRORS.

>> WELL, EVEN IF YOU WAIVE THE
ISSUE BY NOT RAISING IT?

>> I DON'T KNOW THAT THE ISSUE
IS WAIVED IN THE BRIEFS, YOUR
HONOR.

>> OKAY, MAYBE YOU CAN SHOW ME
THAT YOU--

>> YES, SIR.

IN REBUTTAL I WILL LOOK.

THANK YOU, SIR.

BUT IN THIS CASE WE DON'T HAVE
STRATEGY REASONS FOR COUNSEL'S
ERRORS.

TRIAL COUNSEL'S STRATEGY WAS GOING TO IMPLY DOUG MIXON'S INVOLVEMENT.

TRIAL COUNSEL DID SOME INVESTIGATION IN THIS CASE, BUT SHE ONLY DID ENOUGH INVESTIGATION TO KNOW THAT MORE INVESTIGATION WAS NEEDED.

RUNNING INTO HEARSAY IS NOT A REASON TO STOP INVESTIGATING. RUNNING INTO HEARSAY MEANS THAT YOU NEED TO INVESTIGATE FURTHER. HEARSAY AND RUNNING INTO DIFFICULT--

>> WHAT IS THE PARTICULAR HEARSAY STATEMENT YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT NOW?

>> COUNSEL TESTIFIED AT THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING AS WELL AS HER INVESTIGATOR THAT WHEN THEY TRIED TO INVESTIGATE THE CASE, THEY WOULD JUST RUN INTO HEARSAY STATEMENTS, AND SO THEY COULDN'T DEVELOP ANYTHING.

>> YOU'RE NOT TALKING ABOUT THE--

>> NO, SIR, I'M NOT TALKING ABOUT WHAT HAPPENED AT TRIAL. I'M TALKING ABOUT THE PRETRIAL INVESTIGATION.

RUNNING INTO HEARSAY IS FRUSTRATING, BUT YOU DON'T STOP INVESTIGATING YOUR CAPITAL MURDER CASE BECAUSE YOU'RE FRUSTRATED.

AND IN THIS CASE, SHE HAD A LEAD IN HER CASE THAT WAS NOT HEARSAY.

IT WAS ACTUALLY A LEAD THAT WAS GIVEN TO HER WHENEVER SHE DEPOSED HER ALTERNATIVE SUSPECT, AND HE GAVE AN ALIBI WITNESS AND SAID WHERE HE WAS ON THE NIGHT THE VICTIM WENT MISSING IN THIS CASE.

TRIAL COUNSEL NEVER TALKED TO THE WITNESS, TRIAL COUNSEL NEVER DEPOSED THIS WITNESS.

SHE NEVER DID ANY INVESTIGATION OF THIS WITNESS.

AND WHENEVER HER INVESTIGATOR TESTIFIED AT THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING, HIS TESTIMONY WAS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF HOW DISJOINTED THIS DEFENSE TEAM WAS.

THIS IS ESSENTIALLY A TWO-PERSON DEFENSE TEAM, BECAUSE I THINK YOU CAN'T COUNT THE SECOND CHAIR AS MAKING ANY CONTRIBUTION.

>> WHAT DID THAT REPORTED ALIBI WITNESS TESTIFY TO AT THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING?

>> AT THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING, HE TESTIFIED THAT MR. MIXON WAS NOT WITH HIM.

>> IN THE TRIAL COURT, THEY'LL--

[INAUDIBLE]

>> I THINK THIS COURT NEEDS TO HAVE--

>> I NEED YOU TO ANSWER MY QUESTION FIRST.

>> YES, SIR, HE DID.

>> IS THERE COMPETENT, SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THAT CREDIBILITY FINDING?

>> NO, SIR.

>> THERE'S NOT-- DIDN'T MR. CANTRERAS SAY HE SPECIFICALLY TALKED TO AN OFFICER FROM ONE OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENTS, AND THAT OFFICER FROM THE POLICE DEPARTMENT-- I THINK OFFICER MORGAN WAS HIS NAME, TESTIFIED AT THE HEARING-- AND OFFICER MORGAN THAT WHAT HE SAID NEVER HAPPENED?

WASN'T THAT ONE SIGNIFICANT INCONSISTENCY?

>> YES, THAT DID HAPPEN.

>> ISN'T THAT COMPETENT, SUBSTANTIAL BASIS FOR WHICH TO FIND TESTIMONY TO BE FALSE?

>> IT COULD BE.

THE PROBLEM THAT YOU HAVE HERE WITH--

>> ASSUMING THAT THERE IS COMPETENT, SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

FOR THE TRIAL COURT'S
DETERMINATION THAT IT'S FALSE--
AND WE'RE NOT GOING TO REWEIGH
THAT-- THERE'S NO PREJUDICE
WITH RESPECT TO THIS CLAIM,
CORRECT?

>> WELL, IT'S EVIDENCE OF, IT'S
FURTHER EVIDENCE OF--

>> YOU WOULD AGREE THAT THAT
WOULD MEAN THERE'S NO EVIDENCE
WITH RESPECT TO THAT CLAIM.

>> IF THIS COURT--

>> [INAUDIBLE]

>> IF THIS COURT ACCEPTED THE
TRIAL COURT'S FINDING.

>> RIGHT.

>> BUT I'M ASKING THIS--

>> OKAY.

IS THERE ANY LEGAL BASIS FOR NOT
ACCEPTING A CREDIBILITY FINDING
BY A TRIAL COURT UNDER THESE
CIRCUMSTANCES?

>> YES, SIR.

BECAUSE I THINK THAT YOU HAVE TO
LOOK AT THIS ORDER IN ITS
ENTIRETY, AND THERE ARE--

>> NO, I'M TALKING ABOUT
SPECIFICALLY THE CREDIBILITY
FINDING WITH RESPECT TO THIS
PARTICULAR WITNESS.

WHAT, WHAT LAW WOULD ALLOW US AS
AN APPELLATE JUDGE WHO WASN'T--
WHO WERE NOT IN THE COURTROOM TO
SAY THAT THAT CREDIBILITY
DETERMINATION IS INVALID,
PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF THE
EVIDENCE THAT WE JUST DISCUSSED?

>> IN THE JUDGE'S ORDER, THERE
ARE PORTIONS OF HIS DISCUSSION
AND HIS ANALYSIS OF THIS WITNESS
THAT COME STRAIGHT FROM THE
STATE'S CLOSING ARGUMENT.

AND PART OF THE CONCERN THAT I
THINK THIS COURT SHOULD HAVE
WITH THIS ORDER IS THAT-- AND I
UNDERSTAND THAT A COURT CAN
DRAFT AN ORDER, AND WE HAVE
SEVERAL TRIAL JUDGES ON THIS
BENCH CAN DRAFT AN ORDER HOWEVER
YOU WANT TO DRAFT THE ORDER.

IF YOU READ MY CLOSING ARGUMENT AND THE STATE'S CLOSING ARGUMENT AND YOU HAVE ANALYZED THE EVIDENCE AND YOU HAVE MADE A FINDING THAT IS CONSISTENT WITH WHAT THAT ONE PARTY MAY SAY, YOU MAY PLUCK THAT PARAGRAPH OUT AND PUT IT IN YOUR ORDER, BECAUSE WHY SHOULD YOU REINVENT THE WHEEL.

THE CONCERN YOU SHOULD HAVE WITH THIS ORDER IS THIS ORDER MISSTATES-- IT'S FACTUALLY INACCURATE IN MANY PLACES, IT MISSTATES THE LAW IN MANY PLACES, AND THIS IS A PRODUCT OF COPYING AND PASTING THE STATE'S CLOSING ARGUMENT.

THE STRICKLAND LEGAL ANALYSIS, IT IS 100% FROM THE STATE'S CLOSING ARGUMENT.

AND IN THAT THE JUDGE MISSTATES THE STRICKLAND STANDARD.

HE SAYS THAT THE DEFENDANT PROBABLY WOULD HAVE BEEN FOUND NOT GUILTY OR GOTTEN A LIFE SENTENCE.

THAT'S NOT STRICKLAND.

AND SO EITHER THE COURT IS HAVING-- IS INATTENTIVE AND HE'S NOT PAYING ATTENTION TO WHAT HE'S PUTTING IN HIS ORDER BECAUSE HE'S JUST TAKING IT DIRECTLY FROM THE STATE'S BRIEF, OR THE COURT IS, DOESN'T UNDERSTAND THE LAW.

AND EITHER ONE OF THOSE IS SOMETHING THIS COURT SHOULD BE CONCERNED ABOUT.

THERE'S ANOTHER INCIDENT, AND IT IS THE CLAIM WHERE COUNSEL PUT ON, RECALLED GLENDA BROOKS TO TESTIFY THAT BEFORE MR.

CALHOUN'S WAS AT HER HOUSE--

>> I'M HEARING EVERYTHING YOU'RE SAYING.

I'M HAVING A HARD TIME FOLLOWING THE LOGIC OF WHATEVER YOU'RE SAYING GIVES US A LEGAL BASIS FOR OVERRULING THE CREDIBILITY

DETERMINATION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE ON THIS PARTICULAR WITNESS, THE FACT THAT HE GOT THE STRICKLAND STANDARD WRONG AND TOOK IT FROM THE STATE'S BRIEF.

I DON'T-- I'M HAVING A DISCONNECT WITH HOW THAT REFLECTS--

>> BECAUSE THAT'S NOT THE ONLY ERROR IN THIS BRIEF, FACTUAL MISSTATEMENT OF THE LAW. AND THE PORTION ABOUT MR. CANTRERAS, THE DISCUSSION IS OFFICER MORGAN, AND IT'S ALSO THIS DISCUSSION THAT COMES DIRECTLY FROM THE STATE'S BRIEF THAT DOESN'T REALLY MAKE A LOT OF SENSE, THAT HE ASKED FOR AN INTERPRETER AT THE HEARING, AND HE ACTUALLY DOES SPEAK ENGLISH. SO, THEREFORE, HE'S NOT BEING HONEST.

BUT THAT'S NOT TRUE.

HE TESTIFIED AT THE HEARING THAT HE DOES SPEAK ENGLISH, HE DOES SPEAK BROKEN ENGLISH.

THAT WHEN HE SPOKE TO MY PREDECESSOR, HE COULD UNDERSTAND HER, BUT FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS HEARING HE WANTED AN INTERPRETER.

SO THERE'S ANALYSIS THAT IS, AGAIN, CUT AND PASTED FROM THE STATE'S ORDER, THAT HE MUST BE DISHONEST, AND THAT'S NOT TRUE. AND GLENDA BROOKS, THIS IS VERY IMPORTANT BECAUSE THIS IS FURTHER HARMFUL EVIDENCE THAT WAS ELICITED.

THE ANALYSIS OF WHY SHE WAS CALLED IS, AGAIN, CUT AND PASTED FROM THE STATE'S ORDER, AND IT'S FACTUALLY WRONG.

IN THIS SITUATION DEFENSE COUNSEL CALLED GLENDA BROOKS, AND TESTIFIED-- SHE ASKED HER WHENEVER YOU GOT THE PHONE CALL, WERE YOU THEN UNCOMFORTABLE WITH HAVING HIM IN YOUR HOME? AND THE QUESTIONS CONTINUED, DID

YOU ASK HIM TO LEAVE?
AND THEN THERE ARE A FEW MORE
QUESTIONS, AND THEN SHE SAYS,
YOU HAVE A GRANDDAUGHTER, DON'T
YOU?

AND SHE SAYS, YES.
SHE ELICITED HARMFUL HEARSAY.
THEREFORE, HE NEEDED TO LEAVE
HER HOUSE.

DEFENSE COUNSEL DIDN'T
WITHDRAWAL WHY SHE DID THIS IN
HER CLOSING-- I'M SORRY, IN THE
EVIDENTIARY HEARING.

BUT THEN SHE SAID, OH, YEAH, I
THINK IT WAS BECAUSE SHE HAD TOO
MANY PEOPLE IN HER HOUSE.

>> DIDN'T THE STATE FIRST PUT ON
EVIDENCE ABOUT THE MISSING
PERSONS FLIER?

THAT WAS ALREADY IN FRONT OF THE
JURY.

>> THAT'S NOT THE PROBLEM IN
THIS CASE, YOUR HONOR.

THE PROBLEM IS THAT SHE ELICITED
INFORMATION THAT HE WAS
DANGEROUS, AND THEN THE COURT
COPIED FROM THE STATE'S
BRIEF THE IDEA THAT THIS-- SHE
ACTUALLY DID HAVE A STRATEGY.
THEY CREATED A STRATEGY FOR HER.
SHE CALLED HER TO SHOW HER
INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS ABOUT
THE FLIER AND WHAT MR. CALHOUN
SAID WHEN HE HEARD ABOUT IT.
BUT THAT'S NOT TRUE, THAT'S
FACTUALLY INACCURATE.

THAT'S NOT WHAT HAPPENED IN THE
DEFENSE CASE IN CHIEF.

WHAT HAPPENED IN THE DEFENSE
CASE IN CHIEF WAS SHE WAS
IMPEACHED ABOUT HER PRIOR
INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS ABOUT
WHAT MR. CALHOUN SAID ABOUT THE
VICTIM, WHETHER OR NOT HE SAID I
DON'T KNOW HER OR THAT WAS THE
PERSON THAT WAS SUPPOSED TO PICK
ME UP.

SO THE COURT, BY COPYING EXACTLY
WHAT THE STATE WROTE IN THEIR
BRIEF, CREATED A STRATEGY REASON

THAT'S FACTUALLY WRONG.
BECAUSE THAT'S NOT WHAT HAPPENED
IN THE DEFENSE CASE IN CHIEF,
AND THE DEFENSE CASE IN CHIEF--
AGAIN, BECAUSE THIS LAWYER WAS
OVERWHELMED-- SHE DID TRY A
SEVEN-DAY GUILT PHASE BY
HERSELF, A WEEK AND A HALF WITH
NO HELP.

SHE DID NOT HAVE A COGENT
STRATEGY.

THEY HADN'T THOROUGHLY
INVESTIGATED THIS CASE, SO SHE
PUTS ON A WITNESS AND JUST KIND
OF FORGETS WHY SHE DID IT.
AND SO SHE NEVER CLEARED THAT UP
WITH THE JURY OF WHY, WHY SHE
PUT THIS WITNESS UP TO TALK
ABOUT HOW SHE WANTED MR. CALHOUN
TO LEAVE.

AND SO IT IS PROBLEMATIC
WHENEVER THE COURT-- AND THIS
COURT SHOULD BE CONCERNED--
THAT WHENEVER A COURT JUST
COPIES AND PASTES FROM ANOTHER
BRIEF, ANOTHER CLOSING ARGUMENT,
THAT IF IT'S FACTUALLY WRONG,
COMPLETELY FACTUALLY WRONG, IT'S
NOT SHOWING THAT THEY'RE DOING
ANY TYPE OF REAL ANALYSIS.
AND THAT'S CONCERNING IN THIS
CASE.

THAT'S NOT WHAT HAPPENED IN
THOSE TWO PHASES.

IT'S COMPLETELY WRONG.
THE OTHER ISSUE THAT WAS BROUGHT
IN ON, IN HER GUILT-- IN HER
CASE IN CHIEF WAS SHE RECALLED
THE INVESTIGATOR IN THIS CASE.
AND SHE RECALLED THE
INVESTIGATOR IN THIS CASE TO
TESTIFY ABOUT SOME ITEMS THAT
WERE CONSISTENT WITH THE
VICTIM'S CAR THAT WERE FOUND ON
PROPERTY BELONGING TO
MR. CALHOUN'S FAMILY.
IT WAS A TAG BRACKET FROM A CAR
THAT WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE
VICTIM'S CAR BECAUSE IT WAS FROM
THE SAME DEALERSHIP.

AND THERE WAS ALSO A PIECE OF CARDBOARD THAT HAD AN OIL STAIN ON IT THAT THEY'D FOUND IN THEIR INVESTIGATION THAT THE VICTIM'S CAR HAD AN OIL STAIN.

IT WAS NOT BROUGHT IN IN THE STATE'S CASE IN CHIEF BECAUSE THE INVESTIGATOR SAID THAT HE COULDN'T SAY THAT WAS DEFINITELY HER TAG.

I ASSUME THIS DEALERSHIP SOLD A LOT OF CARS IN SOUTH ALABAMA AND NORTH FLORIDA, AND HE COULDN'T SAY FOR SURE THERE WAS THIS OIL STAIN, SO IT WASN'T BROUGHT IN. SO SHE CALLED HIM TO TESTIFY ABOUT THOSE THINGS.

NOW, WHAT SHE SAYS THAT SHE CALLED HIM FOR WAS TO SHOW THAT IT WAS JUST A LITTLE TOO MADE UP, AND EVERYTHING IS FALLING ON MR. CALHOUN'S PROPERTY. SHE NEVER ARGUED THIS TO THE JURY.

INSTEAD, SHE ADDED MORE EVIDENCE FOR THE STATE.

SO THEN WHAT THE STATE DID WITH THIS EVIDENCE WAS THEY BOLSTERED THEIR OFFICER'S CREDIBILITY THAT HE, OF COURSE, WOULDN'T BRING IN EVIDENCE AGAINST A DEFENDANT IF HE DIDN'T HAVE GOOD PROOF OF IT. AND THEN IN CLOSING ARGUMENT, THE STATE USED THAT EVIDENCE TO SAY, WELL, YOU KNOW, WE DIDN'T BRING IT IN BECAUSE WE COULDN'T PROVE IT, BUT IT'S ABSOLUTELY CONSISTENT WITH MR. CALHOUN HAVING DONE THIS.

SO IT'S, AGAIN, NOT DOING A THOROUGH INVESTIGATION, NOT PUTTING-- AND NOT HAVING A PLAN FOR YOUR DEFENSE AND THEN SCATTER-SHOOTING YOUR DEFENSE AND PUTTING IN VERY HARMFUL EVIDENCE THAT HURTS YOUR CLIENT. SHE ALSO FAILED TO CHALLENGE THE STATE'S FORENSIC EVIDENCE. AND WHAT SHE SAID WAS IN A LETTER TO MR. CALHOUN, I THINK

THE 3851 MOTION, BUT IN A LETTER TO HIM, SHE MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT IN A REASONABLE DOUBT DEFENSE, WHAT YOU DO IS YOU ATTACK THE STATE'S CASE, AND YOU DO IT THROUGH EFFECTIVE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF THE STATE'S WITNESSES.

SO SHE HAD A DIFFICULT CASE, AND SHE WAS GOING TO PROVE HER CASE BY CHALLENGING THE STATE'S EVIDENCE.

THAT MEANS ADVERSARIAL TESTING OF THEIR IDENTIFICATION WITNESSES, THEIR FORENSIC EVIDENCE.

SHE WAS GOING TO TEST ALL OF THIS EVIDENCE, AND SHE FAILED TO DO THAT AS WELL.

SO SHE FAILED TO ASK THE DNA EXPERT, ISN'T IT TRUE THAT THEY DNA TESTED AN ALTERNATIVE SUSPECT.

ISN'T IT TRUE THAT HE COULDN'T BE EXCLUDED AS A CONTRIBUTOR? SHE FAILED TO TEST THE STATE'S CASE.

AND I HAVE FIVE MINUTES LEFT FOR REBUTTAL, IF I MAY RESERVE?

>> MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT, MY NAME IS LISA HOPKINS, AND I REPRESENT THE STATE IN THIS MATTER.

I'D LIKE TO START WITH THE ARGUMENT THAT TRIAL COUNSEL DID NOT DO AN ADEQUATE INVESTIGATION PRETRIAL.

IN THIS CASE SHE HAD HER INVESTIGATOR, MR. JORDAN-- WHO ALSO TESTIFIED AT THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING-- THAT THEY FOLLOWED AS MANY LEADS AS THEY COULD.

THEY-- SHE EVEN DESCRIBED HAVING DOORS SLAMMED IN HER FACE IN TERMS OF TRYING TO FIND CONNECTIONS TO PUT DOUG MIXON AS THE ALTERNATIVE SUSPECT.

SHE TESTIFIED AT THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING THAT HER STRATEGY WAS TO

POKE HOLES TO CAUSE REASONABLE DOUBT IN THE STATE'S CASE, MAINTAIN THE CREDIBILITY WITH THE JURY AND ALSO TRY TO PUT DOUG MIXON AS THE ALTERNATIVE SUSPECT.

AT TRIAL SHE HAD MR. MIXON SUBPOENA'D TO TRIAL.

HE WAS THERE THAT DAY, BUT WITH THE DEFENDANT TELLING HER DO NOT CALL HIM, I DON'T WANT HIM CALLED AS A WITNESS ALONG WITH HER OBSERVATIONS THAT HE APPEARED TO BE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF SOME TYPE OF DRUG. SHE MADE THE ULTIMATE DECISION NOT TO CALL HIM DURING HER CASE IN CHIEF.

MR. MIXON DID TESTIFY AT THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING.

HE TESTIFIED THAT

MR. CANTRERAS-- WHILE HE WAS AT HIS HOUSE, MR. CANTRERAS WAS NOT THERE.

THE JUDGE WAS ABLE TO HEAR MR. MIXON'S TESTIMONY AND WAS ABLE TO MAKE CREDIBILITY DETERMINATIONS BASED ON THEIR STATEMENTS.

HE FOUND MS. SIMMONS TO BE COMPLETELY INCONSISTENT.

HE FOUND MR. CANTRERAS TO BE INCONSISTENT AS WELL.

MR. CANTRERAS TESTIFIED THAT HE ONLY KNEW MR. MIXON THROUGH WORK, THAT THEY NEVER SPENT ANY TIME OUTSIDE OF WORK TOGETHER, AND SO IT'S WHOLLY INCREDIBLE THAT MR. MIXON WOULD GO TO SOMEONE HE BARELY KNOWS AND CONFESS TO A MURDER.

MR. MIXON TESTIFIED THAT-- HE WAS ADAMANT, I HAVE NEVER CONFESSED TO THIS CRIME.

I BELIEVE THE DEFENDANT IS THE ONE GOING AROUND TELLING PEOPLE THAT I WAS INVOLVED.

NOW, AS FAR AS THE FORENSIC EVIDENCE, TRIAL COUNSEL TESTIFIED THAT SHE WAS ABLE TO

CONSULT WITH MR. WALTER SMITH
AND MR. WHITE BOTH IN HER
OFFICE.

THEY WERE EXPERIENCED ATTORNEYS.
AFTER CONSULTING WITH THEM ABOUT
THE EXPERTS, THEY MADE THE
DECISION NOT TO CALL AN EXPERT
FOR THE DIGITAL FORENSIC
EVIDENCE AS WELL AS THE
SCRATCHES THAT WERE COVERED--
THAT COVERED THE DEFENDANT.

MS. JEWELL TESTIFIED AT THE
EVIDENTIARY HEARING SHE STILL
WOULD NOT HAVE CALLED AN EXPERT
ON THOSE SCRATCHES, AND THE
COURT SHOULD BE AWARE THAT THE
STATE DID NOT CALL AN EXPERT ON
THE SCRATCHES.

THE JURY WAS ABLE TO HEAR THE
ARGUMENT.

THE STATE THOUGHT IT WAS CAUSED
BY FINGERNAILS.

THE DEFENSE ARGUED IT WAS CAUSED
BY RUNNING THROUGH THE WOODS
THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS
ADMITTEDLY IN AS EVIDENCED BY
HIM SHOWING UP AT THE BROOKS'
HOME ABOUT A MILE AND A HALF
FROM THE SITE OF WHERE THE CAR
WAS ULTIMATELY FOUND.

NOW, AS FAR AS CALLING
MS. BROOKS DURING HER CASE IN
CHIEF, MS. JEWELL DID TESTIFY
THAT INITIALLY SHE WAS-- SHE
COULD NOT REMEMBER WHY SHE HAD
CALL MS. BROOKS.

AND THEN AFTER REFRESHING HER
MEMORY, SHE WAS ABLE TO SAY I
BELIEVE IT WAS BASED ON A
CONVERSATION I HAD WITH THE
DEFENDANT.

I WAS TRYING TO GET OUT THAT IT
WASN'T THAT SHE DIDN'T WANT THE
DEFENDANT IN THE HOUSE, IT WAS
THAT SHE DIDN'T WANT ANYBODY IN
THE HOUSE BASED ON THE FLIER.
AND SOMETIMES WHEN YOU PUT A
WITNESS ON THE STAND, YOU CAN'T
ALWAYS GET THEM TO SAY WHAT YOU
WANT THEM TO SAY.

AND SHE DID ADMIT THAT MS. BROOKS WAS A VERY DIFFICULT WITNESS FOR HER.

AS FAR AS INVESTIGATOR RAYLEIGH, SHE TESTIFIED THAT SHE COMMONLY PUTS ON THE LAW ENFORCEMENT WITNESSES DURING HER CASE IN CHIEF TO POINT OUT THAT SHE, THAT THEY WERE NOT FORTHCOMING TO THE JURY.

SHE TRIED TO BRING OUT THAT THERE WAS AN UNKNOWN SHOE PRINT THAT WAS RECOVERED THAT COULD HAVE SHOWN A POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE SUSPECT THAT INVESTIGATION DID NOT, THAT THE INVESTIGATION DID NOT GO INTO. AND, AGAIN, HER ULTIMATE STRATEGY WAS TO POINT OUT THE INCONSISTENCIES, PLAY OFF THE IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE.

BUT THE EVIDENCE THAT WAS PRESENTED AT THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING DOES NOT NEGATE THE DNA EVIDENCE THAT WAS FOUND IN THE DEFENDANT'S TRAILER 1 IN 38 QUADRILLION.

THAT IS THE DNA OF THE VICTIM. HER BLOOD ON THE DUCT TAPE AND ON THE WHITE QUILT THAT WAS RECOVERED FROM THE TRAILER. 1 IN 27 QUADRILLION, BLOOD FOUND IN THAT TRAILER.

NOW ALSO MR. MIXON'S DAUGHTER BRITNEY, WHO WAS A WITNESS IN THE CASE.

MS. JEWELL TESTIFIED THERE WAS AN IMPLICATION THAT SHE WAS INVOLVED IN THIS CASE AND THAT BECAUSE HER DNA WAS FOUND IN THAT TRAILER, IT WAS IMPLIED THAT MR. MIXON'S BLOOD WAS ALSO FOUND BECAUSE IT WAS ONLY 1 IN 800.

IT WAS A LOW AMOUNT THAT THEY COULD NOT CONNECT MR. MIXON TO THE FORENSIC EVIDENCE RECOVER TOED.

>> LET ME ASK YOU ABOUT A FAIRLY MINOR POINT IN ONE OF THE

CLAIMS.

THE CLAIM REGARDING WHAT PETITIONER TERMS CLASSIC HEARSAY, THE FAILURE TO OBJECT TO CLASSIC HEARSAY WHEN TIFFANY BROOKS TESTIFIED THAT HER BOYFRIEND ON THE PHONE, STEVEN BLEDSOE, TOLD HER ABOUT THE FLIER, AND THE CLAIM IS THAT THAT ALLOWED FOR THE FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THAT TESTIMONY.

I SAW A FLIER, BOTH OF THESE PEOPLE ARE MISSING.

ALLOWED THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT TESTIMONY THAT BROOKS GAVE ABOUT CALHOUN SAYING THAT HE DID NOT KNOW THE VICTIM?

SO THAT'S THE CLAIM.

AND MY SORT OF MINOR POINT IS YOU SEEM TO ACCEPT THAT THAT IS HEARSAY, AND I'M HAVING A HARD TIME UNDERSTANDING WHY THAT STATEMENT BY BLEDSOE, THAT I SAW A FLIER WITH THESE TWO PEOPLE ON IT, WAS OFFERED TO PROVE THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER ASSERTED.

AT ISSUE IN THE CASE WAS NOT WHETHER HE SAW A FLIER OR NOT. IT WOULD SEEM TO ME THAT THAT WOULD BE OFFERED TO SHOW CONTEXT OF THE RELEVANT AND ADMISSIBLE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE WITNESS AND THE DEFENDANT.

SO WHY IS THAT HEARSAY, I GUESS, IS MY QUESTION.

I MEAN, THE CLAIM IS SHE FAILED TO OBJECT TO CLASSIC HEARSAY, AND I DON'T SEE THAT AS HEARSAY. WHAT AM I MISSING.

>> I DON'T THINK YOU'RE MISSING ANYTHING, YOUR HONOR.

I BELIEVE THAT THE EVIDENCE OF THE FLIER HAD ALREADY COME IN THROUGH OTHER WITNESSES, THAT THEY TESTIFIED THAT BOTH THE DEFENDANT AND MS. BROWN WERE BOTH ON THAT MISSING PERSONS FLIER.

THIS WOULD BE MORE OF AN EFFECT ON THE LISTENER RATHER THAN A

TRUE HEARSAY, BECAUSE ONCE THEY HEARD ABOUT THE FLIER, THEY-- THAT CAUSED THEIR ACTIONS TO ASK HIM ABOUT IT, AND THEN THEY ULTIMATELY DROPPED HIM OFF ON THE ROAD ON THE WAY BACK TO FLORIDA AND HAD HIM LEAVE THE HOUSE.

IT'S MORE OF AN EFFECT ON THE LISTENER THAN IT IS TRUTH OF THE MATTER ASSERTED--

[INAUDIBLE]

>> AND THE LISTENER WOULD BE RELEVANT BECAUSE THAT EXPLAINS WHY SHE ASKED THE QUESTION OF THE DEFENDANT, AND WITHOUT THAT CONTEXT, IT WOULDN'T MAKE ANY SENSE.

>> CORRECT.

>> OKAY.

>> COUNSEL, DO YOU HAVE A POSITION ON THE WAIVER QUESTION THAT JUSTICE LAWSON ASKED OPPOSING COUNSEL AT THE BEGINNING OF HER ARGUMENT?

>> I WOULD ARGUE THAT IT WAS WAIVED ON APPEAL.

IT WAS RAISED IN THE INITIAL POST-CONVICTION MOTION, BUT IT WAS NOT RAISED AS A CLAIM IN THE INITIAL BRIEF.

AND IT, AS FAR AS CUMULATIVE ERROR, I DON'T BELIEVE-- THE COURT DID SPECIFICALLY ALSO FIND THAT BECAUSE THERE WAS NO ERRORS IN THE INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS, THERE WAS NO CUMULATIVE ERROR.

SO THAT CLAIM EVEN ON APPEAL WOULD BE MERITLESS.

SO IF THERE ARE NO FURTHER QUESTIONS, I'M-- THE STATE IS ASKING THAT YOU AFFIRM THE POST-CONVICTION COURT'S ORDER AND ALSO DENY THE PETITION FOR HABEAS.

THANK YOU.

>> THE FIRST THING THAT I'D LIKE TO ADDRESS, VERY QUICKLY, IN REBUTTAL IS COUNSEL DISCUSSED THE CREDIBILITY OF DOUG MIXON

FINDING WHAT THE JUDGE FOUND.
SO THE CREDIBILITY OF DOUG MIXON
AT THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS
ALSO, ANOTHER PARAGRAPH IS ON
THE LAST PAGE OF THE ORDER
THAT'S CUT AND PASTED FROM THE
STATE'S ORDER.

AND THE ONLY PERSON, THE ONLY
THING THAT REALLY ANYONE AGREES
IN THIS CASE-- DEFENSE
ATTORNEYS, STATE ATTORNEYS, LAY
WITNESSES, PEOPLE INVOLVED IN
THIS CASE-- IS THAT DOUG MIXON
IS A LIAR, A PATHOLOGICAL LIAR.
IT'S WOVEN THROUGHOUT ALL THE
TESTIMONY AT THE EVIDENTIARY
HEARING.

YET THE ONE PERSON THAT EVERYONE
CAN COME TO THE CIRCUIT COURT
AND TELL YOU IS A LIAR IS
ANOTHER PERSON THAT HE FINDS
CREDIBLE.

AND THAT, AGAIN, IS A
CREDIBILITY FINDING THAT'S TAKEN
STRAIGHT, LIKE, VERBATIM FROM
THE STATE'S CLOSING ARGUMENT.

>> WASN'T THAT, TOO, SUPPORTED
BY COMPETENT, SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE?

>> THAT DOUG MIXON WAS TELLING
THE TRUTH?

>> YES.

>> I DON'T UNDERSTAND, SIR.

>> DOUG MIXON TESTIFIED.

>> HE DID TESTIFY.

>> THE TRIAL COURT SAW HIM
TESTIFY.

>> HE DID.

>> AND DOUG MIXON TESTIFIED I
WAS NOT INVOLVED IN AND DID NOT
MURDER THE VICTIM IN THIS CASE,
CORRECT?

>> THAT IS CORRECT.

>> ISN'T THAT A BASIS OF
COMPETENT, SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
FOR A CREDIBILITY FINDING IN
FAVOR OF DOUG MIXON?

>> THAT CAN BE A BASIS, BUT ALSO
ALL THE OTHER PEOPLE THAT
TESTIFIED THAT HE'S A LIAR,

INCLUDING PEOPLE THAT THE JUDGE FOUND CREDIBLE AS WELL, HE'S A LIAR.

>> WE DON'T HAVE LAW THAT SAYS BECAUSE SOMEBODY'S A LIAR AND THEY'RE KNOWN TO BE A LIAR, THAT WITH RESPECT TO SPECIFIC TESTIMONY THAT A JUDGE CANNOT CREDIT THAT TESTIMONY AS TRUTHFUL, DO WE?

DO YOU KNOW OF CASES WHERE WE'VE SAID, OH, WELL, WE THINK-- THE JUDGE CREDITED THAT TESTIMONY, HEARD HIM TESTIFY, BUT BECAUSE WE KNOW THAT PERSON'S A LIAR FROM OTHER THINGS, WE'RE NOT GOING TO UPHOLD THAT DETERMINATION OF THE TRIAL COURT ON THE CREDIBILITY OF THE WITNESS?

>> NO, SIR, I DON'T KNOW--

>> SO YOU WANT US TO, YOU WANT US TO CHART A NEW PATH ON THIS.

>> NO, SIR.

I WANT YOU TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT THE ORDER AND THE FINDINGS THAT THE COURT MADE BECAUSE THEY DON'T NECESSARILY SHOW THAT HE DID ANY INDEPENDENT CONSIDERATION.

THAT'S WHAT I WOULD LIKE FOR YOU TO DO.

BECAUSE I DO THINK WHEN HE MISSTATES FACTS, AND I DO THINK WHENEVER HE MISSTATES LAW, THAT IS CONCERNING.

BECAUSE THAT, TO ME, SHOWS THAT HE HAS NOT SERIOUSLY GIVEN CONSIDERATION TO WHAT HE IS PUTTING IN HIS ORDER.

AND I THINK THAT'S CONCERNING.

AND I THINK THAT'S CONCERNING THROUGHOUT ALL OF HIS FINDINGS IN THIS CASE.

ALSO I DON'T AGREE THAT TRIAL COUNSEL SAID THAT SHE WANTED, THAT MS. BROOKS SAID-- AND THIS IS DEALING WITH THE DEFENSE CASE IN CHIEF ISSUE WITH MS. BROOKS. I DON'T AGREE THAT BECAUSE OF

THE FLIER, SHE JUST DIDN'T WANT ANYBODY IN HER HOUSE.

THAT'S NOT THE CASE.

WHAT SHE WAS ASKED, WHEN YOU LEARNED ABOUT THE FLIER, WERE YOU UNCOMFORTABLE WITH HAVING MR. CALHOUN IN YOUR HOUSE?

THE ANSWER WAS, YES.

IT WASN'T I WAS KICKING EVERYBODY OUT, IT WAS I WANT THIS ONE PERSON OUT.

>> BUT TRIAL COUNSEL TESTIFIED THAT WAS THE BASIS FOR WHY SHE RECALLED MS. BROOKS, RIGHT?

>> IF THAT WAS THE, IF THAT IS THE BASIS FOR WHY SHE DID IT, THEN SHE HAD A STRATEGY THAT SHE DID NOT EXECUTE.

AND SO, YOU KNOW, YOU CANNOT HAVE-- REASONABLE STRATEGY IS BASED ON REASONABLE INVESTIGATION AND REASONABLE CHOICE.

SO SHE MAY HAVE HAD A STATED STRATEGY, BUT SHE DIDN'T FOLLOW HER STRATEGY, WHICH IS AS GOOD AS NOT HAVING A STRATEGY AT ALL.

>> BUT SHE ASKED ABOUT THE FLIER AND ABOUT THE GRANDDAUGHTER BEING HOME, RIGHT?

>> RIGHT.

SO THAT MAKES IT SOUND LIKE I HAVE A GRANDDAUGHTER IN MY HOUSE, THIS PERSON'S ON A MISSING PERSONS FLIER, I WANT HIM OUT.

>> OR THAT SHE DIDN'T WANT ANYBODY ELSE IN HER HOUSE, RIGHT?

>> I DON'T THINK THAT'S A REASONABLE INTERPRETATION OF THE EVIDENCE, AND I DON'T THINK THE JURY TOOK IT THAT WAY.

AND SHE CERTAINLY DIDN'T ARGUE IT THAT WAY IN HER CLOSING ARGUMENT.

SHE DIDN'T ADDRESS IT.

SO I THINK THAT THERE'S A SPIN YOU CAN PUT ON THAT, BUT I DON'T THINK-- BUT WHAT SHE ASKED, I

MEAN, THE RECORD IS CLEAR.
WERE YOU UNCOMFORTABLE WITH
HAVING HIM THERE, YES.
DID YOU ASK HIM TO LEAVE, YES.
DO YOU HAVE A GRANDDAUGHTER IN
YOUR HOUSE?

YES.

SO THE REASONABLE INFERENCE OF
THAT LINE OF QUESTIONING IS THIS
PERSON'S ON A MISSING PERSONS
FLIER, YOU'RE NOT COMFORTABLE
WITH HAVING THIS PERSON IN YOUR
HOME, YOU HAVE A GRANDDAUGHTER
IN YOUR HOME, THEREFORE, YOU
WANT HIM TO LEAVE.

THAT'S THE REASONABLE INFERENCE
FROM THE JURY.

THAT IS WHY THAT IS HARMFUL
EVIDENCE ELICITED IN HER CASE.
SO SHE MAY HAVE HAD A STRATEGY,
BUT IT WASN'T A WELL THOUGHT
OUT, WELL INVESTIGATED STRATEGY,
AND IT CERTAINLY WASN'T A WELL
EXECUTED STRATEGY, AND I AM OUT
OF TIME.

PLEASE, REVERSE THE CIRCUIT
COURT'S ORDER AND GRANT
MR. CALHOUN A NEW GUILT PHASE IN
HIS TRIAL.

THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

>> ALL RIGHT.

WELL, WE THANK YOU BOTH FOR YOUR
ARGUMENTS, AND COURT WILL NOW BE
ADJOURNED.

THANK YOU.